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Abstract 
 
Between 1674 and 1681, John Finch (1626-1682) and Thomas Baines (1622-1681) 
produced a substantial body of writing on statecraft, religion, and the Ottoman Empire, 
while Finch was serving as the English ambassador to the Ottomans. This thesis, which 
represents the first substantial scholarly engagement with Finch’s political thought, 
reconstructs both his understanding of the Ottoman Empire, and his theory of 
sovereignty. By synthesizing a skeptical epistemology, a robust defense of the royal 
supremacy over the Church of England, and his understanding of Ottoman history and 
politics, Finch developed a theory of sovereignty in which liberty and coercion were 
equally useful and legitimate tools of governance. By placing his manuscripts in relation 
to current historiography on early modern Orientalism and the emergence of imperial 
ideology, this thesis offers a new interpretation of the relationship between scholarship 
and empire in early modern England.  
Keywords: Thomas Baines, ecclesiology, England, John Finch, Ottoman-Anglo 
relations, Ottoman Empire, political philosophy, sovereignty, toleration. 
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Abbreviations and Conventions 
 
Abbreviations  
BL  British Library  
HMC Finch Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on the Manuscripts of the 
Late Allen George Finch (5 vols., 1913-2004)  
EEBO Early English Books Online  
LRO  Record Office for Leicestershire, Leicester and Rutland  
ODNB  Oxford Dictionary of National Biography  
SP  State Papers 
TNA  The National Archives of the UK  
 
Conventions  
Orthography. For the sake of clarity and accuracy, I have expanded most ligatures, 
diagraphs, contractions, and abbreviations, while noting all such expansions. Thus, e.g.: 
ye [th]e 
yt [tha]t 
wch w[hi]ch 
governmt govern[en]t 
Lodps: Lo[r]d[shi]ps 
 
I have retained some original forms, including the contracted ‘ed’ (as in “declard’”) and 
the ampersand (‘&’). The original interchangeable i/j, u/v, ww/vv, and long s/s have been 
regularized per current usage. In all other instances, I have retained the original grammar, 
orthography, and capitalization.  
Citations. The majority of the manuscript sources consulted are foliated; some, however, 
were written as reports, or intended for publication, and therefore paginated by their 
authors. Foliated manuscripts are cited as recto and verso (e.g., ‘76r-82v’), while 
paginated manuscripts are cited by shelfmark, document number (where appropriate), and 
page number. For uncalendared manuscripts, I have either cited the box number and the 
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manuscript date, if available; or in some cases, the manuscript date and its citation in the 
HMC Finch.   
Dates.1 English ambassadors to the Ottoman empire typically used both the Julian and 
Gregorian calendars until September 1752, when the Gregorian calendar was universally 
adopted. According to the Julian calendar, the new year began on March 25. Thus, the 
manuscripts cited regularly give the date in both styles during the period between January 
1st and March 24th, when the two calendars differed: e.g. February 4/14, 1674/5, 
indicating February 4, 1674 in the Julian year, and February 14, 1675 according to the 
Gregorian calendar. I have retained the original dates for all manuscript sources.  
Although documents prepared by English embassies occasionally listed the date 
according to both the Islamic hijrī calendar (hicrī in Ottoman Turkish) and the CE 
calendar, that does not appear to have been the convention during Finch’s tenure. 
Because this research does not encompass Ottoman archival documents, my practice has 
been to cite manuscript sources using only the CE calendar. However, when referring to 
events from Islamic history, or to individual Ottoman subjects, I have given the dates as 
CE/ hijrī (e.g., Mustafa II, r.1693-1703/981-1004). This has also been my practice when 
referring to events between 1672-1681, when Finch lived in the Ottoman empire.  
As a rough guide, the following table gives equivalences between the CE and hijrī 
calendars, based on January 1 in the Gregorian calendar: 2 
1660 CE 1070 AH 
1670 1080 
1680 1090 
1690 1101 
 
                                                          
1 Conventions for dates and place names have been adapted from Michael Talbot’s British Ottoman 
Relations, 1660-1807 (Boydell, 2017), xi-xii. 
2 I have converted between CE and AH dates using the calculator provided by Islamic Philosophy Online, 
using exact dates when possible, and otherwise based on January 1 in the Gregorian calendar (“Conversion 
of Hijri A.H. (Islamic) and A.D. Christian (Gregorian) dates”, 
http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ip/hijri.htm).  
 
vi 
 
Terminology. Seventeenth-century European texts typically refer to locations in the 
Ottoman empire using older Roman or Byzantine names. Ottoman place names are given 
according to modern usage; hence, Istanbul instead of Constantinople, İzmir instead of 
Smyrna, Edirne instead of Adrianople, etc. Except for Istanbul, I have also included the 
archaic form, to reflect both modern usage and the archival sources; e.g., ‘Edirne 
(Adrianople).’  
When quoting directly from European manuscript sources, I have retained archaic or 
polemic names for places and individuals. Where possible, I have attempted to identify 
the place or individual in question, and have supplied the modern usage either in square 
brackets, or in a footnote.3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 The modern usage for Arabic and Turkish terms has been given per the IJMES Transliteration System for 
Arabic, Persian, and Turkish (https://ijmes.chass.ncsu.edu/docs/TransChart.pdf).  
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Introduction  
 
I began to reflect Particularly upon the Greeke & Latin Historians; and I observd’ 
that under both those Empires The Generalls & Emperours carryd’ along with 
them in their Warrs also Pens, (for few Emperours like Caesar were fitted to 
write their own Commentary’s) that might deliver their Gesta and 
achievem[en]ts with an advantageous varnish.4      
                        John Finch, 1675-81 
Napoleon considered Egypt a likely project precisely because he knew it 
tactically, strategically, historically […] His plans for Egypt therefore became 
the first in a long series of European encounters with the Orient in which the 
Orientalist’s special expertise was put directly to functional colonial use […].5 
                 Edward Said, Orientalism, 1979 
John Finch (1626-1682) enjoyed a career that combined high-powered patronage with the 
consistent disappointment of those patrons. Over the course of thirty-five years, he 
corresponded fitfully with a number of notable philosophers, especially the Cambridge 
Platonists Henry More and Anne Conway (who was, in fact, his half-sister); frustrated the 
Royal Society’s ambitions for collaboration with their Italian counterpart; likely spied in 
Italy for English foreign intelligence; briefly acted as a representative on the Council for 
Plantations; wrote a philosophical treatise that was misattributed to his nephew until 
1968; and served without great distinction as England’s ambassador to the Ottoman 
empire between 1672-1681/1082-1091, until his recall under embarrassing 
circumstances. It is little wonder that he has been almost entirely overlooked by 
historians of philosophy, scholarship, and politics.  
Nevertheless, Finch’s unpublished manuscripts offer an unexplored source of 
evidence regarding the relationship between Orientalism, comparative religious thought, 
and the nascence of English imperial ideology during the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries. During the seventeenth century, the English reading public had 
access to a rapidly growing corpus of literature about Muslim religious and political life; 
as Noel Malcolm has noted, “any literate person” during the late sixteenth or the 
seventeenth century “could gain access to a substantial body of information about the 
                                                          
4 LRO Finch MS, DG7 lit. 9, 391.  
5 Edward W Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 80. 
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conditions of life and government in the Ottoman world.”6 Anders Ingram’s recent 
exploitation of digital research methods helpfully confirms this insight: from a 
statistically representative sample of 12,284 printed texts digitized through Early English 
Books Online, over one quarter referenced the ‘Turks’, with immense spikes in the 
normalized frequency of those references during the 1600s and the 1680s.7  To date, 
however, historians have yet to place early modern Orientalists texts and authors in the 
context of “the history of England’s fledgling empire.”8 Through a close reading and 
analysis of John Finch’s unpublished manuscripts, I argue that he offers concrete 
evidence that at least some early modern Orientalists sought to understand and to 
replicate the success of the Ottoman empire: and that at least some early modern theorists 
of European imperialism looked to Istanbul as a model.  
In many ways, Finch’s methods and scholarly preoccupations were quintessentially 
orientalist – he engaged in comparative scholarship, focused on a Muslim polity, in 
relation to European imperialism. In this introduction, I begin by asking whether Finch’s 
political philosophy can be understood as ‘orientalist,’ in the sense described by Edward 
Said. While Said’s articulation of orientalism has become a familiar framework for 
conceptualizing Anglo-Ottoman relations, I will ultimately argue that his thesis is 
inadequate for understanding the nature of Finch’s orientation to empire. I then outline 
the structure, argument, and methods employed by this thesis, before situating my 
research with respect to the current literature on comparative religious scholarship, 
Orientalism, and empire. By carefully reconstructing the current scholarly discourse, I 
illustrate a significant gap – to date, scholars have not appreciated the relationship 
between early modern Orientalism and the emergence of European imperialism. Finch’s 
political philosophy, I argue, synthesizes epistemic skepticism and Orientalism with an 
                                                          
6 Noel Malcolm, “Positive Views of Islam and of Ottoman Rule in the Sixteenth Century: The Case of Jean 
Bodin,” in The Renaissance and the Ottoman World, ed. Anna Contadini and Claire Norton (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2013), 197. 
7 Anders Ingram, Writing the Ottomans: Turkish History in Early Modern England (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015), 7–9. 
8 William J Bulman, Anglican Enlightenment: Orientalism, Religion and Politics in England and Its 
Empire, 1648-1715 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 9. 
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orientation to empire; as a result, his thought is a first step in addressing this scholarly 
oversight.  
1.1 John Finch: An early modern orientalist?   
Writing between 1675 and 1681, John Finch observed that in antiquity, both Greek and 
Roman “Generalls & Emperours carryd’ along with them in their Warrs also Pens,” in 
order to produce accurate and politically useful accounts of their conquests.9 For Finch, 
the genre of historical writing was both epistemologically slippery, and uniquely suited to 
the needs of ambitious politicians. In his view, history was written by the victor: unless 
divinely inspired, a historian was liable to “commit to Paper Notorious Untruths. For in 
all Matter of Controversy whether of [th]e Sword or the Pen the Prevayling Party 
decipher the vanquishd’ under all the disadvantagious misreppresentations, that may give 
credit to the Armes or Opinions of those who have depressd’ the adverse Party.”10 
Elsewhere, he asserts that the early Christian Church and the Roman Empire were co-
dependent upon one another, and assisted one another by upholding temporal and 
spiritual control of conquered populations. “For as under the Temporall Empire of Rome, 
everything was counted and call’d Barbarous that was not Subject to its Rule […] So 
under the Spirituall Empire nothing was allow’d to be Christian, but what follow’d the 
Practise of Rome.”11 According to Finch, the Roman Empire’s ability to define conquered 
peoples justified those very conquests. Defining non-Romans as simultaneously 
‘Barbarous’ in their civil manners and customs, and “Schismaticks or Hereticks” with 
respect to the Roman Church, was a key component of the empire’s justification and 
legitimation of conquest.  
The interdependence that Finch posited between ecclesiastical history, scholarship, 
and imperial self-interest is strikingly familiar to contemporary readers. Indeed, his 
description of the relationship between ‘Warrs’ and ‘Pens’ instantly recalls Edward 
Said’s argument that modern European scholars were deeply implicated in projects of 
colonial expansion. For Said, Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt with parallel armies of 
scholars and soldiers was archetypical of an orientalist colonial dynamic, wherein the 
                                                          
9 LRO Finch MS, DG7 lit. 9, 391.  
10 Ibid, 387-8.  
11 Ibid, 77.  
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expertise of European scholars was leveraged for the purposes of imperial conquest and 
colonial government. In Napoleon’s case, historical, political, and anthropological 
scholars were “enlist[ed]” to ensure the success of his military invasion, by creating a 
paper Egypt which could be known “tactically, strategically, historically and – not to be 
under-estimated – textually”.12  
It might be tempting, therefore, to interpret John Finch’s writing about Islam as a 
seventeenth-century prototype of the form of orientalism that Said described. If we were 
to advance such an interpretation, we might suggest that Finch wrote at a historical 
moment when English state actors were looking ahead to the formation of an English 
empire. We might further suggest that he wrote about Islam and the Ottoman empire as a 
contribution to a broader contemporary project of knowledge-production about Muslims; 
and more specifically, that his scholarship should be understood as orientalist, in that it 
sought to make the Ottoman polity both knowable and other, in order to facilitate and 
justify English imperial goals.  
Ultimately, I will make almost exactly the opposite argument.13 In my view, while 
Finch’s Orientalism was clearly oriented towards imperialism, he sought to learn from the 
Ottomans – not in order to dominate, subvert, or denigrate Muslims, but in order to 
understand and adapt the Ottoman imperial model for an English context.  
1.2 ‘Orientalism’ and contemporary Ottoman historiography  
Throughout this thesis, I use the term ‘orientalism’ to signify two related but distinct 
concepts. Edward Said’s critique of orientalism in Western scholarship remains a 
touchstone for any research in Anglo-Ottoman relations. When gesturing towards to his 
thesis, or more generally, to the matrix of imperiousness and fascination with the 
exoticised ‘other’ that characterized (and characterizes) so much of the cultural, political 
and scholarly contact between Muslims and European Christians during the eighteenth 
century onwards, I have referred to ‘orientalism’ or ‘orientalists.’  
                                                          
12 Said, Orientalism, 80–81. 
13 Nabil Matar and Gerald MacLean have also argued that Said’s critique of modern European empires does 
not adequately describe the relationship between early modern European writers and the Muslim polities; 
see my discussion below, in sections 2.2 and 4.2.  
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I also use the term in a second, less ideologically-freighted sense. The capitalized 
term ‘Orientalism’ is used to refer to Europeans who used ethnographic, historical, or 
philological methods to produce scholarship about the religions and cultures of North 
Africa, East Asia, and the Indian subcontinent.14 While these concepts and usages 
inevitably overlap, distinguishing between the two allows for a more precise discussion 
of the multivalent relationships between scholarship and politics, in the context of the 
history of empires and imperial ideology.  
It is also important to clarify my relationship to the historiography of the Ottoman 
empire, and of the early modern Islamic kingdoms more generally. The relationship 
between contemporary Europeanists and Ottomanists can be fraught: as Kaya Şahin has 
noted, while Ottomanists have made serious attempts at outreach, the reciprocation on the 
part of Europeanists has been disappointing.15 Furthermore, when written by 
Europeanists, studies of early modern British-Ottoman (and more broadly, Christian-
Islamic) relations run a serious risk of what Suraiya Faroqhi has described as “the 
Orientalist trap.”16 At best, they risk offering studies which are psychologically nuanced 
in their portrayal of European Christians, but which portray Muslims as a monolith; at 
worst, they can inadvertently re-iterate the binaries which Said critiqued as endemic to 
French and Anglophone scholarship.  
Early modernists have adopted several strategies to address or to mitigate this 
conceptual pitfall. The contemporary scholarship on early modern British-Ottoman 
relations dates to Nabil Matar’s ground-breaking Islam in Britain, 1558-1685 
(Cambridge, 1998). Matar’s archival work was innovative and well-executed; however, 
the field in general has tended to be strongly tilted towards literary and discourse studies. 
                                                          
14 Gerald MacLean has recently critiqued the impact of Said’s scholarship on later scholars’ ability to 
critically distinguish between these two sense of ‘orientalism’ “Perhaps the most regrettable effect of Said’s 
important study has been that many scholars coming of age in the long shadow of Orientalism have felt free 
to dismiss the important historical studies produced by skilled and knowledgeable Orientalists, many of 
whom do not reproduce the imperializing gestures discerned and described by Said, while even those who 
can be so accused often have a great deal to teach us today” (Gerald MacLean, Looking East: English 
Writing and the Ottoman Empire before 1800 [Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007], 10). 
15 Kaya Şahİn, “The Ottoman Empire in the Long Sixteenth Century,” Renaissance Quarterly 70, no. 1 
(2017): 230. 
16 Suraiya Faroqhi, Approaching Ottoman History: An Introduction to the Sources (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 15–16. 
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Much of the subsequent scholarship has sidestepped the ‘orientalist trap’ by focusing on 
questions of dramatic representation, particularly the depictions of ‘the Turk’ and of 
Muhammad in early modern theatre.17 Another strategy has been to put European and 
Ottoman sources in relation to one another, as in Molly Greene’s excellent scholarship on 
the “shared world” of the early modern Mediterranean.18 Finally, an increasingly common 
strategy has been to focus on individuals, families, or groups who inhabited a trans-
imperial or trans-cultural subjectivity.19 
This thesis adopts a slightly different approach to the ‘orientalist trap.’ In my 
analysis of Finch’s thought, I do not seek to understand how he represented Muslims, but 
rather to reconstruct what he ‘thought he knew’ about Islam, Islamic history, and the 
Ottoman Empire. This, I contend, is a minor but important adjustment, which allows us to 
apply the tools of intellectual historians, rather than relying solely upon the methods of 
discourse analysis. Finch, I argue, analyzed the Ottoman model for empire in relation to a 
set of ecclesiological questions, which in turn translated his analysis into a language 
which was comprehensible in the context of contemporary English politics. It exceeds my 
scholarly competencies to analyze Ottoman sources as well, or to evaluate whether 
Finch’s understanding of Ottoman history and politics was accurate. However, by 
analyzing the ecclesiological framework for that understanding, we can illuminate how 
his writing functioned in its own context.  
1.3 Argument and structure  
As I discuss in the literature review below, Said’s ground-breaking work on modern 
orientalism and imperialism remains a dominant paradigm for understanding the 
relationship between comparative religion, Islamic scholarship, and empire during the 
                                                          
17 Ingram, Writing the Ottomans, 9; and see e.g., Gerald MacLean and Nabil Matar, Britain and the Islamic 
World, 1558-1713 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Jonathan Burton, Traffic and Turning: Islam 
and English Drama, 1579-1624 (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2005); MacLean, Looking East; 
Matthew Dimmock, Mythologies of the Prophet Muhammad in Early Modern English Culture, 2013; 
Matthew Dimmock, New Turkes: Dramatizing Islam and the Ottomans in Early Modern England, 2016. 
18 Molly Greene, A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); Molly Greene, Minorities in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton, NJ: 
Markus Wiener Publishers, 2005). 
19 See e.g., E. Natalie Rothman, Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012); John-Paul A Ghobrial, The Whispers of Cities: Information Flows 
in Istanbul, London, and Paris in the Age of William Trumbull, 2014; Noel Malcolm, Agents of Empire: 
Knights, Corsairs, Jesuits and Spies in the Sixteenth-Century Mediterranean World, 2016. 
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nineteenth century. By contrast, early modernists have argued that his framework is 
inadequate for explaining the political significance of seventeenth-century scholarship. In 
the process, however, they have often simply denied the possibility of a connection 
between early modern Orientalism and European imperialism.  
As a result, the existing historiography has foreclosed a third possibility: that early 
modern writers thought they might have something to learn from Muslims.  Closing off 
this possibility reflects the extent to which the presumed domination of Muslims by 
Christian Europeans continues to structure contemporary thought: it is, in a sense, 
unthinkable that early moderns might have, however grudgingly, sought political insight 
through the study of the more powerful and vibrant Muslim kingdoms.  
Our stubborn reluctance to identify links between early modern European 
Orientalism and imperialism is compounded by a conceptual inability to understand how 
these texts functioned in context. In the wake of J.G.A. Pocock’s seminal work, and the 
broader impact of the Cambridge school of intellectual history, scholars have become 
increasingly sensitive to the diversity of languages and discourses through which early 
modern thinkers expressed political ideas. As Justin Champion notes, “we now have 
accounts of the plural languages of political thinking in the period – jurisprudential, 
common law, historical – but despite this pluralism of discourse the historiography had 
almost entirely ignored the religious context.”20  
In my view, the relationship between Orientalism and empire in Finch’s writing can 
be excavated by understanding the theological framework in which he worked. Finch’s 
political philosophy responds to a set of legal and political questions in Christian 
ecclesiology: what is the correct legal status of Jews, Muslims, and Christian dissenters 
within England? And, what is the correct relationship between the English crown and the 
established Church? Both of these questions are ecclesiological in nature: they pertain to 
                                                          
20 Justin Champion, “Some Forms of Religious Liberty: Political Thinking, Ecclesiology and Religious 
Freedom in Early Modern England,” in Religious Tolerance in the Atlantic World: Early Modern and 
Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Elaine Glaser, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 50. 
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the theology of the structure and governance of the church, and its relationship to the 
state, and more broadly, to what we might call questions of ‘church and state.’21 
Without arguing that ecclesiological writing itself should be considered a unique 
‘language of political thought,’ Finch’s use of an ecclesiological lens frames his 
understanding of the Ottoman Empire in a way that was politically meaningful in the 
context of contemporary English politics. As I ultimately argue, Finch synthesizes 
Ottoman history and politics, a skeptical epistemology, and a staunchly royalist 
ecclesiology into a coherent ‘blueprint’ for empire. The first chapter offers an overview 
and analysis of Finch’s biography, focusing briefly on his personal life, before turning to 
an account of his embassy and his relationship with Thomas Baines. Unfortunately, little 
is known about Baines outside of his relationship with Finch; however, his surviving 
papers have been archived with Finch’s, and are extremely useful for clarifying Finch’s 
thought.  Throughout this chapter, I also critique the existing historiography on Finch, 
which is in many ways hopelessly outdated.  
In the second chapter, I reconstruct and analyze Finch’s political thought, with an 
emphasis on his articulation of religious toleration. Finch developed two parallel 
justifications for the liberty of individual conscience. Drawing from his understanding of 
the early history of Islam, and the history of the early Christian church, Finch argued that 
religious toleration was a normative principle of imperial statecraft. At the same time, as 
an extension of his skepticism regarding the possibility of absolute knowledge, he 
characterized the liberty of conscience as a ‘Humane Right.’ However, Finch 
simultaneously privileged the unified, and unitary, sovereignty of the monarch. By 
                                                          
21 In the post-Reformation Reformed traditions, ecclesiological controversies and scholarship focused on a 
broad range of theological questions:  defining the church, identifying the true visible church, the nature of 
church authority, the proper structure and authority of the ministry, and church government (see Ian 
Hazlett, “Church and Church/State Relations in the Post-Reformation Reformed Tradition,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Early Modern Theology, 1600-1800, ed. Ulrich Lehner, Richard Muller, and A.G. Roeber 
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016]). In this thesis, I use the term “ecclesiology” to refer to a 
particular subset of these questions, relating to specifically to church government. In the early modern 
English context, the sharpest cleavages over church government were between episcopal apologists, who 
prominently included John Jewel and Richard Hooker, and presbyterians such as Andrew Melville, who 
advocated for a non-hierarchical ministry and decentralized church government. My understanding of early 
modern ecclesiology has been deeply shaped by the scholarship of Jacqueline Rose, in particular, who has 
argued that ecclesiological debate in early modern England was inextricable from political factionalism, 
and that political debate was often framed and informed by ecclesiological discourse.  
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precisely defining both the ‘liberty of conscience’ and the church itself, Finch ultimately 
synthesized a theory of imperial sovereignty in which liberty and coercion – toleration 
and oppression – were equally legitimate tools of governance.  
Finally, the conclusion builds upon my analysis of Finch’s political thought, and 
places him in the context of imperial ideology. Finch’s manuscripts offer archival 
evidence that at least some early modern Orientalists were motivated by an orientation 
towards empire; concomitantly, at least some early modern theorists of empire looked to 
Muslim models at the nascence of English imperialism.   
1.4 Sources and Methodology  
In order to reconstruct Finch’s political philosophy, I have relied upon a number of 
manuscript sources written during his residence in Istanbul, between 1674 and 1681. 
Finch and Baines produced a substantial body of writing about statecraft and government; 
while it is impossible to know how much has been lost, the surviving materials include 
three important letters to Edward Conway, a companion letter to Anne Conway, and 
extensive sections from an unpublished philosophical treatise.22 The first manuscript is a 
report by Finch written to Edward Conway, dated February 4/14, 1674/5, and sent from 
‘Pera of Constantinople’ (see Appendix C for a complete transcription).23 In this 
substantial report, Finch offers an historical and sociological explanation for the 
tremendous success and stability of the Ottoman empire.24 The second manuscript is a 
letter written by Finch to Anne Conway, dated February 8/18, 1674/5, and is an 
abbreviated version of the earlier letter to her husband.   
Thomas Baines also corresponded with Edward Conway, and on two occasions, sent 
lengthy discourses on politics and statecraft. The first is roughly the same length as 
Finch’s 1674/5 report, and is dated June 20/30, 1676; the second is dated May 11/21, 
1681, and is likely Baines’ last correspondence before his death later that year. As I 
discuss below, in section 2.3, the two men saw themselves as intellectually inextricable, 
                                                          
22 BL Add. MS 23215, ff. 76r-82r, 84r-85v; LRO Finch MS, Baines to Conway, June 20/30, 1676, cal. HMC 
Finch vol. II, p. 29; LRO Finch MS, Baines to Conway, May 11/21, 1681, cal. HMC Finch vol. II, p. 111; 
LRO Finch MS, DG7 lit. 9.  
23 Pera, now Beyoğlu, is a neighborhood on the European side of Istanbul. During the early modern period, 
it was a centre of trade and diplomacy, which housed the embassies from Christian European kingdoms.  
24 The document itself fills 13 folio sheets, and is approximately 4600 words in length.  
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and both of these letters contribute substantially to my reading of Finch’s intellectual 
project.   
The last manuscript is an extraordinarily long philosophical treatise in Finch’s hand, 
including 544 quarto pages, and an additional 38-page précis (see Appendix B for a table 
of contents). The treatise appears to be the final draft of a work which Finch may have 
intended for publication, and which was drafted between 1675 and his return to England 
in 1681.25 I have also drawn upon Finch’s uncalendared notes for this manuscript.26  
1.5 Religious scholarship and empire: Reviewing the literature 
To date, modern and early modern historians have differed sharply in their approach to 
the relationship between comparative religion, Orientalism, and imperialism. Amongst 
modern historians who focus on the history of scholarship during the nineteenth century, 
it is almost axiomatic that Orientalists and comparative religious scholars were in 
lockstep with European empires and imperial ideology.  
By contrast, while early modern historians have produced detailed studies of both 
Orientalism and comparative religion during their era – the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, especially – they have either denied or simply avoided discussing a relationship 
to the history of European empires. Because this thesis posits exactly such a relationship, 
the following literature review illustrates the existence of this gap in some detail.  
1.5.1 Comparative religious scholarship and modern European empires 
Within the last decade, a wealth of historical literature has investigated the relationships 
between scholarship and European imperialism, colonialism, and intellectual 
universalism. Indeed, it has become almost a commonplace that empiricism and 
imperialism are closely related in European intellectual history. In many cases, scholars 
have argued, new scholarly disciplines like demography, anthropology, and comparative 
religious studies did not simply play a role in justifying and facilitating overseas empires; 
                                                          
25 Sarah Hutton, Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
101. 
26 LRO Finch MS, Box 4987, Packet of loose papers, uncalendared.  
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rather, their emergence in the mid- to late-nineteenth century was at least partially a 
consequence of the knowledge-gathering requirements of European empires.27  
Within this broad river of scholarship, the stream which is most relevant to this 
project evaluates the disciplinary history of comparative religious studies and Islamic 
studies in the nineteenth-century European academy. Tomoko Masuzawa and David 
Chidester have written two of the most important historical monographs about the 
disciplinary history of comparative religion. Their scholarship suggests that comparative 
religious thought, which emerged in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, is deeply 
embedded in European imperialism – both intellectual imperialism, as Masuzawa 
discusses, and the administration of overseas empires, as Chidester argues.   
The subtitle of Tomoko Masuzawa’s 2005 The Invention of World Religions – Or, 
How European Universalism was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism – gestures 
towards her broad historical argument. Until the early nineteenth-century (and as late as 
1860, in some isolated examples), European scholars worked within a conceptual 
paradigm that divided the “religions and nations” of the world into “four categories rather 
unequal in size, value, and stature. There were Christians, Jews, Mohammedans, and the 
rest.”28 The ‘rest,’ whether termed ‘heathens’ or ‘pagans,’ were those who were either 
                                                          
27 This literature is remarkably rich, and a full summary is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, for 
key examples, see Thomas Richards, The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire 
(London: Verso, 2011), originally published in 1993, for one of the earliest examples. More recent 
scholarship has focused on the relationships between the nineteenth-century academy and European 
imperial projects, and the emergence of those very disciplines as technologies of empire. See Karl Ittmann, 
Dennis Cordell, and Gregory Maddox, The Demographics of Empire: The Colonial Order and the Creation 
of Knowledge (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), and see Peter Gottschalk, Religion, Science, and 
Empire Classifying Hinduism and Islam in British India (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), esp. 
ch. 5, "Categories to Count On: Religion and Caste in the Census," which outlines the roles of British 
imperial census-taking in reifying Indian religious identities. For the role played by scientific knowledge 
networks in the maintenance of the British empire, see Brett Bennett and Joseph Hodge, Science and 
Empire: Knowledge and Networks of Science across the British Empire, 1800-1970 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011). See Alice Conklin, In the Museum of Man: Race, Anthropology, and Empire in France, 
1850-1950 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013) for the emergence of anthropology in relation in 
imperialism, and see Michelle Hamilton, Collections and Objections: Aboriginal Material Culture in 
Southern Ontario. (Montreal, Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014) for amateur anthropology 
and museology as an aspect of settler colonialism at the periphery of the British empire, in late-nineteenth 
century Canada. Finally, see James Louis Hevia, The Imperial Security State: British Colonial Knowledge 
and Empire-Building in Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) for the production of colonial 
archival knowledge by British military intelligence itself. 
28 Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism Was Preserved 
in the Language of Pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 47. 
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ignorant of or resistant to Christianity, “spiritual rustics, as yet untouched by the 
civilizing knowledge of Christianity.”29 Jews and Muslims (or ‘Mohammedans,’ as early 
moderns patronizingly phrased it) “did possess religion, but obviously they did not have 
it quite right” – either they rejected Christ as the Messiah, “or worse, they chose to follow 
a false prophet.”30  
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, this once-hegemonic taxonomy had 
been utterly replaced by the discourse of ‘world religions,’ a consistent list of ten or a 
dozen designated “major religions, that is, those conspicuous-enough religions distinctly 
and properly identified as now existing in the world.”31 Linguistically, the early modern 
quadripartite division between Christians, Jews, Muslims, and ‘other’ was rapid and 
complete.  In a chapter titled “The Birth Trauma of World Religions,” Masuzawa offers a 
masterful forensic reconstruction of the appearance of Wereldgodsdiensten and 
Weltreligionen in Dutch and German scholarly vocabulary in the 1870s; the translation of 
these new terms into the English ‘world religions,’ notably in Cornelius Tiele’s 1885 
“Religions” entry in the 9th edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica; and the remarkably 
swift naturalization of that translated term in Anglophone, especially American, 
scholarship.32  
Importantly, however, this rapid shift in academic vocabulary disguises and reiterates 
the ongoing subordination of non-Europeans and non-Christians to a Eurocentric 
worldview. During the late-nineteenth century, European Arabists like Abraham Keunen 
(1828-1891) and Otto Pfleiderer (1839-1908) helped to crystalize a “concept of Islam as 
the epitome of stifling rigidity, intolerance, and fanaticism.”33 In Masuzawa’s view, the 
remarkable durability of this flagrantly counter-factual discourse represents the 
nineteenth-century fulfillment of an early modern political necessity. As she observes – 
and as we will note many more times by the end of this thesis – early modern European 
Christians had few reasons to consider themselves superior to the Muslim worlds of the 
                                                          
29 Ibid., 48. 
30 Ibid., 49. 
31 Ibid., 10. 
32 Ibid., 109. 
33 Ibid., 197. 
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Mediterranean, and very good reasons to feel insecure in their engagements with Islam.34  
Masuzawa suggests that “the conquest of Islam in this complicated sense, then was the 
utmost exigency for European modernity at the moment of its inception.”35 In short, 
reifying ‘Islam’ within the discourse of ‘world religions’ both neutralizes early modern 
Christian Europe’s greatest threat, and replicates the prejudices of the early modern 
quadripartite paradigm within contemporary discourse.  
Masuzawa’s scholarship is a cornerstone contribution to the history of comparative 
religion, and its implication in the broader nineteenth-century project of European 
universalism. Our focus narrows with David Chidester’s more recent Empire of Religion: 
Imperialism and Comparative Religion (Chicago, 2014), which locates “the rise of an 
academic study of religion” in Great Britain “within the power relations of imperial 
ambitions, colonial situations, and indigenous innovations.”36  
Chidester’s study focuses on the complex matrix of “mediations – imperial, colonial, 
and indigenous” through which local scholars in South Africa, and scholars at the centre 
of the British empire, collaborated in the production of a corpus of knowledge about 
South African indigenous religions, particularly Zulu religion, between the 1870s and the 
1920s.37 His major contribution is to precisely describe the process of scholarly 
information flows between the imperial centre and the periphery. Chidester posits that the 
representation of South African religion was subject to a “triple mediation”: an 
indigenous mediation between missionary Christianity and ancestral traditions; a colonial 
mediation on the part of local experts between conditions in the South African colony and 
the demands of the imperial centre; and an imperial mediation which assimilated both the 
indigenous and colonial mediations to an imperial time frame, which encompassed both 
an imaginary “primitive” past and a “civilized” future.38 Religious categories emerged out 
of complex reciprocal intellectual encounters between local and outside intellectuals. 
                                                          
34 See Nabil Matar, Islam in Britain, 1558-1685 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1-20 and 
passim. 
35 Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions, 186. 
36 David Chidester, Empire of Religion: Imperialism and Comparative Religion (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 2014), xi. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 4, 5–11. 
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They “were not simply discovered by outside observers,” but “emerged through complex 
interrelations, negotiations, and mediations between alien and indigenous intellectuals.”39 
For Chidester, the emergence of comparative religious studies and the late British 
Empire are inextricable from one another. On the one hand, he characterizes imperialism 
as the midwife of the new scholarly discipline. British scholars were self-conscious of 
their role in a scholarly arms race with imperial competitors in the Netherlands and 
Germany. In 1902, the imperial theorist Edwin Hartland (1848-1927) warned that 
Britain’s “much-vaunted […] genius for government and colonization will not save us” if 
the empire did not more aggressively invest in religious and anthropological research.40 
Although the British government ultimately ignored calls to formally support a 
commission for the study of African religion, British scholarly networks picked up the 
slack; “by the beginning of the twentieth century, the British had assembled an extensive 
archive on savage beliefs, practices, and customs all over the world.”41 
The crown jewel of this ‘empire of religion’ was the fifty-volume The Sacred Books 
of the East, published between 1879-1910. This monumental archive was edited by the 
philologist Max Müller, regarded as the progenitor of modern comparative religious 
studies. During February and March 1870, Müller delivered a series of lectures to the 
Royal Institution of Great Britain, which both Chidester and Masuzawa consider the birth 
moment of comparative religion.42 Müller strongly foregrounded the interests of the 
British empire at this formative moment, famously saying “let us take the old saying, 
Divide et impera, and translate it somewhat freely by ‘Classify and conquer.’”43 
In short, according to Chidester, imperial interests were inextricable from 
comparative religion, at its earliest moments. On the other hand, he views comparative 
religion as equally inextricable from the British Empire itself. Religious studies, he 
claims, was the quintessential imperial discipline. “More than any other imperial science, 
                                                          
39 Ibid., 18. 
40 Ibid., 46. 
41 Ibid., 47. 
42 Ibid., 61–69; Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions, 209–56. 
43 Chidester, Empire of Religion, 62. 
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comparative religion dealt with the essential identities and differences entailed in the 
imperial encounter with the exotic East and savage Africa.”44 
While clearly indebted to Masuzawa’s earlier analysis, Chidester’s argument differs 
in two important ways. Whereas Masuzawa focuses on the irruption of comparative 
religion in the European and American centres of empire, Chidester examines the 
discipline’s relationship to empire as a reciprocal enterprise between the metropolitan 
centre and the colonial periphery. More importantly, their projects characterize the 
precise relationship between comparative religion and modern European imperialism 
quite differently. For Chidester, the nexus is the scholarly production of an archive of 
knowledge that closely served the interests of empire. Although much more historically 
nuanced than Said, the broad strokes of this argument are profoundly similar to the 
orientalism thesis. Masuzawa, by contrast, foregrounds nineteenth-century Islamic 
scholarship as the connective tissue between comparative religion and empire. As we 
have discussed, she views the congealing of an ossified, ahistorical, and intolerant 
representation of Islam as European scholars’ key contribution to modern empire. The 
Islamic polities in North African and the Ottoman empire, she argues, were the 
ideological and military threat to early modern Christian Europe. ‘Defanging’ and 
delegitimizing Islam was “the utmost exigency for European modernity at the moment of 
its inception,” an act of nineteenth-century intellectual violence that fulfilled a centuries-
old imperial need and enabled subsequent European domination of the Muslim world.45   
1.5.2 Nineteenth-century Orientalism and European imperialism  
Masuzawa and Chidester are key scholars for broadly understanding the relationships 
between nineteenth-century religious scholarship and European universalism and 
imperialism. Taken together, they suggest that comparative religion emerged in the mid- 
to late-nineteenth century academy, and that this new discipline played a key role in the 
intellectual underpinnings of modern European imperialism, through the creation of 
imperial archives, and the intellectual delegitimization of Islam.  Within this framework, 
scholars have also written more narrowly about nineteenth-century Orientalist 
                                                          
44 Ibid., 4. 
45 Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions, 186; see also 199-201, 204-6. 
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scholarship, and its relationship to European imperialism. This literature is a vital 
contribution to the broader study of comparative religion and empire, especially 
considering that, by the 1920s, over half of the world’s Muslim population lived within 
the jurisdiction of the British empire alone.46 Unsurprisingly, then, scholars have 
investigated the role played by Islamic scholarship in not only the British, but also the 
German and French imperial contexts.   
In German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion, Race, and Scholarship 
(Cambridge, 2009), Suzanne Marchand investigates the often-vexed relationships 
between practitioners of Orientalistik – philologists, scholars of modern languages, and 
comparative religious scholars – and German political actors between the 1820s and 
1918. Chapter 8 is especially relevant to this project: titled “Orientalism in the Age of 
Imperialism,” it focuses on the period between 1884 and 1914, when modern Germany 
possessed an overseas empire in Africa, with some smaller possessions in southeast 
Asia.47  
During the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries, German Orientalists were 
substantially more interested in the “ancient pagan cultures of India, China, Egypt, and 
Persia” than in their contemporary descendants.48 The contemporary Islamic world, in 
particular, was largely ignored, being too ‘new’ for an academic culture oriented towards 
ancient philology and critical Biblical scholarship. Furthermore, German academics 
strongly disapproved of the missionaries and diplomats who attempted to contribute to 
Orientalist scholarship during the early nineteenth century, considering them 
insufficiently competent to do serious research.49 Although these attitudes did begin to 
change as Bismarck’s unified Germany “joined the colonizing powers,” German 
academics remained consistently more interested in  "antiquity and 'pure' languages," to 
                                                          
46 Francis Robinson, “The British Empire and the Muslim World,” in The Oxford History of the British 
Empire, ed. Judith Brown and William Louis, vol. 4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 399. See p. 
400 for a very useful map juxtaposing the late British empire with the Muslim world. The list of Muslim-
majority regions and present day countries encompassed by the British empire by the 1920s is frankly 
staggering; a partial list includes Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Egypt, most of the Arabian 
peninsula and West Asia, present-day India and Pakistan, and large portions of present-day Malaysia. 
47 Suzanne L Marchand, German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion, Race, and Scholarship 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 333–86. 
48 Ibid., 26. 
49 Ibid., 224. 
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the detriment of modern Arabic or Islamic study. The most important modern Arabist, 
Martin Hartmann, "raged" that "even when modern authors did touch on the modern 
history of the Islamic states, […] they did not take the subject very seriously."50  
One of Marchand’s central arguments is that, while German academics were at the 
cutting-edge of Orientalist scholarship between the 1870s and 1914, their research was an 
awkward fit with the demands of imperialism. At an institutional level, both the German 
state and academy were slow to invest in contemporary, politically ‘relevant’ Orientalist 
scholarship, to their mutual frustration. It was not until 1885 that the University of Berlin 
founded the Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen, which existed primarily to train young 
officials in the modern languages needed for trade, diplomacy, and colonial 
administration in Africa and southeast Asia.51 And although nineteenth-century German 
Orientalists were often very interested in, and sympathetic to colonialism – younger 
scholars, in particular, were “tempted by the siren song of ‘relevance’” – their discipline 
was rarely very useful to German colonialists.52 German Orientalistik was rooted in 
biblical exegesis, the study of ancient civilizations, and ancient philology: “even if 
everyone had been on the same political page […] it was hard to turn this ship around 
quickly and to root out older values and traditional scholarly pursuits for the sake of 
being ‘useful.’”53 
Historiographically, this line of argument places Marchand in a productive tension 
with Said’s critique of orientalism. Although German orientalists were not, in her view, 
central to an imperial project, they were undoubtedly politically aligned with colonial 
policy. Ultimately, they “were most useful in the implementation of ‘indirect’ 
colonialism, the practice of working with and through local customs, institutions, and 
officials rather than seeking wholesale and immediate Europeanization.”54 However, she 
                                                          
50 Ibid., 344. 
51 Ibid., 350. 
52 Ibid., 344. 
53 Ibid., 346. As Marchand notes, at a broader level, German academia was culturally resistant to any state-
directed efforts to make it ‘useful.’ “There were pervasive problems in the introduction of colonial 
institutions into a German cultural world built around the Humboldtian ideals of Bildung and Wissenschaft. 
The mere idea of practical science clashed with the deep-seated conviction that the state should encourage 
learning for its own sake" (354). 
54 Ibid. 
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also argues that German Orientalists were far from univocally supportive of empire, and 
that their disciplinary commitments led them to be far less concerned with the modern 
questions of controlling local populations, than with “traditional, almost primeval 
Christian questions” that would be instantly recognizable to an early modern humanist.55 
For Marchand, “Said was engaging in a deliberate sort of deck-stacking [by] focusing 
exclusively on British and French literature and scholarship produced during the high 
imperial age.”56 Their German Orientalist counterparts were much less straight-forwardly 
imperial. 
In light of Marchand’s critique, it should perhaps be unsurprising that George 
Trumbull IV’s An Empire of Facts: Colonial Power, Cultural Knowledge, and Islam in 
Algeria, 1870-1914 maps much more comfortably onto the Saidian thesis. 
Methodologically, Trumbull’s argument differs from the studies previously considered. 
Rather than focus on a particular scholarly discipline, he argues that the scholarly genre 
of ethnography emerged in direct response to the epistemological requirements of French 
imperialism. During the French Third Republic, ethnographic writing, “drawn from 
participant observation and research in vernacular languages,” particularly Arabic, 
“articulated with an eye towards the maintenance of power represented the fundamental 
means through which agents of French colonialism […] came to terms with Algeria and 
with Algerian Islam.”57  
Trumbull’s archival research is impeccable, but it must be said that this is a familiar 
line of argument. The relationship he posits between Islamic scholarship, the colonial 
archive, and imperial power closely follows from the insights of Said and Foucault. This 
exposes him to Marchand’s sobering critique of cultural historians of imperialism, who 
often fall into a “presumptuous and rather condescending […] conception […] that all 
knowledge is power, especially since the prevailing way of understanding this 
formulation suggests that power is something sinister and oppressive.”58  
                                                          
55 Ibid., xxiv. 
56 Ibid., xix. 
57 George Trumbull IV, An Empire of Facts: Colonial Power, Cultural Knowledge, and Islam in Algeria, 
1870-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 2. 
58 Marchand, German Orientalism in the Age of Empire, xxv. 
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In my view, however, Trumbull avoids theoretical over-determination through his 
focus on the genre of ethnographic writing. This focus on an academic genre, rather than 
a discipline, leads Trumbull to posit a rather different relationship between individual 
scholars and colonialism than Marchand. Whereas German practitioners of Orientalistik 
guarded their academic turf against missionaries and diplomats, French ethnographers in 
Algeria were often colonial administrators themselves. For example, the most 
comprehensive ethnographic study of Algerian Ṣūfism, Marabouts et Khouan: étude sur 
l’Islam en Algerie, was written in 1884 by the chief of the Native Affairs service, Louis 
Rinn, who later became the colonial Conseiller d’état. In his own words, Rinn’s intended 
audience was “all the French agents who, with whatever title, in Algeria or abroad, have 
the delicate and difficult mission of monitoring the religious or political machinations of 
Muslims.”59 
As a means of knowledge production, ethnography ably met the French imperial 
need to “organize knowledge” – and by extension, colonized people – “into discrete, 
utilitarian facts.”60 In the process of policing religious difference, French ethnographers 
also superimposed cultural narratives onto their textual accounts of Algeria. One of the 
most striking examples is their profound unease with Ṣūfism, which the French viewed as 
politically subversive, and the resulting effort to govern Muslim religious practice 
through scholarship and administration. Trumbull argues that, since the French revolution 
in 1789, “French republicans had posited Catholic orders as a fundamental threat to 
secular government, and it required only the easiest of transpositions to extend the image 
to Ṣūfi orders, as well.”61 By equating the Ṣūfi ṭuruq with Catholic religious orders, 
French ethnographers not only reframed the Islamic threat to imperial order through their 
own historical lens, but also stimulated French paranoia about the political implications 
of Ṣūfism.  
Trumbull has also contributed a chapter to one of the most important recent volumes 
on European empires and Islam. Edited by David Motadel, Islam and the European 
Empires (Oxford, 2014), the collection is an attempt to consolidate and re-direct the 
                                                          
59 Trumbull IV, An Empire of Facts, 21. 
60 Ibid., 48. 
61 Ibid., 103. 
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scholarship on nineteenth century empires and Islam. In an introductory review essay, 
Motadel suggests a new analytical framework for Orientalist scholarship and imperialism, 
with chapters subdivided by their foci on ‘Islam and Imperial Rule,’ ‘Islam and Anti-
Colonial Resistance,’ and ‘Islam and Colonial Knowledge.’62 
Edward Said casts a long shadow over this last section, which includes papers on the 
relationships between scholarship and power in the German, French, British, and 
Japanese empires. As Motadel observes in his introduction, Foucauldian and Saidian 
ideas have influenced “much, though not all, historical scholarship on the connections 
between knowledge and colonial power.”63  
The chapters which follow evidence a variety of stances towards this disciplinary 
legacy. As in his earlier monograph, George Trumbull’s chapter on “French Colonial 
Knowledge of Maraboutism” is clearly indebted to postmodern analyses of power and 
knowledge, arguing that “the Algerian colonial bureaucracy institutionalized the 
production of knowledge about marabouts” for both scholarly and administrative 
purposes.64 In chapters on Islamic scholarship in the German and Japanese empires, 
Rebekka Habermas and Cemil Aydin continue to complicate our view of the Saidian 
thesis.65 Japanese scholarship, for instance, occupied a complex and ambivalent position 
relative to Orientalist thought; although Japanese scholars were deeply interested in pan-
Islamic thought, and the possibility of finding common cause with Muslims resisting 
European empires, their writing was fundamentally indebted to a Eurocentric division 
between Orient and Occident.66 By contrast, Faisal Devji’s contribution, “Islam and 
British Imperial Thought,” energetically confronts Said by arguing that “Orientalism 
operated in a thoroughly ambiguous and even contradictory way as far as modern or 
                                                          
62 David Motadel, “Introduction,” in Islam and the European Empires, ed. David Motadel (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 1–31, esp. 2-4. 
63 Ibid., 26. 
64 George Trumbull IV, “French Colonial Knowledge of Maraboutism,” in Islam and the European 
Empires, ed. David Motadel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 270–71. 
65 Rebekka Habermas, “Debates on Islam in Imperial Germany,” in Islam and the European Empires, ed. 
David Motadel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 231–54; Cemil Aydin, “Islam and the European 
Empires in Japanese Imperial Thought,” in Islam and the European Empires, ed. David Motadel (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 287–302. 
66 Aydin, “Islam and the European Empires in Japanese Imperial Thought,” 301–2. 
21 
 
21 
 
colonial forms of domination are concerned.”67 British imperial thinkers never offered 
“’good’ and ‘bad’ versions of Orientalism,” he argues, and included a long-standing 
effort to legitimate Britain’s empire in terms of Islamic political norms.68 
Without claiming to be comprehensive, the preceding discussion is a firm foundation 
for three conclusions about the recent literature on scholarship and modern imperialism. 
First, comparative religion emerged as a modern academic discipline during the 
nineteenth century, and was profoundly implicated in European projects of intellectual 
universalism and political imperialism from the moment of its conception. Second, 
nineteenth-century Orientalist scholarship operated either as a subset or a close relative of 
comparative religious scholarship, and to various degrees, was invested in European 
imperialism. British Orientalists saw their field as a critical edge over competing 
European powers: French Orientalists took their cues directly from the epistemological 
and material needs of empire, and were often colonial administrators themselves: and 
while German Orientalists were often ambivalent towards colonial functionaries, and 
were not directly ‘useful’ to German colonization, they nevertheless contributed 
indirectly to the German Empire, and saw themselves in competition with their French, 
British, and Dutch scholarly peers. Finally, while Said’s orientalism thesis imperfectly 
accounts for the history of German scholarship, and is variously adapted or rejected by 
contemporary historians, it remains a remarkably durable hermeneutic for understanding 
the entanglements of nineteenth-century comparative religion, Orientalism, and modern 
European empires.  
1.5.3 Comparative religion in early modernity 
When we turn to the literature on seventeenth-century Orientalist scholarship, a very 
different picture emerges. Historians have written extensively, if sporadically, about both 
comparative religious thought and Orientalist scholarship during the early modern period. 
Unlike historians of nineteenth-century scholarship, however, early modern intellectual 
historians have not explicitly asked whether or how this scholarship relates to the history 
of empire during the seventeenth century. In the overview which follows, I first discuss 
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the scholarly literature on comparative religious thought and Orientalism during the 
seventeenth century, in order to illuminate this gap.   
Over the last thirty-five years, two generations of early modern historians have 
argued that comparative religious thought has its origins in the seventeenth century, not 
the nineteenth. Clearly, this literature clashes with the scholarship we have previously 
reviewed: in fact, what I have not acknowledged until now is that the birthdate of 
comparative religion is a matter of significant scholarly controversy (by the genteel 
standards of intellectual history). As Peter Harrison put it in 1990, “most accounts of the 
history of comparative religion or of Religionswissenschaft have the ‘dispassionate’ study 
of the religions beginning in the nineteenth century […] Yet for a number of reasons the 
science of religion had to begin earlier.”69 Resolving this debate would substantially 
exceed the scope of this thesis; accordingly, I will confine myself to establishing that 
there is, in fact, a robust literature dealing with seventeenth-century comparative religion, 
and to outlining some of the broad features of that literature. 70  
The first generation of this scholarship is firmly rooted in Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s 
classic study, The Meaning and End of Religion (1st ed. Harper Collins, 1962). Although 
frequently cited as a canonical text, Smith arguably went much further than any 
subsequent scholar by claiming that the idea of ‘religion’ was unhelpful as an explanatory 
category, and should be replaced by a new framework of “personal faith” and 
“cumulative tradition.”71 According to Smith, "rather than addressing ourselves to the 
problem ‘What is the nature of religion?’, I suggest that an understanding of the 
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variegated and evolving religious situation of mankind can proceed, and indeed perhaps 
can proceed only, if that question in that form be set aside or dropped, as inapt.”72 
Although, according to Smith, the intellectual category of ‘the religions’ would not 
emerge in its modern form until the mid-nineteenth century, its roots lie in early 
modernity. Etymologically, the term ‘religion’ derives from the Latin religio, which for 
Lucretius and Cicero referred narrowly to the external, public rites offered to the gods.73 
Originally, the term did not encompass ‘faith’, inward belief, or a sense of the non-
intellectual or irrational, all constituent components of the modern category of 
‘religion.’74  Even the early Christian Church, he argues, did not understand itself in terms 
of ‘religion.’ Rather, for the church fathers, the key intellectual category was that of 
“’Church’ (Greek and Latin, ecclesia), for the structured – and dynamic – community that 
was injected into” the less formalized classical world.75 In his treatment, Marsilio 
Ficino’s 1471 De Christiana Religione is a watershed in the evolution towards a 
recognizable concept of ‘religion,’ which includes the systematization of rituals and 
communities, and an emphasis on interior belief. From the seventeenth century onwards, 
“Europeans and especially the leaders of their thought […] gave the name ‘religion’ to 
the system, first in general but increasingly to the system of ideas, in which men of faith 
were involved or with which men of potential faith were confronted.”76  
Early modernists did not immediately incorporate Smith’s broad insights into their 
studies; however, by 1990, both David Pailin and Peter Harrison had written important 
monographs which firmly asserted that comparative religious thought emerged from early 
modern intellectual culture. This was an historiographic innovation for their more 
specialized audiences. As Harrison mildly complains in ‘Religion’ and the Religions in 
the English Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1990), even Eric Sharpe’s seminal history of 
comparative religion devoted only three pages to early modern thinkers.77 For Harrison, 
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77 Harrison, “Religion” and the Religions in the English Enlightenment, 176 n.2. See Eric Sharpe, 
Comparative Religion: A History, (Duckworth, 1975; 2nd ed. 1987), 15-17. 
24 
 
24 
 
comparative religious thought evolved as Protestant sacred histories – which used a 
comparative method to equate Catholicism with Jewish, Muslim, and ‘pagan’ heresies – 
gave way to natural history, which used organic metaphors adapted from the new natural 
sciences to investigate religious institutions as natural phenomena.78 
The architecture of Harrison’s argument is quite traditional; nevertheless, it was 
constructed in part using the tools of postmodern theory. He places the emergence of 
comparative religious thought in seventeenth-century England for a number of reasons: 
English writers enjoyed a broader religious freedom than most of their continental peers; 
the monarchs’ oscillation between Protestantism and Catholicism undermined the 
inevitability of a singular religious identity, and led to comparisons of the two; and 
English scholars practiced a particularly robust form of Biblical criticism, that served to 
historicize and localize their own religious truth claims.79 However, early modern travel, 
and the ensuing efforts of European scholars to ‘understand’ the religions and histories of 
North American, African, and Asian peoples, was another key component in the 
emergence of comparative religious thought.80 “As the religious rites and beliefs of other 
peoples were discovered […] the possible scope for comparison continued to increase.” 81  
As Edward Said has pointed out with regard to ‘the Orient’, the discursive creation of 
exotic locations and peoples provided the modern West with a backdrop upon which to 
project images which served some domestic ideological function.82 Early modern 
scholars and polemicists, Harrison argues, defined ‘true religion’ through a comparative 
process of ‘othering’ directed at both “competing Christian factions” and at non-Christian 
peoples.83  
As Harrison himself notes, David Pailin’s Attitudes to Other Religions: Comparative 
Religion in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Britian (Manchester, 1984) was the 
only prior work to argue for an early modern birthdate for comparative religious 
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thought.84 Unlike Harrison, Pailin does not directly cite Smith as a touchstone; however, 
the impact of The Meaning and End of Religion is discernible in his treatment of Islam. 
For Smith, the history of Islam represented a strong potential challenge to his broader 
argument that the ‘religions of the world’ emerged through European scholarly practices. 
“The Muslim world” is “definitely and explicitly conscious of something that it calls, and 
is persuaded that it ought to call, a religion,” and there is undeniable linguistic and 
historical evidence that Muslims have self-identified as a distinct community since the 
emergence of Islam in the seventh century CE.85 Accordingly, Smith treats Islam as a 
“special case” – unlike Buddhists or Hindus (he argues), Muslims have always 
understood themselves as a distinct community, but that understanding, and especially its 
contemporary form, has emerged in part as a process of self-identification in relation to 
outsiders.86 Similarly, Pailin argues that although early modern Christian accounts of 
other religious groups were unapologetically triumphalist, there were “two religions 
which could not be so cavalierly dismissed – Judaism and Islam.”87 For seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century apologists, the remarkable cultural and military vitality of the Muslim 
kingdoms meant that Islam presented an unavoidable ideological challenge. “Jacob 
Bryant, for example, describes Islam as the only possible competitor with Christianity 
while William Paley sees ‘the success of Mahometanism’ as ‘the only event’ in the 
history of humanity that bears comparison with the spread of Christianity.”88 As a result, 
early modern accounts of Islam had the unusual responsibility of showing “that it [did] 
not pose a real threat to the rational establishment of the truth of Christianity.”89 
Following Pailin and Harrison, early modern scholars did not re-engage with the 
history of comparative religion until Guy Stroumsa’s A New Science: The Discovery of 
Religion in the Age of Reason (Harvard, 2010). Stroumsa claims that “the modern science 
of religion was not born, as is usually thought, in the second half of the nineteenth 
century,” but rather “that the period between Renaissance and Romanticism is the crucial 
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one in European intellectual history for the first emergence and early formation of the 
modern study of religion.”90 The obvious similarity to Peter Harrison’s contention twenty 
years earlier speaks to the cicada-like cycle of scholarly interest in early modern 
comparative religion.    
According to Stroumsa, the “epistemological foundations” for the comparative study 
of religion were laid by three revolutionary early modern events: the “Great Discoveries, 
initially of the Americas and then South and East Asia,” the impact of humanistic 
scholarly methods, especially antiquarianism and philology, and the early modern wars of 
religion.91 Like Harrison, Stroumsa argues that European contact with Asian and 
American cultures was a fundamental catalyst for a comparative epistemology. Unlike 
Harrison, however, for whom comparative religious thought was a polemical tool for 
confessional Christian writers, Stroumsa frames early modern comparative thought 
within a secularizing narrative. For Stroumsa, the experience of encountering unfamiliar 
religious cultures – whether through ‘rediscovered’ classical texts, travel narratives, or 
early ethnographic scholarship – necessitated new comparative modes of thought, and 
prompted scholars to set aside older theological lenses. Although occasionally imperfect, 
this new-found objectivity allowed early modern scholars to “overcome, at least to some 
extent, their personal attitudes and prejudices.”92 
This secularizing narrative is one that has been extensively critiqued by 
contemporary scholars; as noted above, a new generation of intellectual historians has 
fundamentally challenged the teleological assumption that early modern, Enlightened 
scholarship was defined by secularity.93 As Jonathan Sheehan recently observed, “[t]o 
open theology up—to make it less orthodox in our scholarship—seems to me a key 
project of intellectual history at this particular juncture, when an older secular 
dispensation is crumbling and new intellectual formations are not yet on the horizon.”94  
Stroumsa goes further, however, by arguing that early modern comparative religion was 
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not only non-theological, but that it was non-political as well: for Stroumsa, early modern 
scholarly interest in ‘other’ religions was not motivated by either politics or polemics, but 
by profound “intellectual curiosity” and “deep personal involvement with the subject of 
their inquiry.”95  
It should come as little surprise that the foil for this claim is Edward Said’s 
Orientalism. Stroumsa argues that, while “the birth of orientalism in France and England, 
for instance, is certainly related to imperialist designs and attitudes,” this fails to account 
for the intense personal curiosity that leads a scholar to invest her career in a particular 
avenue of study.96  
The most important articulation of this argument occurs in relation to early modern 
Orientalism. The sixth chapter, titled “From Mohammedis Imposturae to the Three 
Imposters: The Study of Islam and the Enlightenment,” summarizes several of the literary 
and scholarly genres through which early modern Europeans engaged with Islamic 
history and thought. Usefully, Stroumsa points out that these engagements took three 
forms: travel literature by authors like Jean Chardin and Jospeh Pitts,97 the textual 
scholarship of Arabists like Edward Pocoke,98 and philosophical engagements with 
Islamic thought by Jean Bodin, Rousseau, and others.99 On the surface, this chapter might 
strike us as a catalogue of authors, rather than a sustained interpretation of their writing. 
His underlying argument, however, is that these textual and scholarly engagements with 
Islam were motivated by intellectual curiosity, not politics or imperialism. “It was this 
intellectual curiosity, rather than the wish to lend support to imperialistic designs, 
characteristic of a later period, that sustained the remarkable achievements of the early 
orientalists.”100 Conversely, scholarly attacks on Islam were the result of imperfect 
secularity, the inability or unwillingness to “completely shed prejudice and inherited 
perceptions of Muhammed and Islam.”101 
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1.5.4 Arabic and Orientalist scholarship in seventeenth-century England  
In short, although early modernists have engaged (albeit fitfully) with the history of 
comparative religious thought, those scholars have not investigated the possibility that a 
seventeenth-century epistemology of comparative religion was related to European 
imperialism or universalism. Indeed, one of the central arguments of the most recent 
monograph on the subject, Stroumsa’s A New Science, was to actively deny this 
possibility. When we turn to the literature on early modern Orientalist and Arabic 
scholarship, we find that this approach has been largely replicated.  
Between the 1970s and 1990s, studies of early modern Arabic scholarship adopted a 
wide-angle perspective on the field. In Studies in the History of the Near East (Frank 
Cass, 1973), Peter Holt offered an important overview of Arabic scholarship in England 
during the seventeenth century. Arabic scholarship flourished in England prior to the 
Civil War under the patronage of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and pious lay people; 
professorships in Arabic were endowed at both Oxford (1636) and Cambridge (1632), 
and Oxford’s Bodleian Library rapidly acquired one of the major European collections of 
Arabic manuscripts. According to Holt, the motivations behind this flurry of scholarship 
were religious. The study of Arabic, it was thought, would contribute to biblical 
scholarship by “throwing new light on Hebrew,” a justification which was cited by every 
English chair in Arabic during the seventeenth century.102 Arabic was also seen as an 
important language of polemic, not only for evangelizing amongst Muslims, but also for 
œcumenical outreach to Coptic and Maronite Christians in Egypt and the Levant.103   
Although Holt takes a broad view of early modern Arabic scholarship, he focuses on 
Edward Pococke, who occupied the Laudian professorship in Arabic at Oxford from 1636 
until his death in 1691. In fact, of the three chapters dedicated to early modern Arabists, 
the first is a biography of Pococke, the second focuses on the study of Islamic history as a 
background to Pococke’s scholarship, and the short third chapter outlines the study of 
Arabic in England after Pococke. For Holt, Pococke’s academic career both reflected and 
summarized the history of Arabic scholarship in seventeenth-century England. Following 
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the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, Arabic studies declined precipitously, a trend 
which he juxtaposes against the fact that Pococke “produced no further works of Arabic 
scholarship after 1663.”104 
Holt attributes this decline in professional Arabic scholarship to a number of factors. 
Despite the thriving commercial networks between England and the Muslim polities in 
North Africa and the Mediterranean – trade with the Ottomans represented fully one-
quarter of English foreign trade by 1700105 – Arabic never became a necessary 
commercial language for English merchants, who preferred to conduct their business 
through translators.106 Accordingly, the study of Arabic was motivated almost solely by 
religious and scholarly factors, which dissipated by the mid-century. Holt argues that 
Arabic became less relevant to Biblical scholarship in the post-restoration context, and 
that the “record of unrelieved failure” of English missionaries to the Muslim polities 
undermined the evangelical rationale for Arabic study.107 
This historical narrative – that Arabic studies flourished under Church patronage 
during the 1630s-1640s, reached their English zenith in the career of Edward Pococke, 
and sputtered disappointingly by the end of the century – has proved durable in 
subsequent scholarship. In Eastern Wisedome and Learning: The Study of Arabic in 
Seventeenth-Century England (Clarendon, 1996), G.J. Toomer also places Pococke at the 
apex of a parabola-like narrative of Arabic scholarship in seventeenth-century England. 
He does expand upon Holt’s narrative in several useful ways, however. Like Holt, 
Toomer argues that the study of Arabic flourished in England prior to the revolution in 
1640; however, he also notes that the reasons for that intensification of interest remain 
somewhat unclear. It is not apparent, for instance, why Archbishop Laud invested so 
aggressively in Arabic scholarship during the 1630s; in the absence of a “relevant […] 
pronouncement of his own,” Toomer is obliged to speculate that Laud might have been 
influenced by Peter Turner, the Savilian Professor of Geometry at Oxford.108 
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Furthermore, whereas Holt argued that Arabic was irrelevant to English commerce, 
Toomer implies that Arabic scholarship was at least tangentially related to commercial 
interests. Famously, although he was largely ignored, Laud ordered the Levant Company 
in 1634 to contribute one Arabic manuscript to his growing collection with every 
returning ship.109 
Toomer also seeks to explain the “gradual and then rapid decline” of Arabic studies 
following the restoration.110 For the most part, he considers Holt’s explanation 
compelling, although he suggests that Holt may have assigned too much significance to 
the failure of English missionaries– after all, “whatever the lack of success of the 
missionary efforts by Englishmen […] in Muslim countries, this had very little impact on 
their continuation.”111 In fact, during the eighteenth century, the Society for Promoting 
Christian Knowledge continued to enthusiastically finance the translation of missionary 
texts into Arabic.112 Like Holt and Stroumsa, however, he ultimately concludes that both 
the intensification and decline of Arabic studies were the consequence of individual 
scholarly interest. Although scholars like Pococke clearly saw themselves as contributors 
to a broader Christian project, “their primary motivation was intellectual rather than 
utilitarian.”113 
More recent scholarship has taken a much narrower view than either Holt or Toomer, 
focusing on specific scholars or intellectual circles, rather than the full scope of Arabic 
scholarship during the seventeenth century. For instance, the papers submitted to an 
edited collection on The Republic of Letters and the Levant (Brill, 2005), focus on topics 
such as “Arabick Learning in the Correspondence of the Royal Society, 1660-1677,”114 or 
attempt to explain Archbishop Laud’s personal motivations for endowing the Oxford 
chair in Arabic in 1636.115  Despite the shift in foci, however, these more recent scholars 
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persist in viewing early modern Arabic and Orientalist scholarship as non-political. M.B. 
Hall, for instance, details the early Royal Society’s efforts to collect both scientific data 
and Arabic and Persian manuscripts in the Muslims polities. Henry Oldenburg, the 
“extremely conscientious” Secretary of the Royal Society from 1662-1677, actively 
solicited reams of medical, botanical, ethnographic, and textual information from 
members of the Society travelling in the Ottoman empire and North Africa. In 1672, for 
instance, the Society assigned John Finch a bulletin of “Some Inquiries for Turky” 
following his appointment to the ambassadorship in Istanbul. Their scholarly wish-list 
focused on botanical questions, but also instructed Finch “To procure some curious 
copies of [th]e Vulgar Greek Testament & Liturgies: The Alcoran in Arabic finely writ, 
as it is sent to Mecha, & Whether some Gr.[eek] MSS, auncient & unknowne it among 
us, may not yet be found about those Learned Ruines.”116 However, Hall argues, their 
interest in this knowledge was purely scholarly, and “unravelled” once English natural 
scientists lost interest in Arabic medical and astronomical sources.117  
In the same collection, Mordechai Feingold assesses Archbishop Laud’s motivations 
for patronizing Arabic scholarship. Ultimately, he offers an even more de-politicized 
explanation than either Hall, Holt, or Toomer. While Laud and other benefactors were 
clearly intrigued by scholarship for its own sake, Feingold argues that the commonality 
between early modern patrons of Orientalist scholarship “was their failure to produce a 
male heir. […] No great psychological acumen is needed to realize that in their twilight 
years these men were opting for an alternative route to immortality.”118  
While Feingold’s pseudo-Freudian reading is idiosyncratic, it is consonant with the 
broader literature we have surveyed in two important respects. First, as we have seen with 
Holt and his successors, scholars have remained wedded to a narrative in which Arabic 
and Orientalist scholarship declined rapidly following the restoration. However, this 
narrative is an uneasy fit with Anders Ingram’s important realization that English 
publishing on ‘the Turk,’ and on Islam more broadly, intensified in the decades following 
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the restoration. In fact, as we mentioned earlier, references to ‘the Turk’ proliferated 
dramatically during the 1680s. During that decade, the normalised frequency of ‘the 
Turk’ in English print reached 185/million words; during the 1630s, the decade which 
Holt and others consider the high-water mark for English Arabists, the normalized 
frequency was fewer than 50/million words.119 In other words, the historiographic 
narrative of declining interest in Arabic and Islam only holds up if we narrowly focus on 
the publications of professional academics. Even Holt’s claim that “Pococke produced no 
further works of Arabic scholarship after 1663” is only true if we discount his later 
missionary work.120 As Holt himself noted, Pococke translated both the Anglican 
catechism and the liturgy into Arabic later in his career, in 1671 and 1674, respectively.121 
Second, Feingold’s Freudianism is simply a distortion of the broader historiographic 
tendency to de-politicise not only early modern Orientalism, but comparative religious 
scholarship as well. Consistently, in the writing of Harrison, Stroumsa, Holt, and Toomer, 
we find it argued that early modern scholars studied comparative religion, Arabic, and 
Islam for their own sake, motivated by either personal intellectual curiosity or religious 
commitments, but never by political interests.  
This flies in the face of an ongoing ‘turn to empire’ amongst early modern historians. 
Indeed, although early modernists have found it incredibly productive to ‘think with 
empire,’ intellectual historians have tended to limit their engagements with imperialism 
strictly to early scientific thought. As David Armitage recently observed, in the 
“shorthand histories of political thought […] the main links between empiricism and 
imperialism were generally found in the work of Francis Bacon and the seventeenth-
century Royal Society.”122  
In short, the possible links between seventeenth-century Islamic scholarship and 
European imperialism and universalism have gone unexplored. In light of our previous 
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examination of the literature on nineteenth-century intellectual history, this seems 
surprising, considering that it is impossible to write about Orientalism during the 
nineteenth century without reference to the political context of European imperialism and 
universalism. At a result, by positing a connection between Orientalism and imperialism 
in John Finch’s manuscripts, this thesis is positioned precisely at a moment of silence in 
the contemporary literature.123  
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Chapter 1: John Finch (1626-82): A biographical overview 
 
Although some recent scholarship has begun to examine John Finch’s contributions to 
natural philosophy, this literature has been framed in relation to the history of philosophy. 
Because Finch is virtually unknown to historians of political thought, this chapter offers a 
brief biographical sketch, in which I overview both his career, and his treatment by 
historians during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. I begin by glossing Finch’s 
biography prior to being appointed the English ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, 
before turning to an account of his embassy. Subsequent historians, especially those 
writing in the early twentieth century, have been profoundly disparaging of his diplomatic 
career; in my view, it is important to understand his career in the broader context of 
jurisdictional disputes between the Levant Company, the English crown, and the Ottoman 
Porte. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of his relationship with Thomas Baines, and 
the implications of their relationship for my analysis of their manuscripts.  
2.1 Finch’s personal life  
Finch was born in 1626, and was educated at Eton and Christ’s College, Cambridge, 
where he graduated M.A. in 1649. While at Cambridge, he belonged to a circle of 
students surrounding Henry More, who introduced him to an older physician named 
Thomas Baines. Finch and Baines became lifelong partners, living together for thirty-six 
years, until Baines’ death in 1681/1092 (see Appendix A for a schematic of Finch’s 
network).124 Between 1651 and 1671, they lived in Italy, where Finch held several 
diplomatic postings, and possibly performed some intelligence work on behalf of Henry 
Bennet, the earl of Arlington and Secretary of State for the Southern Department.  
Because Finch’s career unfolded in two distinct phases – he and Baines worked in 
Italy as medical doctors from 1651-1671, and in Turkey from 1674-1681/1085-1092, 
during his tenure as the Ottoman ambassador – subsequent scholars have not understood 
his career holistically, and have tended to treat him either as a natural philosopher or as a 
diplomat. Between 1917 and 1920, Archibald Malloch and G.F. Abbot published short 
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biographies which focused on his diplomatic career.125 By contrast, more recent scholars 
have been primarily interested in his earlier career as a natural philosopher. Within the 
last fifteen years, historians of philosophy, particularly Sarah Hutton and Stefano Villani, 
have written about Finch in relation to his much more famous half-sister, the philosopher 
Anne Conway, and in the context of intellectual exchanges between Italy and England.126   
As Sarah Hutton has noted, during his time in Italy, Finch played a role as “a link 
between the scientific communities of England and Italy,”127 in addition to his work as an 
anatomist, medical doctor, and lecturer at the Universities of Pisa and Florence. 128  In 
1663, he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society, with which he corresponded 
throughout much of his professional life; he was also a member of its Italian equivalent, 
the Florentine Accademia del Cimento, in recognition of his work as an anatomist.129  It 
seems unlikely, however, that he fulfilled that role to the great satisfaction of either his 
English or his Italian peers. In 1666-8, Henry Oldenburg, the secretary of the Royal 
Society, was forced to write to Finch three times, requesting that he present a copy of the 
History of the Royal Society to Prince Leopold; Finch eventually replied in 1668, and 
claimed (unconvincingly) that he had just received Oldenburg’s earlier letters.130 As one 
scholar has argued, “rather than becoming the celebrated promoter of exchanges between 
the Cimento and the Royal Society, [Finch] was possibly an obstacle to 
communication.”131 
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Although this thesis is concerned with Finch’s writing during his ambassadorship to 
the Ottoman empire, there is a case to be made that neatly identifying and distinguishing 
between two phases of his career is not helpful. As William Bulman has noted, early 
modern travellers were often simultaneously scholars, missionaries, and spies132; in 
Finch’s case, the existence of several long reports on current affairs written in 1657, 
when Finch and Baines held university appointments at Padua, suggests that he may have 
been involved in intelligence-gathering and politics well before receiving a formal 
diplomatic appointment.133 
Although he and Baines remained in Italy until 1671, Finch sought an opportunity to 
return to England as early as 1668. Following the adjournment of Parliament in 1668, his 
brother-in-law, Edward Conway, spoke to Secretary of State Arlington on his behalf, and 
urged Arlington to consider Finch for a diplomatic appointment.134 Conway was 
apparently confident that his intercession would be fruitful, assuring Finch that he would 
“have the advantage of coming into a court where there is not one man of ability.”135 On 
July 30, 1670, Finch was appointed to the newly-formed Council for Foreign Plantations, 
which was responsible for supervising the British colonies in North America.136 Two 
years later,  in November 1672, Finch was appointed to succeed Daniel Harvey as the 
English ambassador to the Ottoman Empire137; he lived in Istanbul from 1674/1084 until 
1681/1091, when he returned to England following Baines’ death.138  
Unfortunately, Finch’s personal papers have largely been lost. S.C. Lomas, who 
compiled many of Finch’s extant papers for the Historical Manuscripts Commission in 
1922, suggested that many of his in-papers were destroyed in 1681, when he returned to 
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England from Istanbul severely ill.139 It seems likely that the second half of his 
correspondence with Edward Conway was lost at this point; consequently, while Conway 
obviously solicited Finch and Baines for reports on Islamic governance, his intentions for 
doing so are unclear. When Finch died in 1682, his papers and library were left to his 
nephew Daniel, second earl of Nottingham, who moved them to his new manor at 
Burley-on-the-Hill in 1700.140 Between 1913 and 1965, the Historical Manuscripts 
Commission issued a four-volume survey of the manuscripts housed at Burley; vol. II, 
published in 1922, includes their survey of John Finch’s remaining papers. The HMC 
reported that “[n]o Letter-book of his has been found at Burley, and the only letters 
approaching a consecutive series are those to his nephew Daniel, calendared from the 
originals, preserved by the recipient.”141 Moreover, Finch’s library was destroyed in a fire 
at Burley in 1908; fortunately, however, two extensive, albeit undated, catalogues have 
survived in his personal notebooks.142 Finally, as we have noted, Finch’s treatise was 
never published, and it is unclear whether or not he would have attempted publication if 
he had not died suddenly.143 Indeed, to add insult to injury, the authorship of the treatise 
was misattributed to Finch’s much more prominent nephew, Daniel Finch, until 1968. 144  
The papers which survive include his official correspondence as ambassador, archived in 
The National Archive, his correspondence with Edward and Anne Conway, archived in 
the British Library, and amongst the Finch papers in the Record Office for Leicester, 
Leicestershire, and Rutland. 
2.2 Finch’s ambassadorship to the Ottoman Empire, 1672-1681 
The ambassadorship to the Ottoman Empire, which was simultaneously a dominant 
Eurasian imperial power and one of England’s largest trading partners, was a prestigious 
and complex role. Finch’s major diplomatic accomplishment was to successfully 
renegotiate the Capitulations in 1675/1086, the document establishing England’s trade 
privileges with the Ottoman Empire. These privileges, first granted to William Harborne 
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in 1580/987, were re-negotiated in 1601/1009, 1607/1015, 1612/1020, 1618/1027, 
1641/1050, 1647/1056, and 1662/1672; the version secured by Finch “was a cumulative 
text” that consolidated these earlier privileges, and was essentially unrevised until the 
abolition of the Ottoman Capitulations in 1924.145  
As the English ambassador, Finch simultaneously played a commercial role as the 
Levant Company’s representative in Istanbul. Under the terms of the trade monopoly 
granted to the Levant Company by James I in 1605, the Company was also responsible 
for diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire; practically, this involved maintaining 
and renegotiating the trade Capitulations, providing consular services to British residents 
and travelers in the Ottoman empire, and interceding in legal and commercial disputes on 
their behalf. This diplomatic relationship existed until 1825, when the “Levant Company 
was wound up and the consular service passed into the control of the Foreign Office.”146 
Especially in the context of the history of empire, it is important to stress that, during 
the period under consideration, European Christian kingdoms were firmly the ‘junior 
partner’ in their diplomatic relationships with the Ottoman Empire. This inequality was a 
defining feature of the legal relationship between the English and Ottoman crowns; both 
legally and rhetorically, the Capitulations which governed Anglo-Ottoman trade were 
unilaterally granted to the English. “They were still very much privileges granted by the 
benevolence of the Ottoman government, rather than terms demanded by the British,” 
and the freedoms of movement and religion that the British enjoyed in the Empire 
depended “entirely on Britain maintaining peaceful relations with the Ottomans.”147 In 
fact, the Capitulations granted by the Ottomans were prefaced by an historical narrative, 
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recounting Elizabeth I’s overture during the 1580s: “In the past, the chief of the nobles of 
the queen of the said province [vilāyet] [of England] came to and arrived at our threshold 
of the workings of felicity […] with her gentlemen and her ships with her tribute, and the 
gifts that she had sent were gladly accepted.”148  
As the representative of a moderately wealthy kingdom, living in the imperial capital 
of one of the two hegemonic Eurasian empires, Finch would have possessed little of the 
imperious mindset that characterized European Christian relations with the Muslim 
kingdoms after the mid-eighteenth century. It is telling that, in the course of renegotiating 
the Capitulations between 1674-1675/1086-1087, one of his priorities was to revise the 
translation of Charles II’s title from kral (‘king’) to padişah (‘emperor’).149 The 
imbalance of commercial and military power shaped Anglo-Ottoman cultural relations as 
well. Gerald MacLean has characterized the cultural, military, and aesthetic relationship 
between the English and the Ottomans as one of ‘imperial envy.’150 For the early modern 
English, the Ottoman Empire was “the fabulously wealthy and magnificent court from 
which the sultan ruled over three continents with his great and powerful army.”151 
Although Christian polemicists saw the Ottomans as “the great enemy and scourge of 
Christendom,” they were nevertheless forced to reckon with the indisputable fact of 
Ottoman imperial power. Only during the eighteenth century would European Christians 
feel confident “to draw, paint, poeticize and imagine the Muslims the way they liked;” 
during the seventeenth century, “Muslims had a power of self-representation which 
English authors knew they either had to confront or to engage.”152  
Previous historians have been unsparing in their evaluation of Finch’s success as an 
ambassador; one scholar, writing in the 1920s, concluded that Finch “was not born for 
diplomacy: certainly not for Turkish diplomacy. […] That he failed at Constantinople 
cannot be disguised.” 153 In my view, however, while Finch seems to have been 
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underprepared for his ambassadorship,154 his tenure was crippled by a series of bitter 
jurisdictional disputes provoked by the fractious Levant Company.  
Between the 1660s-1680s, the Levant Company and the English crown engaged in a 
protracted jurisdictional “tussle for control of the embassy” in Istanbul.155 Following the 
Restoration of the monarchy in 1660, the Levant Company – which had flourished under 
Cromwell –  was suspected of Presbyterian sympathies, and of potential “resistance to 
royal authority.” 156 Accordingly, Charles II made a concerted effort to reassert the 
monarch’s jurisdiction over the Company, particularly his prerogative to appoint the 
ambassador, and to ensure religious conformity amongst the Company’s merchants.   
Finch’s family, which was “impeccably Tory and High Church,” was deeply 
involved in this effort to reassert monarchical control over the company.157  During the 
interregnum, Heneage Finch (1628-1689), John Finch’s first cousin, had led an 
underground network of Royalist sympathizers in Kent; in 1660, he became Charles II’s 
first ambassador to the Ottoman empire.158 Steven Pincus characterizes Heneage Finch as 
the central figure in an “Anglican crusade” intended to purge the Company of 
nonconformist or disloyal merchants.159 As part of that political program, Finch strongly 
asserted the monarch’s sole right to appoint the ambassador in Istanbul. In 1668, he 
prepared a “Narrative [of the] Levant Companie’s Proceedings with the Crowne,” which 
railed against the Company’s “arrogancy […] as if they were a Little Republiq[u]e […] to 
pretend to one of [th]e Supreame Praerogatives of yo[u]r Crowne, Viz. The Election of 
[th]e Ambassadours for Turky.”160 
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Heneage Finch was succeeded in 1669 by Sir Daniel Harvey, who was related to him 
by marriage; upon his death in 1672, Harvey was in turn replaced by John Finch.161 In 
this context, Finch’s appointment was not simply a matter of individual patronage. His 
family had been closely associated with the position for over a decade; and especially 
through Heneage Finch’s ambassadorship, had positioned itself as fierce advocates for 
religious conformity and the royal supremacy. Further, he was only appointed after 
Edward Conway assured the Secretary of State, lord Arlington, of his royalist 
convictions.162 In other words, Finch was explicitly intended to serve as ‘the king’s man’ 
in Istanbul: this close association with religious conformity and the royal supremacy in 
England provides important context for his later writing on Islam, the Ottoman Empire, 
and sovereignty.    
Finch’s ambassadorship began to unravel in 1678/1088, when he was unwillingly 
thrust into a legal dispute between the Company and Ottoman authorities. As the English 
ambassador, one of Finch’s responsibilities was to advocate for English subjects residing 
in the Ottoman empire, in both legal and commercial matters. In 1678/1088, a prominent 
English merchant in Istanbul named Samuel Pentlow died suddenly, before formally 
settling his will. Pentlow had married an Ottoman Greek Orthodox woman; ordinarily, as 
the widow of an English merchant, she would have fallen under English legal 
jurisdiction, and been subject to English estate law.  However, because Pentlow had 
failed to confirm his wife’s status with the Ottoman authorities before he died, she 
remained within Ottoman legal jurisdiction.163 Under pressure from several of the English 
merchants associated with the Levant Company, Finch considered helping Pentlow’s 
widow relocate to England, to the intense displeasure of the Ottoman authorities. In 
1678/1088, he received a sharply-worded letter from the Ottoman Grand Vizier, Ḳara 
Muṣṭafā Paşa, warning him “That wee have understood, how you had thoughts of sending 
into England, contrary to [th]e Imperiall Capitulations, [th]e wife & child of a Subject, of 
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Our most valerous & Majesticall Emperor […] Keepe a good correspondence, & for [th]e 
future act nothing in this manner contrary to [th]e estasblish[e]d accord.”164  
Finch subsequently decided to completely recuse himself from the situation – as we 
have discussed, the Levant Company’s ability to trade in the Ottoman Empire was 
entirely dependent on the English crown maintaining a healthy relationship with the 
Ottoman Porte. However, his decision outraged the English merchant community, and 
presented the Levant Company with a fresh opportunity to challenge the monarch’s 
jurisdiction over the embassy. Paul Rycaut, formerly the consul at Izmir, petitioned the 
king to replace Finch, “for, among things, not having done enough to protect Pentlow” 
and his widow.165 In 1679, the Company unilaterally “determined to replace Finch with 
Baron Chandos;” although deeply displeased, Charles II confirmed the appointment in 
1680.166 While awaiting Chandos’ arrival, Finch was almost entirely sidelined by the 
Ottomans, and was forced to report to the Levant Company that “I had reason to conclude 
that His Excell[en]cy My Successour […] was likely in all reason to effect more than 
I.”167 
2.3 John Finch and Thomas Baines  
One of the most intriguing elements of Finch’s personal and professional lives is his 
nearly life-long relationship with Thomas Baines. As mentioned earlier, Finch and Baines 
were introduced at Cambridge in 1645 by their tutor, the Cambridge Platonist Henry 
More, when Finch was nineteen and Baines twenty-three. The two men lived together 
almost uninterrupted for the next thirty-six years, until Baines died on September 5, 
1681.168   
Unfortunately, very little is known about Baines outside of his relationship with Finch. 
The ODNB, for instance, affords Baines a paragraph after the entry for Finch, and notes 
that after they met in 1645, “his biography coincides with that of Finch.”169 Baines did 
leave some unpublished papers, which have been archived along with Finch’s in the 
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Record Office for Leicestershire, Leicester and Rutland, but it is likely that many of them 
were abandoned after his death, when Finch returned to England.  
Their relationship presents a unique historiographic challenge. Although Finch’s family 
apparently prospected for a wife, neither man ever married; as one scholar has observed, 
"[f]rom the vantage point of today, Finch and Baines certainly look like a gay couple.”170 
It is impossible (and beside the point) to evaluate whether their relationship involved a 
sexual dimension; however, it is clear that the two men were deeply committed to one 
another. Following Baines’ death, Finch wrote in his diary that the loss had “cutt off the 
thread of all my worldly happiness and application to business […] which irreparable loss 
[…] reduced me to so much weaknesse that I was given over by my physician.”171 
Although outside the scope of this thesis, their relationship has recently attracted some 
attention amongst scholars of queer history.172 Throughout this thesis, I have referred to 
Finch and Baines as 'partners,' in order to convey the duration, intimacy, and evident love 
in their life-long relationship, without risking the historical anachronism of attempting to 
define them in terms of sexual identity.  
It is evident that, in some sense, the two men were accepted as a couple by their peers. 
When Finch was dispatched to Florence in 1665, as the English minister to the Grand 
Duke of Tuscany, there are some indications that the posting was jointly held with 
Baines.173 During Finch’s embassy to the Ottomans, it was widely understood by both 
English and Ottoman merchants that Baines was an extremely close and influential 
confidant.174 While he was living in Istanbul, an English merchant named Dudley North 
(1641-1691) observed that “John Finch (and, as must be understood, Sir Thomas 
Baines)” had been appointed ambassador. After Finch died on November 18, 1682, he 
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was buried alongside Baines in a joint tomb in the collegiate chapel of Christ’s College, 
Cambridge: the inscription on their headstone was written by Henry More, and reads (in 
part) “Duorum Amicissimorum, quibus Cor erat unum, anaq. Anima.”175  
Especially in comparison to their married contemporaries, Finch and Baines’s 
relationship strikes a modern researcher as surprisingly familiar: both personally and 
professionally, theirs seems to have been an equal partnership. There is some indication 
that upper-class English men who lived abroad, particularly in Italy, experienced a degree 
of freedom from the norms of sexuality and relationships that would have been imposed 
by their families in England.176 The two men relocated to Italy in 1651, and over the 
course of the following thirty years, only lived in England for approximately three.177 As 
a result, I do not think that the relative openness of their relationship, and its seeming 
social acceptability, can be separated from the trajectory of Finch’s professional career. 
Paradoxically, I would argue that their relationship could only be seen as an equal 
partnership by their contemporaries – and hence, by modern researchers – precisely 
because both were men. As noted above, there is evidence that both Finch and Baines 
were consulted during the day-to-day operations of the embassy in Istanbul, and as elite 
men, both moved freely in the rarified world of elite Ottoman sociability. By contrast, 
Katherine Trumbull, who accompanied her husband William during his embassy to the 
Ottomans between 1687-1691, was regularly present at social occasions, but was not 
involved in ambassadorial decision-making.178 
Because Finch and Baines lived with one another for their entire adult lives, there is, 
naturally, no extant correspondence between the two. Unfortunately, this makes it 
virtually impossible to determine how they influenced each other intellectually.179 In fact, 
in his epitaph for Baines, Finch wrote that “our thoughts became so familiar to each other 
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that sometimes wee forgot to whom they originally belonged.”180 Although the two men 
were intellectually inseparable, there is no manuscript evidence that Finch’s papers – 
especially his treatise, and his report on the Ottoman Empire – were co-authored. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to know what has been lost of Baines’s papers. As 
discussed in the introduction to this thesis, the vast majority of the primary material I 
have consulted was written by Finch: I have worked with approximately 800 pages of 
Finch’s manuscripts, and approximately 30 pages written by Baines. Nevertheless, Baines 
wrote two letters to Edward Conway, in 1676 and 1681, that reflect upon and 
significantly clarify Finch’s intellectual project. It is to that project that we now turn. 
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Chapter 2: Finch’s Political philosophy: Liberty, coercion, and 
sovereignty 
In his 1676 report for Edward Conway, Thomas Baines offered a striking metaphor for 
statecraft. After a flowery apology for his tardy reply (like Finch, Baines was apparently 
a terrible correspondent), he proceeds to argue that  
Every ship ought to Lye with its’ Just Levell and Proportion in the water; but in 
the first Fabrick and Disposition Some more some Lesse come short of the 
Exactnesse of the Structure, which is to be amended by placing of the Ballast, 
and the other Burthen it Carry’s more in one Place, then in Another […] My 
Lord, there is not any Kingdome or Common wealth whatsoever, but by reason 
of its fluctuating and unstable Condition may be compard’ to a Ship; And no 
humour of People so equall and well temperd’ One to Another, but it requires a 
Great Art to place the Ballast and Burthen They carry so proportionably that the 
whole might Navigate the better; And this Ballast or Burthen is no other then the 
Laws’ They Live Under.181 
It is not surprising that Baines – a member of a diplomatic retinue from a maritime 
nation – would reach for a nautical metaphor for statecraft. If we fully unpack his 
analogy, however, a fundamental aspect of Finch and Baines’ political philosophy comes 
into focus. For both men, stabilizing the ship of state was not only a matter of wise 
navigation, but of judicious regulation and intervention on the part of its commanding 
officers. To relax the ‘Ballast and Burthens’ placed upon its citizens would endanger the 
ship of state, allowing it to list too far in any one direction: to stabilize the entire vessel, 
to maintain its course in the choppy waters of post-Restoration politics, demanded that its 
subjects be exposed to a heavy burden of law and governance. Finch’s political 
philosophy, in other words, was not a theory which liberated the individual from 
domination: it was a theory of governance which directly exposed individual subjects, 
religious minorities, and the Church itself to the unified and unitary authority of the state.  
In short, this ominous analogy prefigures the fundamental ecclesiological questions 
which animated Finch’s political philosophy: What is the correct relationship between the 
state and minority religious groups? And, what is the correct relationship between church 
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and state; or more precisely, between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities within a 
state?  
Finch never explicitly asked these questions in his own writing. However, when they 
are utilized as an interpretive hermeneutic, his seemingly idiosyncratic (and occasionally 
bizarre) account of contemporary politics and the Ottoman empire comes into focus as a 
concrete philosophy of empire. In order to rapidly expand and consolidate an empire, 
Finch advocated for a policy of robust state intervention in the public and private lives of 
its subjects. To avoid civil unrest, he proposed a policy of state toleration for minority 
religious beliefs; importantly, however, the right to liberty of conscience applied to 
individual dissenters, not to minority religious groups. Indeed, for Finch, the correct 
relationship between civil and ecclesiastical authority was one of state domination: 
inspired by the Ottoman polity, he argued that civil peace could best be secured if the 
monarch wielded both civil and religious authority.  
Finch was far from alone in arguing that the interests of the state demanded strong 
intervention into the public and private lives of its citizens. As Ethan Shagan has recently 
argued, early modern English writers who called for religious toleration never did so 
without asserting the state’s concomitant right to regulate private morality and public 
behaviour. “Moderate toleration was a technique of government, not the withdrawal or 
absence of government.”182 In this context, what distinguished Finch was not his call for 
robust governmentality, but rather, the sources he drew upon in constructing that 
argument, and the conclusions he drew as a result. Finch not only outlined a political 
philosophy that bordered on authoritarian: he did so by synthesizing evidence drawn from 
Ottoman history and politics. And by thoroughly incorporating his understanding of the 
Ottoman empire into his political philosophy, Finch ultimately offered a coherent 
‘blueprint’ for empire inspired by an Islamic model. For Finch, the Ottoman model of 
moderate statecraft served a two-fold imperial interest: it enabled both conquest and the 
continued stability and efficiency of an empire.  
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As previously noted, while Finch has recently been noticed by historians of 
philosophy, his career as a diplomat and a political thinker has been largely overlooked. 
Accordingly, while this thesis cannot claim to have ‘rediscovered’ Finch, the present 
chapter is the first scholarly effort to seriously engage with his political writing. The first 
section investigates Finch’s articulation of religious toleration as both a pragmatic tool of 
statecraft, and an individual ‘Humane Right.’ Crucially, he defines the liberty of 
conscience in such a way that it applies only to individuals, with significant implications 
for both toleration and church government. In the second section, I excavate Finch’s 
ecclesiology – his theological and political understanding of the church, its scope and 
jurisdiction, and its relationship to the English state. Drawing on Ethan Shagan’s analysis 
of moderate toleration, I illustrate how Finch juxtaposes a vigorous defense of religious 
freedom, with an equally vigorous defense of the monarch’s near-total jurisdiction over 
the church. By analysing Finch’s use of Ottoman history, his epistemological skepticism, 
and his ecclesiology, he ultimately emerges as a political thinker for whom liberty and 
coercion were equal partners in a broader theory of sovereignty.  
3.1 Finch’s toleration: Pragmatism and rights   
For early modern Britons, the legal toleration extended to minority religious groups by 
the Ottoman Empire offered a striking contrast to their own society. As John Marshall 
notes in his recent, magisterial work on Locke and toleration, Islam was “central to 
tolerationist debates in England in the late seventeenth century,” in part because “the 
practice of Muslim toleration for Christianity was repeatedly rehearsed by many 
authors.”183  
As a diplomat living in the Ottoman empire, Finch personally experienced and 
benefited from the Ottoman policy of accommodating Christians. Indeed, the first and 
most important article of the trade Capitulations which Finch renewed in 1675/1086 
reaffirmed the imperial guarantee that “the said [English] nation, and the English 
merchants […] in all security may come and go into any part of our dominions in such 
sort, that neither any of the nation, their goods and faculties shall receive any hindrance 
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or molestation from any person whatsoever.”184 However, in Finch’s mind, there had 
never been any doubt that the Ottoman policy of accommodating Jews and Christians was 
integral to their political and military successes. Writing to Edward Conway in 1663, he 
reported that Christian peasants in Hungary were actively supporting the Ottomans in 
their war against the Hapsburgs, in expectation of greater “freedome in the exercise of 
their Religion” under Muslim rule.185 
In his unpublished manuscripts, Finch explores the utility and legitimacy of religious 
toleration in detail. Historically, he argued, religious oppression undermines civil 
stability; conversely, toleration enables conquest and effective government. He also 
offered a robust defense of the individual’s right to liberty of conscience, on epistemic 
and theological grounds. In the following sections, I examine Finch’s articulation of 
toleration as both a pragmatic instrument of statecraft, and as a matter of ‘Humane 
Right’.  
3.1.1 The lessons of history: Toleration, empire, and pragmatism   
Finch’s politique philosophy of religious toleration is underwritten by a cyclical model of 
history. He was especially concerned with two fundamental historical patterns: the 
oscillation of power between religious and civil authorities, and the historical conditions 
which enabled civil unrest and regime change. For Finch, the operative variable for both 
patterns was the expansion and retraction of religious freedoms: accordingly, he argued, 
extending the liberty of conscience to religious dissenters was a technique of wise 
governance.  
Finch’s understanding of ecclesiastical history posits a complex relationship between 
religion and the stability of civil government. On the one hand, government cannot exist 
without religion to secure the loyalty and obedience of the populace. In his manuscript 
treatise, Finch wrote that the Roman Empire became the “Seat of the greatest Universall 
Power that Ever was known either in Temporall or Ecclesiasticall Jurisdiction” precisely 
because it subsumed the power of the Christian Church to the interests of the Empire.186 
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Rome enjoyed a “Universall Monarchy Over Mankind” by combining the “Prerogatives 
acquir’d by fears of Warr” with “ the Seat of the Head of the Ecclesiasticall Power, 
w[hi]ch gives Rules to the thoughts, & Consequently the Souls of Men.” 187 His is a 
darkly theocratic view of Roman imperium: the state enjoyed coercive power over its 
subjects not only through the exercise of penal laws, but through its control of “the very 
point w[hi]ch makes them Men, w[hi]ch is Reason & Religion.”188 In the contemporary 
context, Finch argues, this civil right over ecclesiastical power has been devolved to the 
national churches. “Rome was the Rule of Civility to its Governm[en]t: being [th]e Seat 
of the Consuls, and afterwards the Emperours; as London is to England, and Paris is to 
France.”189 
Conversely, Finch was convinced that oppressing the individual liberty of conscience 
was fatal to the stability of a civil polity. In his 1676 letter to Edward Conway, Thomas 
Baines offered a pithy summary of this historical dynamic: “it Appears That Oppressions 
in Civil Government have allway’s usherd’ in Changes of Religion; Not Religion the 
Change of a well Temperd’ contented Government; For Government was the first Thing 
intended by God, And that Upon necessary Grounds; for no Religion can stand without 
Civill Governments; but Civill Government may be without any one particular 
Religion.”190 
Oppression, in other words, leads to civil unrest – and in extreme cases, Finch 
argued, to regime change. Indeed, Finch placed this historical argument at the forefront of 
his case for religious toleration. In his unpublished treatise, Finch offered a detailed gloss 
of early church history, which characterized the incredible expansion of the early 
Christian church as a direct response to Roman oppression. Importantly, however, he 
argued that the subsequent stability of the Christianized Roman Empire only lasted “So 
Long as Christians kept to this Doctrine of Christ, and the Governed rendred to the 
Government also all Obedience either Active or Passive.”191  
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The stability of the Christian Roman Empire was, therefore, dependent upon a 
symbiotic but unequal partnership between Church and Empire. As discussed earlier, 
Finch considered religion indispensable to Rome: it both legitimized the civil authorities, 
and offered them an invaluable instrument of coercion. However, this symbiosis required 
that the Church cede all civil jurisdiction to the Empire. For scriptural justification, Finch 
leaned heavily on the Gospel of Matthew and Paul’s letter to the Romans, noting that 
“Our Saviour who was King of Kings payd not onely Himselfe […] Tribute to Caesar of 
a very different Opinion from His Doctrine, but enjoynd’ to all the rendring to Caesar 
what was Caesars: And St Paul Rom:13 enjoyns to all Christians absolute obedience, 
even for Conscience sake, to all Kings and Souvereign Authority’s.”192 
Provocatively, Finch argued that the historical conditions which enabled the rapid 
spread of Christianity repeated themselves during the seventh century CE/first century 
AH. Just as the early Church overthrew the pagan Roman cult in the face of civil 
oppression, the oppression of ‘Arrians’ by orthodox Trinitarians enabled Islam to 
flourish. After the bishop of Rome claimed universal jurisdiction over all spiritual 
matters, the church hierarchy erred fatally by attempting to “Lord it over the Consciences 
of their fellow Christians in the same height of Jurisdiction and Persecution th[a]t 
Heathen Rome Exercisd’.”193 In turn, both the Church and the Empire became vulnerable 
to precisely the same civil unrest and internal divisions which had been earlier been 
exploited by the Christians.  
Importantly, however, Finch’s model of ecclesiastical history and religious toleration 
was both cautionary and proscriptive. Persecuting the civil rights of religious dissenters, 
as in the case of the Christianized Roman Empire, leaves an empire vulnerable to 
rebellion and conquest. It was in precisely this context, Finch argues, that “Mahomet 
[began] to promulgate His Doctrine,” which capitalized intelligently on Christian disunity 
by offering religious toleration to the persecuted Arrian minority in the Levant and North 
Africa.194 Fatally weakened by its own policy of religious intolerance, “Christianity was it 
selfe pulld’ down by the same method in Asia and Africa that it had pulld’ down other 
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Religions; and Mahumetanism quickly gave by introducing Liberty of Conscience to all 
that deny Polytheisme Polytheisme (for they are obliged to cut of all th[a]t acknowledge 
not one God) as great a Blow to Christianity, as that gave to Idolatrous Ethnicism 
before.”195 
                                                          
195 Ibid.  Although Finch rarely acknowledged his sources, his account of early Islamic history is clearly 
paraphrased from Henry Stubbe’s 1671 The Originall and Progress of Mahometanism, as noted by both 
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Silvia Berti, Françoise Charles-Daubert, and Richard H Popkin [Dordrecht: Springer, 2011], 343, n.22; and 
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(see Nabil Matar, Henry Stubbe and the Beginnings of Islam the Originall & Progress of Mahometanism 
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Keeper of the Bodleian Library, and enjoyed extraordinary access to the Bodleian’s collection of Arabic 
texts, recently translated into Latin by Edward Pococke and Erpenius. As Matar has noted, Stubbe thought 
it important "that the study of the beginnings of Islam should be conducted through sources written in the 
language of Islam and by writers belonging to the world of Islam" (Matar, Henry Stubbe, 18).  Stubbe was 
especially reliant on historical texts written by four Christian Arabic scholars: Jibrā'īl al-Ṣuhyūnī (1577-
1648/985-1050), Jirjis ibn al-'Amīd al-Makīn (c. 1205-73/c. 602-672), Sa'īd ibn al-Baṭrīq (877-940/263-
328), and Abū al-Faraj (1226-86/623-85). These authors, writing as Christian Arabs in Muslim societies, 
deeply impressed Stubbe, who wrote that "It is certain that the Christians which lived under the 
Mahometans, as Elmacin & others, do mention Mahomet wth great respect as Mahomet of glorious 
memory" (quoted in Matar, Henry Stubbe, 18).  
Unfortunately, there is no extant correspondence between Stubbe and Finch, and no evidence that they ever 
met. Nevertheless, Finch clearly accessed at least a partial draft of the Originall, likely via his 
correspondence with the Conways. During the late 1660s, Stubbe belonged to the social milieu surrounding 
Anne and Edward Conway at Ragley, and was consulted during Anne’s chronic illness. In fact, one scholar 
has speculated that Edward Conway himself may have personally commissioned Stubbe to write the 
Originall; see James Jacob, Henry Stubbe, Radical Protestantism and the Early Enlightenment (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 76-7. 
In both his treatise and his 1674/5 report for Conway, he argues that the Christianized Roman Empire 
disintegrated for political reasons: by claiming persecutory rights over dissenters, he claimed that the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy fatally undermined the unity of Church and Empire, enabling the emergence of 
Islam.  This is an overt adaptation of Stubbe’s 1671 Originall, who argued that the unity of the early 
Church was shattered by moral degeneration and theological in-fighting. Corrupted by the post-Chalcedon 
ɶcumenical councils, Christianity “degenerated into such a kind of paganism as wanted nothing but the 
ancient sacrifices and professed polytheism, and, even as to the latter, there wanted not some who did make 
three gods of the Trinity” (Matar, Henry Stubbe, 102).  The resulting “ignorance […and] debauchery” 
provided an ideal environment for the emergence of a leader who, if he “did but live a pious, strict life, with 
great mortifications and outward devotion, and were but an eloquent preacher, he might in any place of the 
Eastern Empire make a potent sect instantly” (Matar, Henry Stubbe, 101).  
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Finch’s historical analysis of toleration and empire is, therefore, a case study in the 
virtue of peacefully accommodating religious dissenters. Promising religious liberty to 
persecuted Arrian Christians enabled the rapid expansion of the early Islamic kingdoms, 
but also consolidated their rule over ceded territories. In his view, it was thanks to the 
“Liberty of Conscience to all different Religions that acknowledge But one God” that the 
Ottomans “were assurd’ to keep the Conquests they had made; for nothing occasions such 
desperate Revolts and dangerous attempts as the oppressing [th]e Conscience; w[hi]ch 
being a Trade so universally practisd’ amongst Christians; the Turks find it a most 
beneficiall one to them”.196  
In Finch’s context, the clear implication of this historical account is that religious 
intolerance on the part of the English state will, inevitably, undermine the stability of the 
civil government. By juxtaposing the early Church’s self-imposed susceptibility to 
Islamic toleration with contemporary English politics, he strongly implied that the 
English state should consider religious toleration as a political strategy for avoiding a 
second Civil War.197 Although Finch never made this connection explicit, Thomas Baines 
was less coy in his 1676 report for Conway: “the Great Opposition which is made in 
England against Catholicks, is not made by the greatest part of Men simply upon the 
Score of Religion, but Upon the Score of Civill Rights.”198 While it is impossible to 
tolerate the incursion of papal claims to ecclesiastical authority in England, the two men 
were unambiguous that, in the interests of avoiding civil unrest and war, it was necessary 
to avoid unnecessary burdens upon the liberty of conscience.  
3.1.2 Toleration, skepticism, and ‘Humane Right’   
On historical grounds, then, Finch was convinced that civil oppressions levied on 
religious dissenters was a profound error of government. Religious intolerance fomented 
internal rebellion, allowed ecclesiastical authorities to usurp the coercive powers of the 
government, and exposed the state to external threats. It is also evident that he was 
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impressed by the political efficacy of the Ottoman model for toleration. For Finch, the 
‘Liberty of Conscience’ that the Ottomans extended to monotheists was essential to both 
the rapid expansion and the ongoing durability of their empire. Although Finch seems to 
have elided the early history of Islam with the contemporary Ottoman Empire, he did 
have access to reasonably accurate sources on Islamic history in the form of Henry 
Stubbe’s manuscripts (see above, n.15). Finally, in the context of the reports that he and 
Baines wrote to Edward Conway, it is clear that both men saw toleration as a normative 
principle of good government: toleration could stave off a second Civil War, and 
contribute to a project of empire-building.  
Finch also offered a robust philosophical case for the liberty of conscience as an 
individual right, on both epistemic and theological grounds. In fact, he articulated three 
arguments for a ‘Humane Right’ to the freedom of conscience, which I have described as 
the argument from epistemic skepticism, the argument from interiority, and the argument 
against coercion.199 This last argument is particularly pointed: in opposition to the 
prevalent Augustinian view that religious coercion was both effective and justified, Finch 
denied that it was either.  
Finch’s first philosophical argument for toleration is grounded in his epistemic 
skepticism. Although he firmly believed in the existence of incorporeal beings, including 
God, angels, and the human soul, he rejected the possibility of generating any reliable 
metaphysical knowledge. For Finch, all knowledge is derived through sense perception, 
or from subsequent reflection upon sensory information, “it being impossible to 
remember what is neither figurd’ in the mind by some Corporeall Shape; For the 
Imagination cannot convey anything to the memory, but what has first Enterd’ into 
itselfe; and therefore Every Object perceivd’ or understood, must be reppresented by 
Corporiety be it never so subtile.”200 Sense perceptions are generated by the body’s 
sensory organs – the ear, the eye, etc. – which are in turn delivered to the “Internal 
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Perceiving Faculty” in the form of ‘signatures,’ which “function like the shapes that make 
up letters of [the] alphabet.”201 
On this epistemic basis, Finch distinguished between absolute and relative 
knowledge. Because God, by definition, is unaffected by the epistemic limitations 
imposed by imperfect and finite sensory organs, only God is capable of possessing 
“Absolute Knowledge of any Being.”202 Humans, by contrast, are limited to “Relative 
knowledge,” not only of metaphysics and the natural world, but also of “Divine & 
Humane Truths being deliverd’ to Us by God Himselfe in Words, w[hi]ch can never 
Exhibit precisely the same Idea” between believers.203 Accordingly, Finch argued that it 
was “against Divine and Humane Right (since Man can understand Nothing but by 
Words) to impose a necessity of Believing any Truth Reveald’ by God, or deliverd’ by 
Man, exactly & Precisely according to the same Idea, without Latitude or Variation.”204 
Finch’s epistemic skepticism also informs his argument from interiority. If humans 
can only achieve relative epistemic certainty, then it follows that the “Interpretation of 
Scripture” is subject to “the Judgm[en]t of every Private Man,” and “Neither the Doctrine 
of the Church, nor the Interpretation of Scripture can be Infallibly enjoynd.’”205 As a 
result, enforcing religious belief is not only epistemically irrational, but an unacceptable 
usurpation of God’s authority. “God having reservd’ the Prerogative of καρδιογνῶσις206 
to Himselfe, & not having given any Men the Power of knowing the Hearts of others, He 
seems to give Men to understand, that what is in the Heart is out of their Jurisdiction and 
Authority.”207 Since only God is capable of knowing “when the Conscience or Inward 
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Man disobeys His Injunctions & Commands,” then only God has the right to “Impose 
Lawes to bind […] the Conscience.”208 
Finally, Finch supplies a thicket of arguments against the efficacy of enforcing 
belief. Belief, he argues, is purely internal, and cannot be coerced, “[f]or Outward Tyes 
upon Men, are like Prisons, Cords and Chains, w[hi]ch are Externall to their Bodyes, 
They keep them no Longer in hold when there are able to breake Them.”209 Furthermore, 
by definition, belief must be voluntary, for it is not the “Part of Religion to force 
Religion; w[hi]ch ought to be undertaken voluntarily, not by compulsion, since the very 
sacrifices are calld’ for from a Willing Mind.”210 Finally, he argues that compelling belief 
has little effect besides turning a dissenter into a hypocrite, since “forcing a Man to an 
Outward Profession contrary to His Inward Perswasion, is but to Improve the Guilt of 
Him, who sayes He Believes what He does Not.”211 
In the context of the late seventeenth century, it is important to note that Finch 
argued that coercion is neither effective nor justified for the promotion of religious belief. 
In his Treatise Concerning the Correction of the Donatists, Augustine offered a powerful 
theological rationale for religious persecution, arguing for the legitimacy of correcting 
unorthodox practices through force: “men should actually be compelled to the feast of 
everlasting salvation […] He who is compelled is forced to go where he had no wish to 
go, but when he has come in, he partakes of the feast right willingly.”212  This formulation 
framed debates over religious toleration during the seventeenth century, and was 
repeatedly cited by authors who sought to justify persecution. In his very public duel with 
John Locke, for instance, Jonas Proast offered a qualified version of Augustine’s formula, 
arguing that “though no force can compel men to embrace (if by that you mean, to 
believe) the doctrine of others that differ from them, yet some force may induce those 
who would not otherwise to hear what may and ought to move them to embrace the 
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truth.”213 Ultimately, Finch offers a remarkably robust articulation of toleration as a 
fundamental right. “Wee must confesse that God having created Man with freedome of 
will or in manu Consily Sui in the hand of His own Counsell, The Conscience of Men 
ought to be free, it being not in [th]e Power of man to take away or alter, that w[hi]ch was 
the gift of God to Man as part of His Nature. […] Tis of Humane Right & Naturall 
Power, for every one to Worship what he beleives. Nor does the Religion of another, 
prejudice or profitt any Man.”214 This is a substantially more robust claim than simply 
asserting the inefficacy of coercion, a position which would leave half of the Augustinian 
formula unchallenged. By positing a ‘Humane Right’ to the individual liberty of 
conscience, Finch firmly denied both the legitimacy and the efficacy of coercion for 
promoting religious belief. 
3.2 Toleration and ecclesiology: From liberty to coercion    
Earlier, I suggested that Finch’s proposed toleration for the individual liberty of 
conscience would prove significant. Although he offers a remarkably robust defense of 
religious toleration, on historical, pragmatic, and philosophical grounds, we have not yet 
asked how he defined ‘liberty of conscience.’ When we investigate Finch’s 
presuppositions in greater detail, we find that his is a philosophy which prizes liberty and 
coercion in equal measure – to paraphrase Ethan Shagan, it is a ‘subtly violent’ 
philosophy, in which state power and circumscribed liberty are equal partners in a theory 
of sovereignty.215  
In this section, I draw upon Shagan’s interpretation of tolerationist authors in 
seventeenth-century England, in order to understand the relationship between liberty and 
coercion in Finch’s thought. During the seventeenth century, the language of 
‘moderation’ was a key element of political discourse in early modern England. 
Traditionally, historians have taken early moderns at their word when they claim to be 
‘moderate’: however, a host of new interpretive possibilities appear when we understand 
that, in early modern England, ‘moderation’ was both a “state of equipoise and the act of 
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restraint that produced it.”216 “Moderation had a variety of meanings in early modern 
England, centred on ideas of restraint, limitation, governance, or control. 
Paradigmatically, this meant self-restraint […] Yet moderation also meant external 
restraint, quintessentially the kind enforced by authority upon those unable to moderate 
themselves.”217  
For our purposes, Shagan’s analysis of religious toleration is particularly vital. 
During the seventeenth century, the defense of religious freedom was almost invariably 
articulated alongside an “assault on immorality.”218 In An Address to Protestants upon the 
Present Conjuncture (1679), for instance, William Penn vigorously defended religious 
toleration, but simultaneously displaced moral behaviour from the jurisdiction of the 
church, to an interest of the state. “Those impieties that relate more particularly to the 
state to correct are drunkenness, whoredoms and fornications; excess in apparel and 
furniture and living; profuse gaming; and finally oaths, profaneness and blasphemy.”219  
This juxtaposition of liberty and moral restraint is not evidence that a given author 
failed to fully secularize or liberalize his thought, nor is it a “byproduct of tolerationist 
thought [or] a response to conservative criticism.” Rather, “[u]niveralising arguments for 
religious toleration became moderate and hence virtuous precisely because they bridled 
sin.”220 It is crucial to understanding Finch’s thought that “seventeenth century writers 
[…] never imagined a toleration that was not always already a concomitant restraint; their 
intellectual projects justified the state's toleration of certain dubious beliefs and practices 
by arguing that such toleration more firmly established the state's capacity to restrain 
other dubious beliefs and practices.”221  
As I will argue, both the ends and the means of Finch’s theory of sovereignty are 
ecclesiological. In order to eliminate theological differences between Christian 
denominations, he argues for a sort of theological minimalism – a ‘lowest common 
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denominator’ version of the church, to which any reasonable Christian could assent. In so 
doing, he radically narrows the jurisdiction of the church, to such an extent that religious 
communities have no independent authority over their own members. Religious freedom 
is an individual right, not a communal right: an individual has the right to believe 
whatever she pleases, but not to join a dissenting church.  
This minimalist ecclesiology enables him to simultaneously advocate for the liberty 
of conscience, on political, theological, and ecclesiological grounds, and for the 
intolerance of dissenting or non-conforming Christian denominations. As a result, a 
Christian monarch has total jurisdiction over every aspect of religion that is not strictly 
interior: he has the right not only to demand conformity to the Church of England, but 
also to assert his authority over the Church itself. Ultimately, for Finch, religious 
toleration and religious oppression become complementary aspects of an imperial 
ecclesiology. 
3.2.1 Finch’s ecclesiology  
According to Finch, Christianity can be reduced to three components: “No Church can be 
deny’d to be a True Church, where the Faith of Christ is preachd’, The Sacraments are 
rightly administred; and none of its Doctrines directly repugnant to the Word of God.”222 
Ostensibly, this minimal version of Christianity is intended to secure the “peace of 
Conscience and Peace of the Church,” by rendering the “divisions and animosity’s 
w[hi]ch proceed from our Lusts Jam[es] 4:1” moot. 223 At the same time, this is an 
extraordinarily narrow ecclesiological view. By “Reduc[ing] Things finally but to the 
Holy Scriptures; and oblig[ing] Christians to nothing more then what is contained there,” 
Finch excludes religious practices from the definition of ‘religion’ in a single stroke. 224 
This ecclesiological minimalism has profound consequences for both the relationship 
between the established church and the state, and for the practical utility of the 
individual’s right to liberty of conscience.  
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Because Finch defines the church as an organization that preaches the Christian faith 
and administers the sacraments, the jurisdiction of the church is narrowly confined to 
matters of internal belief. As a result, an extraordinarily broad category of religious 
practices are extraneous to Christian worship, and outside the jurisdiction of the Church – 
including “the wearing of the Surplice, the use of the Cross in Baptisme, the Ring in 
Marriage and Sett forms of Prayer; or any Ceremony’s that are not absolutely in 
themselves sinfull.”225  
Importantly, it was precisely these embodied religious practices that grounded Tudor 
and Stuart claims to royal supremacy over the Church, and which were most fiercely 
contested between conformists to and dissenters from the Church of England. The 1533 
Act of Restraint in Appeals legally established the independence of the Church of 
England from the Roman Catholic Church, and codified the English monarch’s 
jurisdiction over matters of Christian worship in England. As Walter Ullmann has argued, 
Henry VIII’s ideological and legal claims to sovereignty were adapted from the Roman 
imperial model, assuming “the sum-total of all the rights and functions which the late 
Roman emperor had, hence was rex who in his kingdom was imperator."226 This is not to 
imply that the Tudors harboured any universalist ambitions, but rather that Henry VIII 
sought to “play in his own kingdom the role and function of the late Roman emperor 
which was abundantly documented in the easily available Roman law.”227 Accordingly, 
the Tudor claim to ecclesiastical authority indigenized the Roman formula for imperial 
power: that "Ius publicum in sacris, in sacerdotibus et in magistratibus consistit.”228 
Imperial sovereignty, according to this conceptualization, did not involve an 
extraterritorial political claim, but rather a claim to undivided authority within the bounds 
of a given kingdom. In ecclesiastical matters, this bifurcated the legal authority over the 
Church of England into two categories. The monarch’s authority extended to both the 
governance of the church, and to the establishment of external, embodied practices of 
                                                          
225 Ibid., 473.  
226 Walter Ullmann, “This Realm of England Is an Empire,” The Journal of Ecclesiastical History 30 
(1979): 198. 
227 Ibid., 176. 
228 Ibid., 179. “The public law consists in the objects of religious cults, in the administrators of sacred 
matters (or, jurisdiction over them), and the civil service” (translation mine).   
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worship – called adiaphora, or ‘things indifferent,’ which were considered extraneous to 
belief.229 This authority did not extend to sacerdotal, or priestly, functions: the Church 
was solely responsible for administering the sacraments, ordaining priests, and 
consecrating bishops.230 
It is difficult to overstate the centrality of this legal formula to subsequent Tudor and 
Stuart claims to royal supremacy over the Church of England; and more broadly, to 
debates over the governance of the church and religious toleration for dissenters. 231 In 
1559, the Henrician model of church governance was revived by the Act of Supremacy, 
which confirmed Elizabeth I’s right to wield the powers which had been granted to her 
father by the Acts of Appeals, Annates, and Submissions.232 Following the Restoration of 
the monarchy in 1660, the Restoration church settlement once again established the 
monarch’s jurisdiction over adiaphora and the governance of the church. In 1662, the Act 
of Uniformity “ordered, firstly, that all clergy swear their ‘unfeigned assent and consent’” 
to the use of the Book of Common Prayer, which had not been revised to address the 
concerns of puritans.233 Once again, the monarch’s jurisdiction over external religious 
practices became a flashpoint between religious conformists and dissenters. The “rites, 
gestures, ceremonies, and vestments which had annoyed puritans since the 1560s were 
                                                          
229 Ibid. See also Jacqueline Rose, “Royal Ecclesiastical Supremacy and the Restoration Church,” 
Historical Research 80 (2007): 324–345.  
230 Jacqueline Rose, Godly Kingship in Restoration England: The Politics of the Royal Supremacy, 1660-
1688 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 50. 
231 Relatively little has been written about the royal supremacy or the theory of church governance in early 
modern England. The best and most recent publication is Jacqueline Rose, Godly Kingship in Restoration 
England: The Politics of the Royal Supremacy, 1660-1688, 2013, 7; but see also John Marshall, “The 
Ecclesiology of the Latitude-Men 1660–1689: Stillingfleet, Tillotson and ‘Hobbism,’” The Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History 36 (1985): 407–27, and Jan Wojcik, “‘Behold the Fear of the Lord’: The Erastianism 
of Stillingfleet, Wolseley, and Tillotson,” in Heterodoxy, Spinozism, and Free Thought in Early-
Eighteenth-Century Europe: Studies on the Traite Des Trois Imposteurs, ed. Silvia Berti, Françoise 
Charles-Daubert, and Richard H Popkin (Dordrecht; London: Springer, 2011), 357–74, for the influence of 
Erastian thought during the 1670s and 1680s, especially amongst the so-called 'Latitudinarians.' On the role 
of civil religion in early modern English scholarship, see Mark Goldie, “Civil Religion and the English 
Enlightenment,” in Politics, Politeness and Patriotism, ed. Gordon Schochet (Washington: Folger Institute, 
1993), 31–46, and also Mark Goldie, “Toleration and the Godly Prince in Restoration England,” in Liberty, 
Authority, Formality: Political Ideas and Culture, 1600-1900., ed. John Morrow (Luton: Andrews, 2012), 
45–65. Finally, Justin Champion has begun to investigate ecclesiology as a 'language of political thought' in 
early modern England; see “Some Forms of Religious Liberty: Political Thinking, Ecclesiology and 
Religious Freedom in Early Modern England” (2014). 
232 Rose, Godly Kingship in Restoration England, 2013, 45–46. 
233 Ibid., 7. 
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retained: kneeling to receive Communion, signing the cross in baptism, and wearing the 
surplice would thus remain Restoration complaints.”234 As Jacqueline Rose has noted, the 
Oath of Supremacy first legislated under Henry VIII in 1533 was not repealed until 
1689.235  
In this context, Finch’s decision to place ‘the use of the Cross in Baptisme, the Ring 
in Marriage and Sett forms of Prayer’ outside of the church’s jurisdiction is not simply an 
assortment of religious practices, but rather a direct intervention into an explosive debate 
surrounding worship, religious freedom, and church government. Behind Finch’s bland 
phrasing is a deliberate intention to eliminate the freedom of religious dissenters to 
translate their convictions into practice. Because these ‘things indifferent,’ or adiaphora, 
are excluded from the definition of ‘religion,’ there is no need to tolerate those who 
conscientiously object to them. Indeed, Finch explicitly affirms that there is no liberty of 
conscience in matters of religious practice. “Nothing therefore can be sufficiently cogent 
to a Christian to breake of the Communion with the Church He is born a Member of, and 
to become a Dissentor or Nonconformist (to avoid the odious names of Separatist & 
Schismatick) But that He apprehends Himselfe out of the State of Salvation under The 
Communion of such a Church.”236  
This requirement is even stricter than it appears at first glance. Finch uses the term 
‘apprehend’ in its strongest possible epistemological sense. It is not enough to simply 
object to a given doctrine of the Church on conscientious grounds: rather, “receding from, 
and forsaking a Church a Man is a Member of, requires two things.”237 A legitimate 
dissenter must not only provide “powerfull Arguments, of High Probability at Least,” for 
the sinfulness of a given doctrine: the doctrines of the church in question must actually be 
“Damnable.”238 Paradoxically, by positing a version of Christianity stripped down to three 
minimal propositions, Finch narrows the legitimate grounds for dissent so drastically that 
the right to liberty of conscience is virtually meaningless. 
                                                          
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid., 46. 
236 LRO Finch MS, DG7 lit. 9, 472.   
237 Ibid., 475.  
238 Ibid.  
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Indeed, on the basis on his epistemic minimalism, Finch argued that Christians 
should default to religious conformity. As we have seen, Finch posited that human 
knowledge was relative, in that it was subject to the inherent limitations of sensory 
organs. Accordingly, there is little to adjudicate between the claims of the established 
church and religious dissenters, and “they th[a]t conform to the Governm[en]t may be as 
Conscientiously perswaded of [th]e Justnesse of what the Governm[en]t enjoyns, out of 
an Inward Principle, as well as Dissentors of the Contrary.”239 In the absence of any 
conclusive theological or epistemic evidence, he asserts that “the Conscience w[hi]ch is 
for preserving what is according to Law, is caeteris paribus [all other things being equall] 
most preferable, and in things indifferent alwayes so.”240 
In fact, Finch goes so far as to make morality itself a creature of government. 
Because “all Men have equal Authority in pronouncing anything Good or Reasonable,” 
two conflicting “Edicts […] were candidates of Equall Pretensions to Good.”241 In order 
to preserve the unity of sovereignty within a state, Finch asserts that moral disagreements 
must be resolved by the government, which “steps in, and siding with one Party, make 
one opinion Good and the other Bad by Law.”242  
In short, imposition in things indifferent does not abrogate the liberty of conscience, 
precisely because Finch has defined the Church so minimally. There is no legitimate 
dissent from a church which restricts itself to the requirements of scripture and the 
administration of the sacraments: and because those grounds explicitly exclude 
adiaphora, or ‘things indifferent,’ conscientious objections over religious practices are 
not protected by the liberty of conscience. 243  In other words, Finch’s ecclesiology is one 
which simultaneously defends and delimits liberty. By simultaneously extending the 
liberty of conscience as a ‘Humane Right,’ and defining the appropriate scope of 
                                                          
239 Ibid., 425.  
240 Ibid., 473.  
241 Ibid., 417.  
242 Ibid.  
243 This argument departs significantly from Sarah Hutton’s view of Finch; see “Sir John Finch and 
Religious Toleration” (Firenze, 2011), passim but esp. 292-4. For Hutton, Finch’s “doctrinal minimalism 
might be used to promote religious eirenicism” (292).  
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conscience so narrowly as to make legitimate dissent virtually impossible, he ultimately 
invests the monarch with extraordinarily broad ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 
3.2.2 Toleration in practice: Jews, Muslims, and Christian non-conformists  
This imperial ecclesiology is the driving force behind Finch’s recommendations for 
religious toleration in practice: for Finch, the liberty of conscience, though a ‘Humane 
Right,’ was secondary to the sovereignty of the civil monarch. Judaism and Islam, the 
two other monotheistic religions which had ‘orespread almost all [th]e whole world,’ 
were not only to be tolerated, but might even be (admittedly imperfect) routes to 
salvation. By contrast, dissenting Christian denominations, with the possible exception of 
the Quakers, were intolerable threats to the sovereignty of the state. The unifying feature 
between these recommendations is an ecclesiological question: if, in Finch’s estimation, a 
given religious community claims ecclesiastic authority that threatens the unitary, and 
unified, sovereignty of the state, then the ‘Humane Right’ to liberty of conscience must 
be abrogated.  
Finch was far from immune to contemporary prejudices regarding Jews and 
Muslims. In his 1674/5 report for Conway, for instance, he asserts that “The fourth Great 
Point that tends to Enlargement of Empire is the Liberty of Every Mans having 4 Wives; 
and as many Concubines as He Can maintain.”244 Indeed, in his estimation, the majority 
of Christian conversions to Islam could be explained by concupiscence –  which, he 
observed with anticlerical relish, was a particular affliction of “Fryers & Ecclesiasticall 
Persons.”245 Finch’s interest in Muslim sexuality and gender relations is quintessentially 
orientalist, although unlike many of his peers, he saw Ottoman gender relations as a 
model worth replicating, rather than evidence of his own superior self-mastery.246 Both 
                                                          
244 BL Add. MS 23215, f. 79v.  
245 Ibid. Cultural anxiety about the prevalence of Christian conversions to Islam was widespread in England 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; see Nabil Matar, Islam in Britain, 1558-1685 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 14-20; and esp. ch.1, 'Conversion to Islam in English Writings,' 21-49. 
Although precise statistics are unavailable, it is likely that there were thousands of Christian converts 
during the period; in 1619, for instance, the author of Relations of the Christianitie of Africa noted that 857 
Germans and 300 English had converted (Matar, Islam in Britain, 35). These ‘renegades,’ as contemporary 
authors described them, prompted massive cultural anxiety and theological embarrassment, especially 
considering the near-absence of recorded Muslim conversions to Christianity.  
246 Finch devotes more than an entire sheet of his 1674/5 report for Conway to a description of women’s 
clothing and social roles (BL Add. MS 23215, ff. 79v-81r).  His language strongly reflects contemporary 
English discourse regarding Muslim sexuality; see e.g., Lancelot Addison, The First State of Mahumedism, 
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Finch and Baines also traffic in Jewish stereotyping, although they refer to Jews far less 
frequently than Muslims. In a letter dated May 25, 1674, for instance, Baines informed 
Conway of Finch’s skillful negotiations with “[th]e faithlesse Greeke & false Jew.”247 
At the same time, both men appear to have personally interacted with Ottoman 
subjects on a basis of mutual respect. As the ambassador from an important trading 
partner, Finch belonged to and socialized with the Ottoman social elite: as John-Paul 
Ghobrial has noted, “the identities that mattered most in Istanbul were not always those 
prescribed by Ottoman law – musta’min/subject, Christian/Muslim – but rather the social 
distinctions that marked elites off from everyone else.”248   In the course of his 
ambassadorial duties, Finch was an invited guest at high-level court functions.249 In 
1676/1087, for instance, Finch traveled to Edirne (Adrianople) to attend the circumcision 
celebrations for the sultan’s eldest son, later Mustafa II (r.1693-1703/981-1004). John 
Coke, the Levant Company’s secretary in Istanbul, accompanied Finch, and published an 
account of the celebrations later that year. Coke was keen to inform the English reading 
public that they were well-served by Finch’s diplomatic efforts, writing that “To our own 
private Affairs his Excellency my Lord Ambassador Sir John Finch had all 
                                                          
Being an Exact Account of Mahomed, the Author of the Turkish Religion, EEBO (London : Printed for Will 
Crook, 1687), esp. 135-6. While Finch replicated this discourse, however, he drew precisely the opposite 
conclusion to authors like Addison, for whom Ottoman sexuality and gender relations were proof of 
Christian superiority. Finch admired what he understood about the role of women in Ottoman society, and 
considered it one of their public policies that “tends to Enlargement of Empire” (BL Add. MS 23215, 79v). 
According to Finch, because “the whole Sexe is Left to their home devotions, and conversations one with 
another […] it comes to passe that the Governm[en]t of this Empire is wholly Masculine; w[hi]ch it is in no 
part of Christendome” (Ibid., 80r). This is an unusual and disturbing synthesis between orientalism and 
early modern discourse on gender relations; as Ethan Shagan has argued, early modern moderation was 
“routinely described as quintessentially masculine, and masculinity as quintessentially moderate” (Shagan, 
The Rule of Moderation, 63). In this context, Finch’s interest in regulating women’s appearance and 
presence in the public sphere is a logical extension of his broader project to extend the state’s sovereignty 
over the embodied practices of everyday life; although this thesis focuses on religious practices, the same 
might be said of gender relations.    
247 TNA SP 97/19, f. 206r, Baines to Conway, May 25, 1674.  
248 Ghobrial, The Whispers of Cities, 85; for more on elite sociability in the Ottoman empire, see ch. 3, 
'European-Ottoman Sociability in Istanbul,' 65-87. 
249 See ‘Remarques in Turky of [th]e Country: And at Audiences with foreign Ministers in these Parts,’ 
LRO Finch MS, Box 4988. See also the diary of John Covel (1638-1722), the chaplain to the Levant 
Company during Finch’s embassy, which records numerous audiences between Finch, Baines, and various 
members of the Ottoman political and religious elite. The most accessible version of Covel’s diary is an 
abbreviated section published in 1893; see  John Covel, Early Voyages and Travels in the Levant, ed. J. 
Theodore Bent, Hakluyt Society 87 (London: Printed for the Hakluyt Society, 1893). 
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satisfaction.”250 This example nicely illustrates the importance of Finch’s membership in 
the Ottoman social elite to his overall diplomatic project, both materially and rhetorically: 
publicly performing his social status facilitated his relationships with ranking Ottoman 
bureaucrats, and communicated his (and the Company’s) importance to the English 
public.  
Finch clearly respected many of the Ottoman officials whom he encountered in the 
course of his mercantile and ambassadorial duties. In 1674/5, for instance, he informed 
his sister Anne that one “Chusain Aga’,” an official responsible for customs collections in 
Istanbul, was “the most Subtile manager of his charge that has been [th]e Memory of 
man; & I could wish our Merch[a]nts did not find it so.”251 He was also impressed by the 
novelty of socializing without alcohol, and wrote that the “whole Discourse of the People 
is Grave, Sedate, and without Heat; their words are slow the People being thoughtful; 
attributing the haste and Heat of Speaking usd’ by most Christians to their being at the 
best not quite Sober.”252 Finally, there is evidence that he and Baines were interested in 
religious dialogue with Muslims, and were open to genuinely learning from those 
encounters. John Covel’s diary records a theological disputation between Baines and 
Vānī Meḥmed Efendi (d. 1684/1094), an influential and charismatic Qāḍīzādeli 
preacher,253 during which the two spoke about Islamic thought, particularly the nature of 
the soul, the status of women, and religious toleration.254  
                                                          
250 John Coke, A True Narrative of the Great Solemnity of the Circumcision of Mustapha Prince of Turkie, 
Eldest Son of Sultan Mahomet [...]; Being in Company with His Excellency the Lord Embassador Sir John 
Finch., EEBO (London: printed by J[ames] C[ottrell] for William Crook, 1676), 6. 
251 BL Add. MS 23215, f. 84v.  
252 Ibid., f. 79.  
253 Ghobrial, The Whispers of Cities, 48. Efendi was highly popular with Sultan Meḥmed IV and his 
household. He was one of several influential preachers associated with the Qāḍīzādeli movement, a 
"passionately devout, markedly anti-mystical group of Muslim mosque preachers on the periphery of the 
Ottoman religious establishment" which consolidated into an influential revivalist movement, with strong 
ties to the imperial household, around 1650-1/1061 (Simeon Evstatiev, “The Qāḍīzādeli Movement and the 
Spread of Islamic Revivalism in the Seventeenth- and Eighteenth Century Ottoman Empire,” Centre for 
Advanced Study Sofia Working Paper Series, no. 5 [2013]: 4, and 1–34).  
254 Covel, Early Voyages and Travels in the Levant, 268–72. As an historical source, Covel’s account of 
this disputation, dated 10 August 1675/18 Jumada 1086, must be approached with care. First, Covel was 
not actually present, and seems to have synthesized his account from a conversation with Baines and the 
recollection of one of the dragomans present. Finch himself refers to the conversation, but provides no date 
(LRO Finch MS, DG7 lit. 9, 71). However, it is difficult to imagine why Covel – who directly served Finch 
as the Company’s chaplain in the Levant – would be inclined to exaggerate, or why Baines would 
misrepresent his experience to his personal chaplain. Second, it is important to foreground a double power 
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In short, the manuscript record does not support any definitive statement regarding 
Finch’s personal attitudes towards non-Christians. It seems most likely that he and Baines 
internalized broad cultural stereotypes, but engaged in respectful professional and social 
relationships with individual Muslims, in the context of the Ottoman social elite. In his 
political and theological thought, however, Finch is far less opaque: religious toleration 
should be extended to both Jews and Muslims. His most sophisticated argument for 
tolerating non-Christians is articulated in his treatise manuscript, and relies upon a 
conceptual distinction between ‘hearers’ – those who deliberately reject Christianity – 
and ‘non-hearers.’ ‘Non-hearers,’ who had never been exposed to Christianity, could 
nevertheless enjoy salvation if they “Livd’ with th[a]t measure of light they had originally 
Implanted in them.”255 It is for that reason, he argues, that “Enoch, Noah, Abraham, & 
                                                          
dynamic between Baines and Vānī Efendi. On the one hand, Baines was deeply self-conscious of his status 
as a religious minority in this context, especially relative to Efendi, who had powerful connections to the 
imperial court. On the other hand, Baines’s quintessentially orientalist line of questioning about Muslim 
women suggests that, at the outset of the disputation, his intent was to embarrass Efendi. As Nabil Matar 
has noted, the trajectory of Baines’s attitude, from brazen self-confidence to humiliation, humility, and 
(apparently genuine) growth characterizes the conversation as a fascinating encounter in the broader history 
of inter-religious dialogue. For more on the disputation as a genre of inter-religious dialogue during the late 
medieval and early modern periods, and for a discussion of this particular encounter in that broader context, 
see Nabil Matar, “The Anglo-Muslim Disputation in the Early Modern Period,” in Cultural Encounters 
between East and West, 1453-1699, ed. Matthew Birchwood and Matthew Dimmock (Amersham: 
Cambridge Scholars, 2005), 39–40. From Covel’s diary:  
“Sr. Tho. B. said he had heard many things which he now found not truly reported of them [Muslims], and 
he had read their Alcoran, which he now sees wrongly translated; both which rather prejudic’d him then 
furthered him in his belief, and many there are who never heard of it at all; supposed such a one (who never 
heard) to be a Christian and live well, whether he might be saved? He answer’d not close to the point. Sr. 
Tho. told what kind of Christian he was, viz., he would rather dye then worship either crosse, Picture, 
Images, or the like. He adored onely one true God, and lived in his fear onely; he believed a Musselman, 
living up to the height of his law, may be undoubtedly saved. He thought himselfe obliged (though it was 
never so absolutely in his power to do it) not to touch a hair of a Musselman’s head for his difference in 
religion, but rather to help, relieve, and cherish them in every good office that he was able to do for them. 
Here Sr. Th. B. saies he wept, and said he could not believe any Christian came so near true Musselmen, 
but that they all had been Idolators; and the Standers by (which were many) cryed out E Adám – he was a 
Good Man. […] Vaní pressing the perfection of his law, and the necessity of turning to it, Sr. Tho. said he 
was now about 55 years of age, and his bones were dryed and hardened to their forme; and his 
understanding was in like manner settled by long practice of his own religion, and it would be a hard task, 
and of some long time, to unrivet his notions. Vanī bad him welcome, desired more frequent converse, 
assuring him all security and freedome” (Covel, Early Voyages, 271).  
255 LRO Finch MS, DG7 lit. 9, 452. This strongly recalls John Covel’s account of the 1675/1086 
conversation between Baines and Vānī Efendi, particularly Baines’ reported assertion that “he believed a 
Musselman, living up to the height of his law, may be undoubtedly saved” (see above, n. 74).  
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Job […] were righteo[u]s before the Law & before Christ,” along with virtuous classical 
philosophers.256 
Provocatively, Finch proceeds to compare contemporary “Jews, Turkes, & Pagans” 
to these righteous ‘non-hearers.’257 On a fundamental level, he argues, education and 
upbringing inevitably shape the epistemic context of an adult believer. “Now how near to 
the Condition of Non Hearers approach, those th[a]t are Hearers, but under the Prejudice 
of Education, or other Prevalent Circumstances repugnant to the Doctrine of Christ, as 
Jews, Turkes, & Pagans.”258 Rhetorically, Finch distances himself from the full 
theological implication of this argument. He quickly asserts that “no Name under heaven 
is given by w[hi]ch Men can be savd’ but that of Jesus Christ,” and frames the argument 
as an open question.259 Taken to its logical conclusion, however, his suggestion is that 
‘Jews, Turkes, & Pagans’ are ontologically equivalent to virtuous ‘non-hearers,’ and are 
therefore eligible for salvation.   
It is possible that Finch was even more theologically sympathetic to Judaism and 
Islam in private. Among his uncalendared papers is an undated document in his hand, 
titled ‘How farr Humane Reason is exercisd’ in matters of Religion.’260 The document, 
which occupies 11 folio sheets, appears to be a preliminary draft of material that was later 
included in his much longer treatise manuscript.261 Remarkably, in a section on the early 
history of the Church, he claims that “the Great Religions w[hi]ch have now orespread 
almost all [th]e whole world though repugnant to each other the Jewish, Christian, & 
Mahumetan Professions, doe not-withstanding all three agree the old Testament is [th]e 
                                                          
256 Ibid.  
257 Ibid.  
258 Ibid.  
259 Ibid.  
260 LRO Finch MS, Box 4987, Packet of loose papers, uncalendared. The box contains approx. 107 pages of 
papers, in both quarto and folio, all in Finch’s hand; the majority are undated.  
261 One of the clearest indications is a long section devoted to the early Christian martyrs. In his treatise 
manuscript, composed sometime between 1675-81, Finch argued that if ‘Liberty of Conscience’ is not 
permissible, then the Roman emperors must be commended for ‘Murdering of all that Noble Army of 
Martyrs’ (LRO Finch MS, DG7 lit. 9, ff. 454-6). In ‘How farr Humane Reason is exercisd’ in matters of 
Religion,’ Finch offers a numbered list of arguments for the reasonableness of Christianity. The fourth 
hinges on the ‘suffering of so many Martyr’s,’ and glosses several primary sources from the Bible and 
Tertullian (LRO Finch MS, Box 4987, uncalendared). It seems likely that this document functioned as a 
commonplace notebook, which Finch later drew on whilst drafting his treatise.  
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Word of God, w[hi]ch nothing but Truth could Extract Out of the mouths of declard’ 
adversaries in Religion.”262 
Nevertheless, Finch’s proposed toleration for Jews and Muslims is grounded in a 
pragmatic, ecclesiological calculation, not a principle of mutual regard. Finch is 
unambiguous that “Jewes, Turkes, & Pagans” should be “Indulgd’ Toleration,” which is 
not a formula which appears anywhere else in his political writing.263 In this context, the 
term ‘indulgence’ is used in a technical sense, referring to a particular legal instrument. 
Under English law, only an Act of Parliament could fully rescind statutory law; however, 
it was the monarch’s legal prerogative to personally excuse “individuals from the effects 
of statutes, or to suspend statutes universally.”264 This unilateral legal instrument was 
referred to as either a ‘declaration of indulgence’ or the monarch’s ‘dispensing power.’ In 
the context of religious toleration, this prerogative was the king’s “main means to exempt 
nonconformists from the obligation of religious uniformity.”265 Paradoxically, this power 
meant that, in the face of a staunchly Anglican Parliament, late seventeenth-century 
Puritans, Catholics, and other religious non-conformists often staked their hopes for 
toleration on the indulgence of the monarch, and advocated strongly for the royal 
supremacy.266 In 1662 and 1672, Charles II issued Declarations of Indulgence in an 
attempt to “comfort peaceable Dissenters” from the Church of England, both of which 
failed in the midst of bitter jurisdictional battles between the crown and Parliament.267  
Accordingly, Finch’s proposal to ‘indulge’ toleration for Jews and Muslims has 
political, legal, and ecclesiastical significance. Politically, it reflects his staunch royalism, 
and his support for the monarch’s supremacy over the Church of England. Indeed, as the 
Attorney General from 1670-3, Finch’s brother, Heneage Finch (1621-82)268, was 
                                                          
262 LRO Finch MS, Box 4987, ‘How farr Humane Reason is exercisd’ in matters of Religion,’ f. 3r.  
263 LRO Finch MS, DG7 lit. 9, 454.  
264 Rose, Godly Kingship in Restoration England, 2013, 90. 
265 Ibid. 
266 Rose, Godly Kingship in Restoration England, 2013, 5–6, 174–81. 
267 Ibid., 95. For the Stuart Declarations of Indulgence more generally, see ch. 2 passim., 89-128. The 1689 
Bill of Rights did not ban the dispensing power outright, but “left to judicial construction a statutory ban on 
the use of the dispensing power ‘as it hath been exercised of late’” (idid., 91). However, the crown never 
attempted to exercise the dispensing power again.  
268 Heneage Finch (1621-1682) shared a name with John Finch’s first cousin, also Heneage Finch (1628-
1689), mentioned above on p. 48.   
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responsible for defending Charles II’s second attempt to use indulgence to lift penal 
sanctions from religious dissenters. Although Charles ultimately withdrew the 1672 
Declaration, Heneage Finch “argued that Charles’s ecclesiastical headship meant that 
changes to religion and canons needed statutory authority, but insisted kings could 
dispense particular individuals.”269  
Legally, it indicates that Finch did not propose toleration per se for Jews and 
Muslims. Rather than repealing the statutory restrictions places on both groups, his 
proposed strategy mirrors his brother Heneage’s argument for indulgence: that the 
statutory intolerance of Jews and Muslims would be suspended by the monarch’s 
unilateral declaration. In fact, that was exactly the legal status of the Jewish population in 
England during the 1670s. Having been forcibly expelled from England in 1290, Jews 
were first readmitted during the 1650s by Oliver Cromwell, who used “personal 
prerogative powers to allow private but not public worship.”270 This indulgence was 
extended by his monarchical successors, and by 1677, the Jewish community in England 
had grown to approximately 500 people.271  
Ecclesiastically, Finch’s defense of indulgence as a legal instrument indicates that his 
proposed toleration would extend to Jews and Muslims on an individual, not a 
communitarian basis. This is particularly significant with relation to Muslims. Early 
modern travel writers repeatedly echoed the idea that Muslims were subject to a 
transnational religious authority. In A Voyage into the Levant (1636), Henry Blount wrote 
that “All these Sects [of Muslims] are governed by one Head, called the Mufty, whose 
authority unites, and orders them […] This Mufty is created by the Emperour, to whom 
he is held ever subordinate.”272 Conceptually, many English writers equated the “mufti in 
Constantinople” with the Roman Catholic Pope, whose claims to universal jurisdiction 
were seen as an intolerable attempt to subvert the monarchy.273 For this reason, it is 
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272 Henry Blount, A Voyage into the Levant (Amsterdam and Norwood: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum and 
Johnson, 1636 [repr. 1977]), 79. 
273 Vernon, Locke on Toleration, 36. John Locke’s claim that Muslims are intolerable, if “they admit that 
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ecclesiologicaly significant that Finch calls for the indulgence of Muslims on an 
individual basis: by doing so, he intentionally sidesteps the potential for a conflict 
between the jurisdictional claims made by ‘the mufti’ and the English state. Certainly, 
Finch is relying on some nimble legal argumentation – but at least conceptually, 
‘indulging’ rather than ‘tolerating’ Muslims allows him to simultaneously defend their 
right to liberty of conscience, while preserving the state’s unitary sovereignty.   
By contrast, Finch’s discussions of non-conforming and dissenting Christian 
denominations are largely hostile to the possibility of toleration. Whereas Jews and 
Muslims do in fact merit religious toleration, in the form of the monarch’s indulgence, 
Finch subjects dissenting Christian sects to aggressive state intervention.  
Finch’s attitudes towards Roman Catholics, in particular, are a mixture of personal 
sympathies and ecclesiological hostility. As noted previously, the Finch family was 
firmly Tory and High Anglican. Liturgically, Finch was committed to a catholic and 
sacramental form of worship, and defended the use of vestments during the Eucharist, the 
sign of the cross in baptism, the use of rings in the marriage liturgy, and the use of “Sett 
forms of Prayers,” i.e., the Book of Common Prayer.274 At the same time, he and Baines 
were opposed to the use of religious iconography in worship.275 
Having lived in Italy almost uninterrupted for twenty years, from 1651-1671, Finch 
and Baines were comfortable with Roman Catholics on both a personal and professional 
level. Both men held university appointments in Italy, and as a member of the Accademia 
del Cimento, Finch benefited from the personal patronage of Leopoldo de’Medici. And, 
although the European diplomatic community in Istanbul was a close-knit social world, 
the two men clearly enjoyed socializing (and sparring) with Catholic diplomats and 
clerics.276 In his treatise manuscript, Finch records an anecdote from a dinner party with 
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several members of a Catholic chivalric order, who had sworn a “Vow of perpetuall 
Enmity with [th]e Turkes.”277 In response, Baines “pleasantly asked them” whether or not 
they were familiar with the Lord’s Prayer, then gleefully “wondrd’ they could desire God 
to forgive them their Trespasses, […] when they have made a solemn vow against 
forgiving their Enemy’s, Contrary to the Doctrine of Christ.”278 Furthermore, both Finch 
and Baines largely eschew anti-Catholic rhetoric. Both men thought that sectarian 
prejudices were grounded in economic and jurisdictional anxiety, not in theological 
controversy. As Baines wrote in 1676, “the Great Opposition which is made in England 
against Catholicks, is not made by the greatest part of Men simply upon the Score of 
Religion, but Upon the Score of Civill Rights.”279  
Nevertheless, Finch was unambiguous that the Roman Catholic Church could not be 
tolerated within England. His reservations are not liturgical or polemical, but strictly 
ecclesiological: the Catholic popes, he argued, had over-extended their rightful 
jurisdiction in three crucial ways. The first was temporal. In order to “oblige the 
Consciences of all Men as well as Princes,” the popes had claimed the right to “not onely 
of forgiving Sinnes upon Earth, but of making that w[hi]ch was no Sinne to become a 
Sinne.”280 By doing so, the pope had claimed an authority “beyond that w[hi]ch the Sonne 
of God Himselfe Exercisd’.”281 Ecclesiologically, Finch claimed, this fundamentally 
threatened the sovereignty of the state, and “dissolvd […] [th]e most Solemn & Legall 
obligations th[a]t Ever can happen between Prince & Prince, & Prince & People.”282 
Secondly, according to Finch, the Roman Catholic Church overstepped its legal 
privileges by claiming universal jurisdiction over all Christians after the fall of the 
Roman empire. As the head of the imperial Roman church, he argued, the “Patriarch or 
ArchB[isho]p of Rome” had exercised “as Universall a Dominion in Spiritualls, as the 
Empire Excersisd’ in Temporalls, Rome being the Seat of both Jurisdictions.”283 
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However, this universal jurisdiction was not “derivd’ from St Peter,” but was rather a 
function of “[th]e dignity of Rome w[hi]ch was the Imperiall Seat of So Vast an 
Empire.”284 Following the collapse of the Roman Empire, then, the universal jurisdiction 
of the Roman Catholic Church was likewise devolved to the leaders of the national 
churches.285 
Finch’s final argument is a logical extension of the first two, which delimit the 
temporal and spatial authority of the Roman Catholic Church. Tolerating the 
jurisdictional claims of the popes would fundamentally undermine the sovereignty of the 
government. “For God having made People for Governm[en]t, Every Governm[en]t must 
be within itselfe Supreame as to all Interests & Purposes; Since the Governm[en]t would 
be Lame & Defective if it depended in anything upon any Person out of its Territory or 
Jurisdiction either. […] And This very Consideration is enough to Exclude out of all 
Christian Commonwealths the Popes Supremacy, or indeed His Concerning Himselfe 
with what related to any Thing Acted in ye state of another Prince, under the Pretense of 
being Guardian Generall of Christianity.”286 For Finch, sovereign power in a given 
jurisdiction must be vested in a single authority. In the context of the Roman empire, the 
imperial church had been fully integrated into a single, universal polity; in a post-imperial 
context, however, acceptance of the papal claim to universal jurisdiction amounted to 
sedition.  
In sum, Finch was virtually uninterested in anti-Catholic rhetoric; lived in Catholic 
Italy for most of his adult life; and was personally inclined to a recognizably catholic 
form of worship. His unwillingness to tolerate Catholicism is purely a matter of 
jurisdiction. When we turn to his writing on dissenting Protestant sects, we find that he 
oscillates between relative openness and almost complete hostility. For Finch, the 
determining factor hinged on an ecclesiological question: if a given sect threatened the 
unitary, and unified, authority of the state, then it had no right to liberty of conscience.  
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Finch’s attitudes towards Quakers are consistent with this focus on ecclesiology and 
the authority of the state. He was cautiously sympathetic to Quakers, insofar as he was 
skeptical that they claimed independent ecclesiological authority. His most substantial 
engagement with Quakerism was an epistolary exchange with Anne Conway in 1678. 
Before her death in 1679 – likely sometime between 1677-8 –Anne scandalised her 
family by converting to Quakerism, after a long process of exploration and dialogue with 
prominent Quaker thinkers.287 Finch learned about her conversion on November 4, 1678, 
when he received a letter forwarded from Henry More, and wrote to Anne himself four 
days later.288 His reaction to the news is difficult to parse: the tone of the letter is both 
disapproving and deeply affectionate. Nevertheless, he does not directly condemn her 
decision, and unlike her husband Edward, does not claim to be personally embarrassed.289 
He describes the Quakers as “well-meaning though mistaken,” and respects her 
preferences by addressing her as ‘thee/thou.’290 
This mitigated openness towards Anne’s conversion, and towards the sect at large, 
proceeded from Finch’s admittedly rudimentary understanding of Quaker ecclesiology.291 
It is significant that his letter stresses the importance of the royal supremacy: “In Short 
my Dear Christs Kingdome being a Spirituall and not a Temporall One, For He came not 
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to dethrone Kings, but Personally Obeyd’ Them and payd them their duty’s.”292 Finch 
articulated this perspective more clearly in the notes for his treatise.  Among his 
uncalendared notes is an untitled document, dated June 10/20, 1678, in which he 
discusses Quakerism at some length. Although he does not directly call for their 
toleration, he offers two defenses against their critics. First, he observes, “those Persons 
w[hi]ch are decipherd’ and distinguishd’ by that name [Quakerism], doe & and believe 
many things […] that the most rigid or orthodox or Conformists […] So that [th]e Saing a 
thing to be to the Doctrine of [th]e Quakers or Quakerism does not therefore render it 
evill.”293 Second, he argues that the Quakers pose little threat to the integrity of the state. 
In language that recalls his argument against toleration for Catholics, Finch displays far 
more concern with religious dissenters who assert an independent ecclesiastical authority. 
“For if Ecclesiastickal Persons have any Power of Governm[en]t [tha]t tis not from the 
Civill Power; then [th]e Civill Power has no right to invade it or oppose it […] Now is 
not this setting up direct Rebellion & Worse then Quakerisme, for those deluded People 
pretend no thing as I rememb[e]r (who am little Consonant with their Reasons or 
Doctrine) of Authority Independent of [th]e Governm[en]t.”294 Judging from these earlier 
notes, while not quite prepared to call for their toleration, Finch was reasonably confident 
that Quakers did not claim ecclesiological independence from the state. While 
theologically misguided, they posed no immediate threat to the state’s unitary 
sovereignty.  
When religious dissenters threaten the unified and unitary sovereignty of the state, 
however, Finch is clear that the principle of toleration must be abrogated. He was 
certainly sympathetic to the plight of religious dissenters, noting that “every Man is 
bound up to the Inward Law of what His Conscience or Perswasion enjoyns Him as 
Good; yet the Peace of the Governm[en]t is of more Concern to the rest of Mankind, then 
the Peace of any one Private Mans Conscience.”295 Furthermore, the sovereignty and 
‘Peace of the Governm[en]t’ was not solely a matter of statecraft: it was explicitly 
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ordained by God, and obedience to the state had a sacred dimension. Because God had 
“Left Men in Government (w[hi]ch is of absolute necessity to Civill Society, and could 
no subsist if all Mens Assertions and actings upon them were of equall Validity & 
Authority) to such Declarations and Constitutions, and Publick Sanctions, as to the 
Governm[en]t seem most consonant to Truth; […] No Man without Sinne can Depart in 
any Point He is satisfyd’ of [th]e Truth of.”296 Accordingly, he warns “Dissentors [to] 
further consider, that Almighty God never designed Religion to destroy Government in 
regard that Religion being for the good & advantage of Humane Nature, it supports the 
Preservation of Men, as to their Individualls whose Good it is to be, w[hi]ch cannot be 
done without Government.”297 
Ultimately, Finch arranges Christian denominations along an ecclesiological 
spectrum, from Roman Catholics, to Quakers, to dissenting Protestant sects. Both 
Catholics and Protestant dissenters are beyond toleration, because both claim 
ecclesiastical authority independent of the state. In the case of Roman Catholics, the 
claim to universal papal authority represents an intolerable usurpation of sovereignty at a 
supranational level, whereas dissenters pose a subnational threat by claiming 
independence from the national church. For Finch, Quakers occupy an intermediate 
category. As he himself admits, he was ‘little Consonant with their Reasons and 
Doctrine,’ but was under the impression that Quakers did not stake a claim to ‘Authority 
Independent of [th]e Governm[en]t.’ It is precisely because of that uncertainty that he 
does not unambiguously call for either their toleration or suppression. In each case, 
however, the deciding factor is his degree of certainty as to whether a given denomination 
fails an ecclesiological test.  
3.3 Conclusion  
From one perspective, Finch’s political thought seems deeply paradoxical, if not openly 
inconsistent. He viewed religious toleration as a pragmatic tool of statecraft, but also 
defended it as a ‘Humane Right.’ He argued that Jews and Muslims should be tolerated, 
in the form of monarchical indulgence, but denied religious freedom to the majority of 
                                                          
296 Ibid.  
297 Ibid., 473.  
77 
 
 
 
Christian denominations. He argued passionately for the liberty of conscience, but 
accorded the monarch extraordinary power over religious practice.  
These paradoxes are resolved, however, by slightly refocusing our critical lens. 
Finch’s overwhelming priorities are to precisely define the jurisdiction of the state, and to 
eliminate any possible challenge to the monarch’s sovereignty. While the liberty of 
conscience is a ‘Humane Right,’ that right belongs to individuals, not to communities. 
Hence, any community which challenges the jurisdiction of the state is intolerable. Those 
challenges, according to Finch, can take either of two forms: a supranational challenge to 
the state’s authority, as in the case of the Roman Catholic Church, or a challenge to the 
monarch’s jurisdiction over the form of worship, as in the case of Protestant dissenters. 
At the same time, Finch’s understanding of church history and the history of Islam had 
convinced him that religious oppression was a fatal political error.  
Accordingly, for Finch, liberty and coercion were equally necessary tools of prudent 
government. The ‘Humane’ and inviolable right to liberty of conscience defended 
individual believers from the sort of authoritarian oppression which could provoke them 
to civil unrest: at the same time, restricting that right to individual beliefs ensured that the 
monarch could suppress communities and practices which might challenge his 
sovereignty. As Thomas Baines wrote, “it requires a Great Art to place the Ballast and 
Burthen [the people] carry so proportionably that the whole might Navigate the better; 
And this Ballast or Burthen is no other then the Laws’ They Live Under.”298  
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Conclusion: Orientalism and imperialism in Finch’s thought  
 
I thinke If I flatter not myself that I have somewhat out of [th]e ordinary Road, 
showed the Religion of Mahomet to be calculated out of Prudentiall Principles, 
for growth & Encrease of its profession, & consequently for Grandeur of 
Empire.299                    
            John Finch to Edward Conway, Feb. 4/14, 1674/5 
In 1968, Henry Horwitz published a short bulletin in Notes and Queries, that correctly 
attributed the authorship of Finch’s treatise manuscript for the first time in nearly three 
hundred years. Based on the paleographic and textual evidence, Horwitz concluded that 
the document – which had previously been attributed to Finch’s nephew, Daniel Finch – 
was in fact the treatise which Finch had alluded to, but which had been presumed lost. 
“[I]t is hoped that this brief notice will at last bring Sir John's treatise to the attention of 
those students of seventeenth-century thought who can undertake the task of assessing it,” 
Horwitz concluded.300  
While Finch has gradually been rediscovered by historians of philosophy, 
particularly Sarah Hutton, this thesis is the first effort to seriously engage with his 
political thought. As I have argued, Finch freely synthesized his understanding of 
Ottoman history and politics, his epistemological skepticism, and a staunchly royalist 
ecclesiology into a theory of sovereignty and statecraft which balanced liberty with 
coercion, pragmatism with rights. In this short conclusion, I build upon my reading of 
Finch to offer three arguments. First, I argue that Finch’s political philosophy is both a 
theory of sovereignty – as we have previously discussed – and a theory of empire. 
Although Finch did not explicitly call for foreign colonization, his orientation towards 
empire is betrayed by his involvement with the Council for Plantations (see above, ch. 1), 
and confirmed by the substance of his political writing. As Jennifer Pitts recently 
observed, the “problem of managing difference is often seen as the perennial political 
challenge for empires.”301 Finch himself admitted that his keen interest in Ottoman 
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religious toleration was an effort to understand the ‘Prudentiall Principles’ which enabled 
‘Grandeur of Empire.’  
As a result, Finch offers manuscript evidence that at least some early modern 
imperial thinkers looked to the Ottoman empire as a model. His political philosophy 
combined comparative, Orientalist scholarship with an orientation towards empire: his 
papers are, therefore, a first step in addressing an important gap in the existing scholarly 
literature.  
Finally, I argue that the role played by ecclesiology in Finch’s philosophy offers an 
important conceptual tool for further inquiry. If Finch illustrates a gap in the existing 
scholarship, then he also suggests a tool which can be used to ‘read for imperialism’ in 
early modern Orientalist manuscripts and publications. Finch synthesized his 
understanding of English and Ottoman politics and history by filtering both through a set 
of ecclesiological questions regarding the church, the state, religious minorities, and 
Christian dissenters. Understanding the role that ecclesiological thought played in his 
scholarship offers a forensic tool: if a given Orientalist author frames his account of the 
Ottoman empire using ecclesiological thinking, then it is worthwhile to ask whether he, 
like Finch, is acting out of an orientation to empire.    
4.1 A theorist of empire   
As I have argued, Finch’s political philosophy is ultimately best characterized as a theory 
of sovereignty. For Finch, the unitary authority of the monarch was paramount. Although 
he offered a robust theory of religious toleration, grounded in epistemic skepticism, he 
did not seek to liberate the individual from religious oppression. Instead, liberty and 
coercion – toleration and oppression – are equally important tools of statecraft, and both 
may be wielded by the government in order to uphold its sovereignty.  
This is not a theory of empire in the sense that would be prevalent between the mid-
eighteenth century and the mid-nineteenth century. Finch did not “rank all non-European 
cultures as ‘inferior’ or ‘lower’ from the point of view of the presumed direction of 
European civilisation.”302 Rather, he explicitly sought to learn from and about the 
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Ottoman model for empire, in order to apply it in his own context. He did not attempt to 
“legitimate European imperialism” or colonialism.303 Having sat on the Council for 
Plantations for two years, it is almost certain that Finch was interested in the idea of 
colonial expansion, but his political theory is almost entirely concerned with domestic 
policy. Neither is it quite accurate to say that Finch “imposed” his theory of empire “on 
non-European peoples as their cultural self-understanding.”304  
Rather, this is a theory of empire which bridges the gap between the legal concept of 
imperium, which the English had inherited from Roman law, and the articulations of 
imperialism which would emerge later in the eighteenth century. As discussed previously, 
the concept of imperium was introduced in England by Henry VIII, who sought to 
combine territorial sovereignty, in defiance of the Catholic Church’s supranational 
authority, with the Roman emperor’s imperial powers – the administration of cultic 
objects, control of the civil service, and supremacy over the church.  
Based on his understanding of ecclesiastical history and the early history of Islam, 
Finch was convinced that empires rose and fell according to their ability to unite civil and 
ecclesiastical power. As he observed in his treatise, “the first Splitting of the Roman 
Eagle, was not the dividing it into the Spreaded Powers of the Eastern & Western 
Empires, but that w[hi]ch made it become a true Spread Eagle was this dividing Rule & 
Governm[en]t into Spirituall & Temporall; as to the Exercise of Punishm[en]t & reward 
under different names of Power w[hi]ch before were streams arose from ye same fountain 
[…].”305 His political project, then, was an effort to fuse the two heads of the Roman 
imperial eagle, by reuniting ‘Spirituall & Temporall’ power under the unitary authority of 
the English monarch.  
Crucially, Finch thought that the Ottoman sultans had already accomplished this feat. 
For the Ottoman dynasty, which did not claim descent from Muhammad, the conquest of 
Istanbul in 1453/856 was an important element of imperial rhetoric and ideology. 
Subsequently, the Ottoman imperial ideology was strongly influenced by their self-
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conception and presentation as the successors to the Roman empire. In 1538/944, for 
example, Süleyman I claimed sovereignty over the historical Roman empire, boasting 
that “In Baghdad I am Shah, in Rum Caesar, in Egypt Sultan, who sends his fleets to the 
seas of Europe, the Maghrib and India.”306   
Finch was not only familiar with this claim, but saw the Ottoman empire as an 
improvement upon the Roman – precisely because of the relationship between Islam and 
the Ottoman porte. In 1674/5, he wrote that the  
Civill Law of the Government is so twisted with the Ecclesiasticall; That the very 
basis of the Governm[en]t is built upon the reverence to the Law; […] Mahomet 
like a wise Prince being the Lawgiver, having Learnd’ from the vexations and 
troubles the Emperours mett with from the exorbitant assuming of Jurisdiction of 
the Patriarchs of Constantinople and the Popes in Rome; to fit the Ecclesiasticall 
part of the Governm[en]t to a perfect dependence upon the Secular in the Person 
of the Prince.307        
The Ottomans, in other words, had successfully reunited the ‘two eagles’ of Roman 
imperium. Finch’s comparative analysis of Ottoman history and politics was far from a 
dispassionate scholarly project: it was an overt attempt to understand the religious basis 
of their imperial success, and to translate his analysis into the language of contemporary 
English politics.  
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4.2 Early modern imperialism: Overlooking Orientalism    
In the introduction to this thesis, I gestured towards a gap in the existing literature on the 
history of scholarship, and its relationship to empire. As I argued, there is a vibrant and 
important literature focused on the nineteenth century that investigates the relationship 
between comparative religious scholarship and European imperialism, and between 
Orientalist scholarship and imperialism. Conversely, while early modernists have 
engaged (albeit fitfully) with early modern comparative religious scholars and 
Orientalists, they have not done so in relation to early modern concepts of empire. This 
thesis begins to address that gap. Finch was keenly interested in comparing and 
synthesizing Ottoman and English politics and religious history, precisely in order to 
learn from the Ottoman imperial model, and to apply it to the English context.  
In my view, Finch’s interest in learning from the Ottomans illustrates one of the 
reasons that intellectual historians have overlooked the relationships between early 
modern Orientalists and empire. Edward Said’s critique of orientalism remains an 
indispensable tool for identifying the imperial project underlying much of European 
scholarly engagement with Islam. However, in his wake, it has become natural to think 
that European scholars and writers interested in the Ottoman empire were always already 
motivated by an urge to exoticize, to ‘other,’ and to dominate. As we have seen, Finch’s 
thought and sensibilities are far from postmodern and postcolonial. However, his interest 
in Ottoman politics is not orientalist in the sense that Said articulated – from his vantage 
point in the 1670s, seeking to subvert or to dominate the Ottoman empire would have 
appeared ludicrous.308 Indeed, especially considering his role as a diplomat and a source 
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of intelligence for the English state, his lack of interest in identifying or exploiting any 
political weaknesses in the Ottoman Empire is striking.309 Instead, by analyzing the 
religious basis for the “Greatnesse of this Empire,” he sought to chart a course to empire 
for the English state.310  
In other words, while Finch sought to develop a body of knowledge about religion 
and politics in the Ottoman Empire, he did not do so with the intention of dominating or 
subverting the Ottomans. Rather, as an ambassador to the most successful empire in 
Eurasia, he sought to learn the mechanics of empire from the Ottomans, in order to adapt 
and apply them to the English context. Those mechanics, as we have seen, involved 
placing a heavy burden of government upon English subjects, religious communities, and 
the established church. Put differently, Finch’s imperialism is domestic, not imperial; his 
empire regulated the English themselves, not a colonial ‘other.’ To identify Finch as an 
imperial thinker, we must learn to invert the ideological orientation absorbed from Said: 
in Finch, we find an example of an early modern Orientalist who was interested in 
learning from the Ottomans, and for whom empire was a domestic project.  
As a case study, however, Finch also challenges a second body of historical 
literature. Within the past two decades, early modernists have begun to investigate the 
history of European imperial ideology; almost invariably, however, the literature has 
focused on early modern imperial theorists in the context of the Renaissance and the 
legacy of Roman law and ideology. According to Anthony Pagden, “the theoretical roots 
of the modern European overseas empires reached back into the empires of the Ancient 
World. It was, above all, Rome which provided the ideologues of the colonial systems of 
                                                          
give way to an emergent imperiousness” (Gerald MacLean, Looking East: English Writing and the 
Ottoman Empire before 1800 [Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007], 20–22). 
309 In 1676, for instance, Finch wrote to Henry Bennet, the earl of Arlington (then the Lord Chancellor), 
and rather lamely excused himself for the paucity of intelligence flowing to London. “I must acknowledge 
indeed, That the Topicks your Great Insight into Affayr’s, has suggested for Hints of Information, are 
suitable to a Person, who is Concerned’ in Affayrs of Importance: But I must needs aver, That I have not 
yet bin able to give My selfe that Satisfaction you are pleasd’ to desire of Me: And I doe not find it easy to 
arrive to a True Knowledge of Them; For Things passe here Under Great Taciturnity; And the Management 
of State Affayr’s, passe Under No more Eyes then those of the Gran Vizir; Unlesse it be in Case of Warr, 
And then the advice of the Great Officers is heard. As to the Generall Idea of this Government, you have it 
best in Consul Rycauts History; And it will take up much Time, Either to Examine Thoroughly those 
Animadversions, or to adde any Thing of Certainty to Them” (TNA SP 97/19, f. 226, Finch to Arlington, 
May 31, 1676).   
310 BL Add. MS 23215, f. 76v.  
84 
 
 
 
Spain, Britain, and France with the language and political models they required.”311 
David Armitage has argued that an integrated concept of the British Empire, as 
“Protestant, commercial, maritime and free” was only possible by the 1730s.312 One of 
the most important conceptual challenges to modern imperialism was inherited from 
Machiavelli’s analysis of the Roman empire. “For the classical - above all, Roman - 
historical and moral traditions within which the majority of early-modern British theorists 
had been educated, libertas and imperium remained seemingly incompatible values. […] 
So widespread was knowledge of classical history, among the generally educated as well 
as the more technically learned, that the problem of how to achieve empire while 
sustaining liberty became a defining concern of British imperial ideology from the late 
sixteenth century onwards.”313 English imperial thinkers only resolved the classical 
tension between empire and liberty by equating empire with commerce, and commerce 
with freedom.314 Thomas Dandelet has called attention to the centrality of the European 
Renaissance to the (re)emergence of imperial thought in early modernity. In his view, 
empire was an intellectual, aesthetic, scholarly, political, and ideological project, that 
drew inspiration from the texts and physical artifacts of ancient Rome.315 London, Paris, 
and Madrid were “numerous new Romes all vying for the imperial mantle and all 
claiming to be the rightful successor to ancient Roman glory.”316 In England, Roman law 
and rhetoric held incredible attraction. As we discussed earlier, Henrician imperium was 
adapted from the Constantian model, which ascribed ecclesiological sovereignty to the 
emperor. This legal concept would be even more forcefully re-articulated for his son, 
Edward VI, by a German theologian named Martin Bucer. Writing in 1551, Bucer turned 
to “the Byzantine church of Constantine and Justinian [for an] historical precedent that 
                                                          
311 Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britian, and France, C. 1500-
1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 11; and passim, ch. 1, 'The Legacy of Rome,' 11-28. 
312 David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 195; 9. 
313 Ibid., 125. 
314 Ibid., 141–45. 
315 The redesign of London following the Great Fire of 1666 provides a striking example of the classical 
influence on the aesthetic of European empire. “The devastation unexpectedly gave Charles II the chance to 
fulfill the ambition of his grandfather, who had dreamt of following Augustus, after a fashion, by 
transforming a city of wood into a city of brick” (Thomas James Dandelet, The Renaissance of Empire in 
Early Modern Europe [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014], 276). Subsequently, Christopher 
Wren (1632-1723) rebuilt London in the image of Renaissance Rome.  
316 Ibid., 3. 
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allowed for a dominant monarchical role vis-à-vis the Church”; Bucer’s work in turn 
influenced other, better-known writers, notably John Jewel.317 
These studies, while ground-breaking, have yet to investigate how or whether early 
modern European theorists of empire were impacted by either Islamic thought or the 
Ottoman imperial model.318 As a case study, John Finch’s extant papers challenge this 
silence. He not only analyzed the religious roots of Ottoman imperial success: he adapted 
that model to the English context, and explicitly called upon his correspondents to 
implement it. 
4.3 Reading for imperialism: Ecclesiology and Orientalism   
In short, Finch is evidence that at least some early modern Orientalists were motivated by 
an orientation to empire: and that at least some early modern theorists of empire sought 
information about Muslim models of imperialism. His example also suggests a potential 
hermeneutic for identifying others who did the same.  
Recently, early modern historians have begun to re-evaluate the relationship between 
religion and the Enlightenment; or more precisely, between religious discourse and the 
languages of early modern political thought. As Justin Champion has noted, in 
“partnership with John Pocock” and other historians working in the ‘Cambridge school’ 
of intellectual history, “we now have accounts of the plural languages of political thought 
in the [early modern] period – jurisprudential, common law, historical – but despite this 
pluralism of discourse the historiography has almost entirely ignored the religious 
context.”319 To reconstruct and recover the political discourse of the seventeenth century, 
                                                          
317 Ibid., 253, 255. 
318 See further e.g., David Armitage, ed., Theories of Empire, 1450-1800 (Aldershot: Aldershot, 1998); 
William Roger Louis et al., The Oxford History of the British Empire. The Origins of Empire: British 
Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century Vol. 1 Vol. 1 (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001). To my knowledge, the only counter-example is Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of 
Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010);  see ch. 3, "The Requirement: A Protocol for Conquest," which traces the impact of the Mālikī 
public ritual for announcing jihad on the later Spanish legal protocol for enacting conquest, called the 
Requerimiento. Margaret Meserve, Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008) is an excellent resource for efforts by Renaissance humanists to 
comprehend and respond to the success of the Ottoman empire, but does not address the possibility that 
early European ideologies were influenced by Islamic models or examples. 
319 Justin Champion, “Some Forms of Religious Liberty: Political Thinking, Ecclesiology and Religious 
Freedom in Early Modern England,” in Religious Tolerance in the Atlantic World: Early Modern and 
Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Eliane Glaser, 2014, 50; see also Jonathan Sheehan, “Thomas Hobbes, 
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I would argue that we must add ecclesiological thought to this list. At minimum, we must 
recognize that, for early modern thinkers, ecclesiological discourse was not ‘confined’ to 
theological debates: those theological debates were political in and of themselves.320 
By extension, writing in terms of ecclesiology was one discursive tool through which 
an early modern author could intervene in contemporary political questions, or gain 
purchase on political debate. In Finch’s case, we find an example of an author who 
sought to synthesize Ottoman politics and history with the history of the early church, in 
order to address contemporary political concerns. Crucially, his most pressing concerns 
involve the relationships between an established church, religious dissenters, and the state 
– these are fundamentally ecclesiological questions, or to employ a slight anachronism, 
questions about ‘church and state.’ To extrapolate from Finch’s example, then, when 
trying to determine whether an Orientalist text or author might be relevant to the 
emergence of European imperial thought, a useful hermeneutic might be to ask whether 
or not the text is framed in terms of ecclesiological discourse or questions.321  
4.4 Conclusion   
As William Bulman has argued, while “the intimate relationship between the 
Enlightenment and the modern European empires has become an almost hoary truth, it is 
crucial to understand that in England, at least, this relationship was present from the 
                                                          
DD: Theology, Orthodoxy, and History,” The Journal of Modern History 88, no. 2 (2016): 249–274, which 
provides a useful summary of recent historiography on the 'turn' to religion and theology in early modern 
intellectual history. 
320 This argument follows recent work by Justin Champion, Ethan Shagan, Mark Goldie, and Jacqueline 
Rose; see Champion, “Legislators, Imposters, and the Politic Origins of Religion: English Theories of 
‘Imposture’ from Stubbe to Toland”; Shagan, The Rule of Moderation; Goldie, “Toleration and the Godly 
Prince in Restoration England”; Rose, Godly Kingship in Restoration England, 2013; Champion, “Some 
Forms of Religious Liberty: Political Thinking, Ecclesiology and Religious Freedom in Early Modern 
England.” 
321 Finch was only one of many authors who wrote first-hand accounts of Ottoman politics during the 
Restoration period. As noted in the introduction, the 1660s and 1670s witnessed a flurry of Orientalist 
publications, written by chaplains, diplomats, and merchants. See e.g., John Evelyn, The History of the 
Three Late, Famous Impostors, Viz. Padre Ottomano, Mahomed Bei and Sabatai Sevi, EEBO (London: In 
the Savoy : Printed for Henry Herringman, 1669., 1669); Lancelot Addison, West Barbary, Or, A Short 
Narrative of the Revolutions of the Kingdoms of Fez and Morocco with an Account of the Present Customs, 
Sacred, Civil, and Domestick, EEBO (Oxford: John Wilmot, 1671., 1671); Thomas Smith, Remarks upon 
the Manners, Religion and Government of the Turks, EEBO (London : Printed for Moses Pitt, 1678., 1678); 
Paul Rycaut Sir, The History of the Present State of the Ottoman Empire, EEBO (London : Printed by T.N. 
for Joanna Brome, 1682., 1682); Addison, The First State of Mahumedism. 
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beginning.”322 Although broadly applicable to Finch’s manuscripts, I would suggest that 
this ‘hoary truth’ must be considered afresh in his case. Finch’s methods and 
preoccupations were undoubtedly orientalist; by framing his account of the Ottoman 
empire through an ecclesiological lens, however, he intended to provide his readers with 
a blueprint for an English empire. Drawing on Ottoman politics, the early history of Islam 
and the Christian church, and a skeptical epistemology, he synthesized a theory of 
sovereignty that obliges us to reconsider the relationship between early modern 
Orientalism and the history of European imperial thought.  
Finch never published during his lifetime, and his surviving papers only exist in 
manuscript form. As a result, besides Thomas Baines, the only known audience for his 
views on empire are his sister, Anne Conway, and his brother-in-law, Edward Conway, to 
whom both men wrote at length on statecraft, empire, and Islam. It seems fitting to 
conclude with Baines’ last known letter, written to Conway in 1681. Earlier that year, 
Conway had been appointed the Secretary of State for the Northern Department, a post he 
would only occupy for two years. On May 11/21, Baines wrote to congratulate (and to 
flatter) him: 
And Therefore I will be a Prophett & Say That your Lord[shi]p will not be fixd’ 
in this place, but will rise Higher in His Ma[jes]ty’s Grace & Favour.  
His Ego nee metas rerum nee termpora pono        
Imperium sine fine dedi.323 
Making good use of his classical education, the quotation is from Virgil’s Aeneid, and is 
spoken by Jupiter: “For these, I set no limits in space and time; I give them empire 
without end.” 
                                                          
322 William Bulman, “Enlightenment and Religious Politics in Restoration England: Enlightenment and 
Religious Politics,” History Compass 10 (2012): 61. 
323 LRO Finch MS, Baines to Conway, May 11/21, 1681, cal. HMC Finch vol. II, p. 111, f. 2.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Finch in context  
The following schematic outlines Finch’s family relations, and his personal connections 
to better-known figures – Henry Stubbe, Anne Conway, and Henry More. 
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Appendix B: Table of Contents for John Finch’s treatise  
The following chart outlines the contents of John Finch's treatise manuscript. Composed 
between 1675-81, the manuscript is currently archived in the Record Office for 
Leicestershire, Leicester and Rutland (LRO Finch MS, DG7 lit. 9).   
This table of contents follows Finch’s highly regimented structure, which subdivides the 
manuscript into books, chapters, and sections. I have provided a brief description of the 
contents of each section.  
 
     
Book  Chapter  Section   pp.  Subject/contents 
1 1 1 1-13 Necessity of focusing on natural world.    
2 13-17 Necessity of evaluating textual knowledge  
naturalistically.   
2 1 17-18 Elaborates epistemology - the nature of the  
"perceiving faculty."    
2 18-22 Explanation of the perceiving faculty.   
3 1 23-24 All science is a positore from its effects.    
2 24-25 Knowledge of incorporeal beings is impossible.    
3 26-27 Impossibility of understanding infinite  
extension.   
4 1 27-30 Perfection in knowledge from repeated sense  
impressions.    
2 31-34 Use of language to distinguish between  
"one thing from the other."    
3 35-38 Accuracy of the perceiving faculty varies 
between individuals.  
2 1 1 39-41 Undermines the possibility of any innate ideas.    
2 41-43 Equates the plastic faculty and the perceiving  
faculty.    
3 43-47 Illustrates the correspondence of behavior to  
bodily structure.     
4 47-53 Body designed for the possibility of receiving  
sense impressions.   
2 1 53-55 Both external and internal senses (common sense,  
memory) learned.   
3 1 55-58 Both the senses and motion are learned.     
2 58-61 Motion of the body is learned through use 
 and custom.   
3 62-68 Muscles activated by use and custom.    
4 68-74 Plastic and perceiving faculties identical. 
 Philosophy of race.     
71-2 Audience with Vani Effendi.   
5 74-92 Temporal vs spiritual authority, religious  
politics.  
3 1 1 92-99 Impossibility of perceiving incorporeal  
substances.      
Challenge to Descartes.  
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2 99-105 If incorporeal spirit is unintelligible, are we  
compelled to atheism?    
3 105- 119 Critiques the indivisibility/self-unity of spirit.     
112 Critique of self-penetrability.      
113 Critique of self-activity.   
2 1 120-125 Elaborates on a "sort of beings unknowns to us  
but by their effects."    
2 125-133 More detail on the existence of angels and  
devils .  
4 1 1 133-144 Elaborates on the common sensorium - long  
discussion of colour theory.     
2 144-148 
 
 
2 1 148-153 Man's dominion over animals related to his  
possession of reason.     
2 153-165 Fluids, air and water.    
3 165-176 Corrosive substances. Further critique of  
Descartes.   
3 1 176-184 Epistemology: science analyses human  
understanding of phenomena.      
Interesting ideas re: language as representation.    
2 184-195 No objects enter the sensorium except through  
perception.   
4 1 195-206 More mathematics - number is the differentiation  
of bodies.    
2 206-212 A numerical theory of music.     
3 212-224 Discusses Galileo's laws of natural motion.  
Section on vibrations.     
4 224-234 Galileo as support for theory of the common  
sensorioum.     
220 Account of Persian music.   
5 1 1 234-245 Astronomy, and movement of celestial bodies.     
2 245-266 Stars fixed; draws upon Copernicus.     
Fig. 1 - lunar/planetary motion   
2 1 267- Sceptical about astronomical scientific knowledge  
as well.       
270  Description of light, optics, and emanation  
of light.      
276 Further critique of Descartes.    
2 280-300  Offers 7 propositions re: optics, in relation  
to an elaborate figure.     
3 301-314 More optics - "depends wholly upon Human  
sensation" (314).   
3 1 314-317 Mechanics, "the second and remaining part of  
[…] continual quantity.” 
6 1 1 318-325 Turns to natural philosophy.      
Continues critique of More and of immaterial  
substance (323)    
2 325-335 Attacks indiscerpibility, truth of being.    
2 1 335-345 A discussion of war, religious accommodation,  
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and Ottomans.   
3 1 345-353 Theory of war - must be divinely ordained.   
2 353-357 
 
  
3 357-370 Theory of the state - forms of government.  
7 1 1 371-375 Physick ought to replace natural philosophy.    
2 375-381 Natural philosophy is "composed deductions  
from sensible objects"   
2 1 381-386 The usefulness of poetry to a civilizing mission.    
2 386- Brief discussions of oratory (386-7), and a longer  
one on history.       
"Reflexions upon history," p. 389 onwards.      
395-7 The Church's efforts to suppress early history.     
404 Account of "imposture" and civil wars.     
407 Strong argument against nobility, using the  
Ottomans as a model.      
414 Turkish slavery.      
417 Possibility of rule by atheists; reasonableness  
of religion.     
422-4 Oneness or eternity of truth in God - God and  
sensory organs.     
425 How divinity differs from morality.     
427 Why Christians hold themselves to their parole,  
but Turks do not – pseudo-contract theory.      
433 Why governments can  deprive private persons  
of life and property.     
438 Returns to atheism; discussion of Turkish divorce  
law.      
452 Extends sympathy to "Jews, Turks, and Pagans."    
454  Discussion of religious toleration.     
473 Long section about dissent in religious practice.     
478 Divine rights of the monarch.     
483 Weakness of Christian church enabled emergence  
of Islam.     
485 Critique of priestcraft.     
486 Lawfulness of breaking with the church's errors.      
492 Discusses religious accommodation and Roman 
Catholics.     
500-11 The impossibility of knowledge about God.     
529 Long passage on prayer.      
537 Returns to critique of More's philosophy of 
incorporeal substance.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
541-2 Another critique of incorporeal substance.     
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Appendix C: John Finch to Edward Conway, 1674/5 
 
<76r>             Pera of Constantinople Feb 4/14: 1674/5 
My ever most honoured & Dear Lord324     
Tis so long since I have given the least interruption to yo[u]r Lo[r]d[shi]ps thoughts, and 
enjoyments: that I know not how to breake in upon them, w[hi]ch are entertain’d with so 
many pleasing objects in the advancements of your best friends to the most advantageous 
stations in England; without begging your Lo[r]d[shi]ps pardon: w[hi]ch though the 
wonted goodnesse your Lo[rdshi]p exercisd’ towards me gives me some assurance of; yet 
knowing that the constant conversing with the same though neverso delightfull 
Reppresentations; must at length sate, if not cloy the faculties of the mind; The nature of 
beings gives me security of. For now I can easily imagine that if nothing else in my 
writing is agreeable to your Lo[rdshi]p at least the variety of conversing with so remote a 
Person, and Different objects, will serve for your divertissement.  
My Lord I never understood the humour of those Men, who in their travels thinke 
themselves obligd’ so soon as they are settled in their Lodgings to give an Account of the 
Country: And this is a fault I cannot dispense withall; in our Modern writers of their 
voyages, whose Itinerary’s are stuffd’ up with little more then mine Hosts tale, some 
Language Master’s or Interpreter’s Story’s, and some Figures of Buildings, than could 
not remove out of their way; w[hi]ch Superficiall Survey of Country’s and Regions, 
though it be blamable, even when the vicinity of the Place and affinity of Customs can 
easily afford us better grounded observations, is unpardonable, when the remotenesse of 
the Country, and repugnant manners, give no Leave to perfect those weake and loose 
notices that are given us. And I much fear My Lord that in <76v> the Desscriptions of the 
Empire your Lo[rdshi]p is Conversant with, this defect is too obvious; the Pictures 
making the greatest part of the Discourse; as if the Greatnesse of a Monarchy that is 
grown bigg out of the Conquest of Christians, was founded in those petite differences of 
habit w[hi]ch every mans eyes that does not shutt them cannot but animadvert. I shall 
therefore endeavour to entertain your Lo[rdshi]p whose is a Person of businesse; with 
some Account of this Empire in another Manner; Leaving the perfecting of those things 
which are fitted to the brevity of a letter, to time and observation.  
The Greatnesse of this Empire or rather that of Mahumedanisme, was layd in the infancy 
of it by Mahomet; in opposition to Christianity upon w[hi]ch the Religion being to make 
its advances; Quite Contrary to Christianity w[hi]ch is a Religion of Peace; The 
foundation of Mahumedanisme is warr; It being enjoynd’ as a Precept to make war upon 
                                                          
324 The following is my transcription of John Finch’s 1674/5 report on the Ottoman empire for Edward 
Conway, currently archived in the British Library (BL Add. MS 23215, ff. 76r-82r). This transcription has 
been published in accordance with Canadian copyright law; my thanks to Tom Adam, of the D.B. Weldon 
Library at the University of Western Ontario, for clarifying the relevant regulations.  
I have indicated folio breaks using angled brackets in bold. In all other respects, my transcription practices 
are identical to those outlined in the ‘Abbreviations and Conventions’ section, above. 
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all Persons that acknowledgd’ not the Alcoran or Submitted not to the Government of 
them that believd’ it. This Religion beginning in the time of the Emperour Heraclites had 
its rise in a time when it was fitted to make a suddain growth (and accordingly its 
progresse in 30 years time reducing all Arabia Persia & Agypt was beyond the example 
of all other Religions) For the seat of the Roman Empire being translated to 
Constantinople, and the Eastern and Western Empire divided; The Interests quickly 
became not the Same, they [tha]t wore [th]e Imperiall Crowns being not so; and 
consequently [tha]t overproportiond  power was renderd’ Lesse formidable being 
divided: Besides the result of a desire in [th]e Western Emperour to see the Eastern so 
concernd’ly engagd’ at Home, [tha]t He might not be at Leisure, to exercise superiority 
over the Western Emperour; the Great Divisions in all Religions then under any name of 
Profession; gave <77r> great advantages to the introducing of a new one. For Christian 
Religion w[hi]ch was now flown in the beliefe and Generall Exercise of it as farr as the 
Wings of the Roman Eagle could carry it; insomuch [tha]t it had very weake opposition 
from Paganism; begun to Exercise greater cruelty upon itselfe, then all the Heathen 
Persecutions amounted to. For with Constantine the Emperour came the Promulgation of 
Two points that rent the outward profession of Christianity into incomposable disunion: 
The first was the Heresy of Arrius w[hi]ch though by [tha]t Emperors diligence was 
condemnd’ in the Councill of Nicea; yet that Generall Councill did rather kindle then 
extinguish the flame, Whole Regions & Kingdoms as Spayn & all the Goths professing 
Arrianisme; Nay Italy itselfe under the Popes immediate direction was so overspread with 
it, That at Rimini Arrianisme was establishd’ by a Councill of Bishops; that were more in 
number by above one hundred, then what were present at the Nicene Councill, and that 
with so unanimous Suffrages; That there were not 15 who asserted the Doctrine Contrary 
to Arrius as besides universall History, the Inscription set up by Cardinall Spada attests as 
Catholica so calld’ because that little place Ten miles distant from Rimini, gave a 
receptacle to those few orthodox who dissented. The point that next divided the 
Christians was the Introduction of Images and their worship; by the Emperour Himselfe, 
For Constantine was the First [tha]t ever made the Statue of our Saviour Christ, and 
Helena his mother that of the Virgin Mary: w[hi]ch though to persons who had never 
known any other worship then th[a]t of Images; upon their Entrance into Christianity & 
directing by it  their devotions; might to Proselytes in some measure be indulgd’; yet to 
those who had long bin escaped out of the Heathen darkenesse; it looked like a retrograde 
Passe towards Paganism; and whilst it invited some who were usd’ to adore Images, to 
embrace the new Confession, <77v> it deterrd’ others from admitting those into their 
Society & Communion, who admitted [th]e adoration of Images, the great theme so 
advantageously to Christian Religion declaimd’ against by the Primitive Christians.  
As to the Jewish Religion; Since the destruction of Hierusalem by Titus, and the utter 
desolation of [th]e remaines of it &changing its name into Aelia Hadriana; and 
banishment of the Jewes from thence by the Emperour Adrian. The poor miserable 
remnants of [tha]t People became Citizens of the world; and shelterd’ themselves under 
the name of Christians, for in the primitive times these two Religions agreeing in the 
worship of one God and abhorring of Idols, were not easily distinguished and therefore 
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distinct from Christians, though were able to make a number, were not now able to make 
a lead; & much Lesse when the Christian Religion became the Religion of the Roman 
Empire; and very probably from the great Concourse of Jews to Agypt (for they have 
ever had a mind to the Garlick & Onions of that place) great was the number of Judaizing 
Christians in Alexandria and its Patriarchate, w[hi]ch makes us [th]e lesse wonder [tha]t 
Arrius came from thence with a Doctrine so suitable to Judaism. But to return more 
closely The Dispersion of the Jews renderd’ their religion more considerable for what it 
had been; then was in [th]e opinion of men when the open Professors of it were not 
known.  
The Pagan Religion had bin by the Mosaicall writings and forms, long batterd’, but by 
the Christian Religion wide Breaches were made in it, till the Emperours becomming 
Christians the Walls were quite thrown down; and Pagan worship forbid by Publicke 
Edicts; so [tha]t Paganisme being now  discountenancd’ by the head the Emperour; was 
not able to make any Head for its own defense; In this condition was the face of things as 
to all Religions; and as to Governm[en]t Heraclitus ruled the East in person at 
Constantinople, & Italy by His Exarchats325 at Ravenna. <78r> This Governm[en]t of 
Italy by Hexarchs who resided at Ravenna as the Imperiall Seat; gave advantage to the 
Longobards to plant a Kingdome in Lombardy w[hi]ch was of long duration inspight of 
[th]e Roman Empire; & [th]e occasion of it was the non agreem[en]t of these Hexarchs of 
the Emperour who resided in Constantinople with the Popes; by w[hi]ch means the power 
of Rome was frequently Depressd’. And The two predecessors of Heraclitis, Mauritius & 
Phocas had made Italy by their detestation of and ad hoering to [th]e Pope the Scene of 
Suddain and contrary mutations w[hi]ch render all Governments dangerous. For the First 
at a Councill held at Constantinople declard’ the Patriarch of Constantinople to be the 
Universall Bishop or Oecumenicall Pastor, giving great disquiet to S. Gregory the Great 
then Pope by His Hexarchs, & Longobar[ds] [tha]t Joynd’ with then; and He being 
murdred by Phocus who Succeeded Him, was as well murdred by him in His Edicts, 
Declaring upon appeal of Gregory the Great That the Pope was the Vicar of Christ & 
Oecumenicall Pa[sto]r: By w[hi]ch so immediate and contrary Declarations All the 
Eastern & Western Christians were torn asunder; and full of [th]e highest animosity’s 
towards each other; Heraclitis followd’ [th]e Roman Interest to the great dissatisfaction of 
[th]e Eastern Church; & being now weary with a Long warr against [th]e Persians gives 
Himselfe to ease. And in this Conjuncture as to all Religions of the World; & the Roman 
Empire; did Mahomet beginn to promulgate His Doctrine; w[hi]ch beginning to have 
followers gott an Army to overrun Persia quickly, by the ill Conduct of Heraclitis, For the 
Sarracens who were allways in the pay of the Empire; being ill payd’ & worse usd’ by the 
Emperours officers they in a mutiny Revolted to Mahomet, who had fitted His 
fundamentals to the Present Conjuncture of Affayrs Universally. And therefore sett up a 
Religion That through neither Jew nor Christians could being so admitt of; yet it should 
have Principles Suitable to both; and be fitted for Proselyts w[hi]ch could not possibly be 
                                                          
325 An idiosyncratic variant of “Hexarch,” the title given to the governors of the provinces in Italy and 
Africa recovered by the Byzantine emperor Justinian I.  
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other then reall by the Shibboleth He <78v> gave to buy them. These Points of Religion 
were Principally four [tha]t were fitted to make an Empire great.  
Their first and main Principle is That there is but one God; w[hi]ch in all their Prayers 
(w[hi]ch they say five times a day in Publick) they repeat over and over; And Atheisme 
or Polytheisme is amongst them Death without mercy; The repetition of the Doctrine of 
one God in all their Prayers and Discourses, was that w[hi]ch brought over The Arrians to 
them with ease; who denyd’ the Divinity of our Saviour, and they were very numerous in 
all the Eastern parts at that time; and to Speake the Truth The very Doctrine of [th]e 
Alcoran seems particularly to be Levelld’ against the Doctrine of [th]e Trinity and 
Divinity of our Saviour; Mahomet repeating the Impossibility of God having Sonnes; and 
yet calls our Saviour the Spirit of God, The Miraculous Holy one Borne of a Virgin; and 
in every thing that relates to our Saviour speakes as honorably as Arrius, nay Further 
enjoyns every Musselman to believe so of Him & Punish as a blasphemer anyone that 
speak contumeliously of Him: This Doctrine of one God brought in all the Jews too, 
whom to invite by nearer approaches, They retaind’ Circumcision; And frequent outward 
washings for till they wash their Feet and their Arms they cannot say their Prayers; and 
the Prohibition of Swines flesh.  
Their second Great Principle is the Accounting Wine an Accursed thing; and forbidding 
the Drinking of it as a horrid Sinne. This was a perfect opposition to Christians; who 
celebrate the Sacram[en]t of the Lords Supper with Wine, & cannot if it be to be had 
Celebrate without it, w[hi]ch putt Christians to a Shiboleth of being known by; as well as 
the speaking magnificently of our Saviour was a Shiboleth to the Jews; and was [th]e 
occasion of [th]e mistake in many writers who say that a Jew before He can Turn Turk 
must first Turn Christian. But the Politick use of this Prohibition is of more use then the 
Religious; For your Lp[rdshi]p who is so great a souldyer will <79r> presently conclude 
That an Army w[hi]ch Drinkes nothing but water is not only with much more ease 
provided for then one that drinks Wine & Beer; For water will be had with ease; when 
those other Drinks cannot be gott, for want of w[hi]ch they [tha]t are usd’ to it presently 
Languish. an advantage fitted for conquest. But To this must be added the Constant 
Sobriety [tha]t attends them; w[hi]ch makes them not only in Military affayrs keep exact 
discipline, and slip no occasion; w[hi]ch Drunkenesse in Christian Army’s makes them 
wanting in: But in Civil Government makes the People of so calme & Pacific a Temper; 
That [th]e whole Discourse of the People is Grave, Sedate, and without Heat; their words 
are slow the People being thoughtful; attributing the haste and Heat of Speaking usd’ by 
most Christians to their being at the best not quite Sober. True it is my Lord that the 
Greatest Turkes violate this prohibition & once or twice a week drink Wine (And the 
Court amongst Christians are not the most mortifyd’ men neither). But when the Turks 
drink wine they doe it on purpose to be drunk, for water they will never putt to it And the 
Quantity is always Great. The Gran Signor himselfe would one day in His Hunt entring a 
Christian House needs taste wine w[hi]ch He smelt in the Poor Cottage; But His 
Favourite [tha]t marry’s now His daughter durst not till He had acquainted the G. Visir 
give Him any; And then [th]e Visir orderd’ wine to be given Him [tha]t was allmost 
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vinegar w[hi]ch the G. Signor tasting wonderd at the Gusto of [th]e Christians: The Visir 
feard’ the change of Inclinations in the G. Signor who being a most Mercifull and Sedate 
Prince, He did not thinke it safe to putt unlimited power into humors never yet 
experimentd.  
The Third Great Principle is Liberty of Conscience to all different Religions that 
acknowledge But one God; The Professors of it paying to the Gran Signor onely 15 s 
p[er] Annum. As by the former Praecepts they were fitted for Conquests, so by this they 
were not onely made easy, by making their yoke so  (in that w[hi]ch men are the most 
uneasy in) But by it, they were assurd’ to <79v> keep the Conquests they had made; for 
nothing occasions such desperate Revolts and dangerous attempts as the oppressing [th]e 
Conscience; w[hi]ch being a Trade so universally practisd’ amongst Christians; the Turks 
find it a most beneficiall one to them; For all sides empty their coffers at this Court to 
depresse those Christians that are of a different perswasion from them; And in the time of 
the Christian Emperours The Eastern & Western Churches did never with more 
bitternesse persecute each other; I cannot say Annually what they spend, but the 
Christians are allotted at least 40 th[ousa]nd Crowns per annum to uphold their 
Animositys. And at this very time the Greeke Church by mony has gott a sennenod 
[synod?] to out the Latin Church of the possession of [th]e Holy Sepulchre; unlesse it be 
only from midnight to break of day; w[hi]ch after a little time very likely they may with 
much expense regayn.  
The fourth Great Point that tends to Enlargement of Empire is the Liberty of Every Mans 
having 4 Wives; and as many Concubines as He Can maintain. Tis true indeed My Lord 
The Husband is obliged once a weeke to give due benevolence to his Wives or for want 
of it The woman may goe to the Cadi & be divorced; nor can He without [tha]t 
benevolence use any of His Concubines: But Desire of Women being the most Prevalent 
because the most naturall & necessary Passion God has given Man; Tis very inviting to 
make that a reward of a Beleif w[hi]ch Christians hold inconsistent with their beleif. And 
upon this very Account most of the Renegado’s Turn Turks; especially Fryers & 
Ecclesiasticall Persons; And Sawyer Himselfe our English Apostate made this liberty of 
enjoying women without sinning, the Great Argument of his becoming Turk; and to 
maintain Him when He was so, of cheating His Principalls; This Doctrine of Concubines 
was exactly fitted to the Jewish Practise, and indeed to the Customs of all the Eastern 
Great Persons in all ages; and servd for [th]e propagating Mahumadanism; The 
Concubines being of any Religion for they are Generally Slaves; and their children 
become all Turkes, and the Mothers if not before, yet after then have children are 
seldome <80r> otherwise. But to speake of things as they are of all Religions The Turkish 
provides the least for [tha]t of [th]e women: For though the Men are enjoynd’ to come 
five times a day to say their Publick prayers in the Moscheas; yet the women are never 
permitted to come to doe their devotions there; w[hi]ch I believe to be occasiond upon a 
Treble Account, Each w[hi]ch depend upon one Generall one, w[hi]ch is the strange 
Jealousy of all their women; For they never suffer them to speak to any man but their 
own Husbands or Masters; unlesse Eunuchs [tha]t Guard them, nor to be seen by any 
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man; For if at any time they come in view w[hi]ch is but seldome for they hardly give 
them Leave to goe abroad; They are so muffled up that nothing of their face is to be seen 
more then such a part of their eyes as must not be hid if they would have them see their 
way; nor any part of their Skin save their hands, whose Extremity their sleeves (for they 
never wear gloves) doe not cover & so their nayles and tips of their fingers may be 
perceivd’ to be dyed red for [tha]t they all use. Now My Lord were women enjoynd or 
permitted to come to church; so I call at present their Moscheas; In the first place they 
would come abroad five times a day; Secondly their morning prayers being a little before 
break of day; and their Two last times of prayer, at Sun Sett, & An hour & and a half 
after sun sett, the Womens dayly comming abroad, would at such hours of Convenience 
for appointments enrage the Turkish Jealousy; But in [th]e third place if they should 
come to Publick devotion, since they could not be admitted to prayers unlesse they first 
washed their Armes and Feet, they must expose to dayly & Publicke view of men; what 
they would murder their own Brothers for, if they knew they had seen uncoverd’, & what 
so studiously they reserve only to their own view. But the whole Sexe is Left to their 
home devotions, and conversations one with another; By w[hi]ch inaccessibility, and 
impossibility of applications to them; it comes to passe that the <80v>  Governm[en]t of 
this Empire is wholly Masculine; w[hi]ch it is in no part of Christendome, where though 
the women by law are excluded from the entering into Sessions of Parliam[en]ts and 
offices of state; yet the charming & irresistible beauty of [th]e Soft Sexe above Law; 
gives rules to the very Lawgivers themselves in a great measure; and by their Smiles and 
Graces, meet with more reverence and Awe to their commands Then Superiors 
themselves receive from their frowns. All w[hi]ch despoticall power of the Sexe is 
perfectly abrogated Here, where Women are neither to be seen, not spoken to.  
But My Lord Leaving this Digression concerning [th]e Sexe, w[hi]ch I could not omitt 
the reppresenting the State of, having occasion to speake something of them as to 
Religion: I must needs mention some great advantages Mahumedanisme had in making 
Proselytes out of the Christians, w[hi]ch I omitted when I mentioned their First Great 
Principle so often repeated by them dayly that there is but one God; For my Lord from 
hence they Conclude that nothing else is to receive any Demonstrations of worship; all 
deference of devotion belonging onely to that being w[hi]ch knows whither it be renderd’ 
from the from the Heart or not; & consequently all outward Acts of reverence implying in 
the object to w[hi]ch it is payd a καρδιογνῶσις326 or knowing of the thoughts: Hence they 
indisputably breake all Images; whose worship being as I sayd before introducd’ by 
Constantine, brought irreconcilable differences into the Church and all those Christians 
who were Εἰκονομαχίαori327 or for the breaking of Images w[hi]ch some Emperours & 
Councills were, if their own Consciences could not permitt them to embrace Turcisme; 
yet it made them willing to admitt the yoke; rather then to be forcd’ to an adoration of 
                                                          
326 καρδιογνῶσις is a compound of καρδία, ‘heart,’ and γνῶσις, ‘seeking to know, inquiry, investigation.’ 
Here, Finch uses the term to mean ‘knowledge/knowing of the heart,’ in juxtaposition to “knowing of the 
thoughts.” 
327 Iconoclasts. My thanks to Andrew Rampton for his valuable assistance in transcribing and translating 
both terms.  
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that whey abhord’. And upon the same Ground the Turkes are against Images & Pictures, 
They are against Praying to Saints, that in Hypothesi; supposing the Saints to be, 
omniscient & omnipresent. <81r> For if they know not all mens thoughts, possibly they 
may not know His that Prayes to them; & what return then ought He to expect of what 
did not animadvert His Petition; w[hi]ch makes omnipresence necessary, or else every 
Individuall Mans Prayer was not certain to be heard much lesse granted, if the Saint 
should be chance to be out of the way; or if the Prayer was made by one out of the sphere 
of the Activity or Diocesse of the Saint. And the school distinction th[a]t the Saints See 
all these things in God tamquam in speculo, is but an empty sound: For How can a finite 
thing as a Glasse is, reppresent an infinite object and such is [th]e Divine knowledge; 
And if they will have the Glasse to be God Himselfe and so Infinite, Then The Eye that 
beholds it must be infinite too to Survey It, w[hi]ch to the Saints which have but finite 
organs and must see part by part is impossible. And the Turkes doe so abhorr this 
Doctrine that instead of praying to Mahomet they constantly pray to God, for Him their 
Great Prophett; & begg of God to glorify Him every day more & more; This Doctrine of 
theirs mett with many Christians who readily submitted to it, by becomming Professors, 
or putting themselves under the Protection of those that held a Doctrine so agreeable to 
their own sense. But since than Mahomet first broachd’ His Doctrine Transubstantiation 
(for then though 600 years after Christ it was not not heard of) upon its Principle it more 
vehemently impugnd’ then all Image worship or Paganism; They Pretending that [tha]t 
Severall Statues reppresented so many Gods as Roman Catholicks will have them now to 
doe Saints; But the Roman Church making the Turkes believe that one part of [th]e 
flower out of w[hi]ch they made their bread, is converted into the very essence of God 
Himselfe, the Creation into the Creator; doe more provoke their Anathema’s  then any 
thing they most detest; and invites those Christians that abhor the Doctrine to recurr to 
them for Protection against the Persecution <81v> of those, who condemn those th[a]t 
will not assent to this Doctrine against their own Consciences; to temporall flames in this 
world, and to eternall ones (as farr as their vote goes) in the world to come: And thus the 
Turk gaines still upon Hungary; & is still like to doe so, unlesse persecution for Religion 
be taken off.  
My Lord I have not instanced in any Precepts of Mahometanism w[hi]ch were designd’ to 
bring Pagans to submitt to His Governm[en]t Because No Quarter is allowd’ to any th[a]t 
either deny there is one God, or assert that there is more than One; And Paganism at the 
Time of the Publication of the Alcoran was upon its last Leggs; and as to the number & 
Power of the Profession scarce considerable; as the Suddain conquest of Persia showd’.  
But I thinke If I flatter not myself that I have somewhat out of [th]e ordinary Road, 
showed the Religion of Mahomet to be calculated out of Prudentiall Principles, for 
growth & Encrease of its profession, & consequently for Grandeur of Empire; Now this 
Religion was like to remain unchangd’ from two Principles. First Because tis not Lawfull 
to dispute the points of [th]e Alcoran as to praecepts whether they be lawfull or not; for it 
is enjoynd’ by Mahomet as well as it was by Moses That He shall be cutt off that Speakes 
against the Law. Secondly the Civill Law of the Government is so twisted with the 
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Ecclesiasticall; That the very basis of the Governm[en]t is built upon the reverence to the 
Law; in the very Same manner The Precepts of the Alcoran being Jure Divino to the 
Turkes as the Judiciall Law of Moses was to the Jewes, upon the Common Principles of 
Divine Revelation: And therefore the Gran Signor (who must have obedience from His 
Subjects unlesse He or they renounced the fayth upon this Ground) gives Great 
Reverence to the Mufti who like the Pope the Scriptures Interprets the Alcoran; and if He 
is calld’ before the Mufti as sometimes He is upon some extravagant putting men to 
death; or Enormous Vices, The Gran Signor himselfe in honour to [th]e Law sits not 
down but stands up and <82r> and this Is done in perfect reverence to [th]e Law & not 
[th]e Mufti; in regard He holds not this charge for life like the Pope, but is removeable 
whensoever the Gran Signor pleases: Mahomet like a wise Prince being the Lawgiver, 
having Learnd’ from the vexations and troubles the Emperours mett with from the 
exorbitant assuming of Jurisdiction of the Patriarchs of Constantinople and the Popes in 
Rome; to fit the Ecclesiasticall part of the Governm[en]t to a perfect dependence upon the 
Secular in the Person of the Prince; who allwayes names, & as often as He pleases 
changes the Mufti, and that without the least dispute, that Prerogative being as much Jure 
Divino to [th]e Gran Signor, as any that are annexed to the Person or office of [th]e 
Mufti; both their rights depending upon the Same noble Law as they call the Alcoran.  
My Lord Having I fear tyred your Lo[rdshi]ps patience with the necessity of Greatnesse 
That must result to an Empire founded upon the Principles of Mahomet; and in the 
Conjunction He found & left things; I dare not enter upon a particular Examination at 
present of the Grounds of their Civill and Military Constitutions; But I dare affirm to 
your Lo[rdshi]p they are no Lesse conducible to the Greatnesse of Empire then the 
Religion is; & I believe would be an Enquiry of much Curiosity to your Lo[rdshi]p. 
When I know it a thing desirable; I shall find so much time as to give an account of that, 
suitable to those great fundamentals of Reason w[hi]ch I perceive to move this Great 
Machine; For beleive it My Lord No Governm[en]t can wax Great & Permanent but it 
must be deeply rooted in the Stable Grounds of Reason; and knowing no man a Greater 
Judge of them then your Lo[rdshi]p I would most willingly suggest my thoughts to a 
Person that knows how to correct & pardon their mistakes; I am sure your Lo[rdshi]p will 
make none in esteeming me to be My Lord 
Your Lo[rdshi]ps 
Most faythfull humble servant &  
most entirely affectionate Brother John Finch  
 
Sr Thomas Baines is with unalterable devotion & fidelity yo[u]r Lo[rdshi]ps most reall & 
humble Servant.  
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